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DDoS attacks is a major threat that targets companies and organizations on a 
daily basis, as reported in the 2012 Information Security Breaches Survey, with 
the most common target being Web Services. Additionally, the raise of the 
activism group “Anonymous” and the availability and easiness of DDoS tools in the 
Internet made this dangerous attacks very popular and reachable for the masses. 
According to Arbor Networks a DDoS attack can last anywhere between 2 and 6 
hours. From the companies prospective, the downtime of their web services, as a 
result of such an attack, lead companies into loosing valuable profit and 
customers.  
 
In this dissertation a method for DDoS detection by constructing a fuzzy 
estimator on the mean packet inter arrival times is proposed. The problem is 
divided into two challenges, the first being the actual detection of the DDoS event 
taking place and the second being the identification of the offending IP addresses. 
Strict real time constraints were imposed for the first challenge and more relaxed 
constraints for the identification of addresses. Through empirical evaluation it is 
confirmed that the detection can be completed within improved real time limits 
and that by using fuzzy estimators instead of crisp statistical descriptors the 
shortcomings posed by assumptions on the model distribution of the traffic can be 
avoided. In addition, results under a 3 second detection window were obtained. To 
overcome the problem of IP Spoofing in a DDoS attack a new method was 
introduced using Fuzzy Logic called Fuzzy Hybrid Spoofed Detector(FHSD). This 
method distinguishes the spoofed IPs packets reaching a web server from 
legitimate packets by analyzing the hops, which the packets pass through, the 
User Agent and by utilizing OS passive fingerprinting. In order to proof the 
proposed method’s efficiency a program was developed that uses our technique 
and it was tested by using the BoNeSi DDoS emulator. The results showed that the 
proposed method can successfully identify the spoofed IPs and mitigate a DDoS 
attack in a small amount of time and with low use of resources. 
 
Finally, an on scene digital investigation on computers was conducted, which 
were part of the Botnet that attacked our infrastructures. In order to achieve that, 
three open source triage tools were put to the test. In an attempt to identify 
common issues, strengths and limitations they were evaluated both in terms of 
efficiency and compliance to published forensic principles. The results showed that 
due to the increased complexity and wide variety of system configurations, the 
tested triage tools should be made more adaptable, either dynamically or manually 











Extended Abstract in Greek(Περίληψη) 
 
 
Οι κατανεμημένες επιθέσεις (DDoS) αποτελούν μια από τις σημαντικότερες 
απειλές που καλούνται να αντιμετωπίσουν οι επιχειρήσεις και οι οργανισμοί σήμερα 
σε καθημερινή βάση, όπως αναφέρεται στη Δημοσκόπηση πληροφοριών 
παραβίασης ασφαλείας του 2012 [PwC (2012) “Information Security Breaches 
Technical Report”, April 2012]. Όπως επισημαίνεται στην ίδια έρευνα, το 1/3 των 
μεγάλων επιχειρήσεων, 15% των μικρών επιχειρήσεων και σχεδόν οι μισοί πάροχοι 
υπηρεσιών τηλεφωνίας έχουν δεχθεί τέτοιες επιθέσεις. Σε ένα υψηλό ποσοστό 
78%, η πλειοψηφία των ερωτηθέντων της έρευνας της Νeustar [Neustar (2012) 
DDoS Survey: Q1 2012: When Businesses Go Dark ], απάντησε ότι αντιμετωπίζει 
τουλάχιστον ένα επεισόδιο DDoS επίθεσης την ημέρα, ενώ ποσοστό μόλις 1% 
απάντησε ότι αντιμετωπίζει εκατοντάδες τέτοιες επιθέσεις την ημέρα. Αυτού του 
είδους οι επιθέσεις είναι πολύ ζημιογόνες για τις εταιρίες αφού υπολογίζεται ότι το 
κόστος της ζημιάς για μια εταιρία, ανάλογα με το μέγεθος και το πελατολόγιο της 
είναι από $10000 έως $50000 την ώρα. Σε έρευνα που διεξήχθη από την Tecdata 
για λογαριασμό της Arbor Networks το 2012 [Techdata. (2011) Worldwide 
Infrastructure Security Report, Arbor Networks 2011 Volume VII], οι ιστοσελίδες 
διαφόρων εταιριών και οργανισμών αναφέρονται ως ο πιο συχνός στόχος DDoS 
επιθέσεων. Η έξαρση αυτή των DDoS επιθέσεων σε ιστοσελίδες υποβοηθήθηκε και 
από την άνθιση των κινημάτων χακτιβιστών όπως οι Anonymous.  
 
Τα προβλήματα και οι προκλήσεις των DDoS επιθέσεων σε web υπηρεσίες, τα 
οποία πραγματεύεται η διατριβή αυτή, αφορούν την: 
 
 ανίχνευση, ειδικά όταν η επίθεση συνοδεύεται με IP spoofing 
 καταστολή της επίθεσης 
 εύρεση των bots και του κέντρου ελέγχου και εντολών (C&C Server) 
 
Για το σκοπό της διεξαγωγής της έρευνας της διατριβής αναπτύχτηκαν δύο 
πειραματικές πλατφόρμες: 
 
 Πλατφόρμα παραγωγής δεδομένων DDoS, η οποία περιελάμβανε 
επιτιθέμενους υπολογιστές, ένα διακομιστή διαδικτύου (web server) και 
ένα πρόγραμμα περισυλλογής δικτυακών δεδομένων. 
 Πλατφόρμα αντιμετώπισης περιστατικών, η οποία περιελάμβανε ένα 
εικονικό περιβάλλον που αποτελούνταν από διαφορετικά λειτουργικά 
συστήματα. Αυτό το περιβάλλον χρησιμοποιήθηκε για την αξιολόγηση των 
εργαλείων διαλογής (triage). 
Η παρούσα διατριβή χωρίζεται σε 6 Κεφάλαια. Στα κεφάλαια 3, 4 και 5 
προτάθηκαν και αναπτύχθηκαν αντίστοιχα τεχνικές για την ανίχνευση και 




καταστολή DDoS επιθέσεων, τεχνικές για την ανίχνευση και καταστολή των 
spoofed διευθύνσεων IP, ενώ χρησιμοποιήθηκαν και αξιολογήθηκαν εργαλεία 
διαλογής (triage) για την εγκληματολογική έρευνα υπολογιστών που ανήκουν σε 
botnet με στόχο την εύρεση του κέντρου ελέγχου και εντολών (C&C Server).  
 
Τα κεφάλαια της διατριβής μπορούν να συνοψιστούν ως εξής: 
 
 
Κεφάλαιο 1: Εισαγωγή 
 
Το πόσο εφικτό να ανιχνεύσουμε μια DDoS επίθεση σε σύντομο χρονικό 
διάστημα, είναι η κύρια ερώτηση που μας απασχολεί στη διατριβή αυτή. Πριν 
προχωρήσουμε στους στόχους αυτής της διατριβής πρέπει να προσδιορίσουμε αυτό 
το σύντομο χρονικό διάστημα. Όπως είναι γνωστό μια DDoS επίθεση ανιχνεύεται 
αφού στο τέλος οι χρήστες μιας διαδικτυακής υπηρεσίας, δεν έχουν πλέον 
πρόσβαση σε αυτή. Άρα το σύντομο αυτό χρονικό διάστημα για την ανίχνευση μιας 
DDoS επίθεσης πρέπει να είναι πριν γίνει διακοπή αυτής της διαδικτυακής 
υπηρεσίας, αν και ο ακριβής χρόνος εξαρτάται σε μεγάλο βαθμό και από την 
υποδομή στην οποία βρίσκεται η υπηρεσία. Στη παρούσα διατριβή, αυτός ο χρόνος 
ορίζεται σε λίγα δευτερόλεπτα. Η ανίχνευση μιας DDoS επίθεση είναι η πρώτη 
πτυχή της έρευνας η οποία συνεχίζει με την ανίχνευση των κακόβουλων 
διευθύνσεων IP που λαμβάνουν μέρος στην DDoS επίθεση, στις οποίες μπορεί να 
εμπεριέχονται και ψεύτικες διευθύνσεις IP. Αφού ανιχνεύσουμε τις κακόβουλες 
διευθύνσεις IP και καθορίσουμε την τοποθεσία τους, αν κάποιες από αυτές 
βρίσκονται στο δίκτυο μας προχωράμε σε  επί σκηνής εγκληματολογική ανάλυση 
(triage) σε αυτά, ώστε να μαζέψουμε τα δεδομένα που χρειαζόμαστε και να τα 
αναλύσουμε περαιτέρω για να βρούμε τον ένοχο πίσω από την επίθεση αυτή.  
Οι στόχοι αυτής της διατριβής είναι: 
O1. Να βελτιώσουμε το χρόνο ανίχνευσης μιας επίθεσης DDoS 
O2. Να βελτιώσουμε την ανίχνευση των κακόβουλων διευθύνσεων IP 
O3. Να βελτιώσουμε την ανίχνευση των ψεύτικων IP διευθύνσεων 
O4. Να αναπτύξουμε ένα κατάλληλο σχέδιο αντιμετώπισης για προληπτική 
προστασία των δικτυακών πόρων και την ελαχιστοποίηση των ζημιών 
O5. Να αναπτύξουμε μια μεθοδολογία για την εγκληματολογική ανάλυση των 
πηγών της επίθεσης. 
 O5.1 Να αξιολογήσουμε και να βελτιώσουμε τα εργαλεία διαλογής ανοικτού 
κώδικα (triage tools). 
Κλείνοντας το κεφάλαιο αυτό δίνουμε μια περίληψη με τις καινοτομίες τις οποίες 
προβάλλει η παρούσα διατριβή σε ερευνητικό επίπεδο 
 
 
Κεφάλαιο 2: Υπόβαθρο 
 
Στο κεφάλαιο αυτό παρέχεται το απαραίτητο υπόβαθρο για την κατανόηση των 
βασικών εννοιών και προγραμμάτων που χρησιμοποιούνται σε αυτή τη διατριβή.  




Πιο αναλυτικά ξεκινάμε με μια αναφορά στην Ασαφή Λογική (Fuzzy Logic) και 
προχωράμε στις αρχές της, τις συναρτήσεις μεταφοράς δίνοντας ταυτόχρονα και 
παραδείγματα. Στην συνέχεια εξηγούμε τα μοντέλα Mamdami, Sugeno καθώς και 
τους τρόπους αποσαφιοποίησης με παραδείγματα για κάθε μέθοδο, ώστε να είναι 
πιο κατανοητή η μέθοδος που αναπτύξαμε στο κεφάλαιο 4. 
Στη συνέχεια προχωράμε στην εξήγηση των Fuzzy Estimators, που είναι 
συνέχεια της Ασαφής Λογικής και τα οποία χρησιμοποιήθηκαν για την ανάπτυξη 
μεθοδολογιών και προγραμμάτων που αναφέρονται στο κεφάλαιο 3.  
Κλείνοντας το κεφάλαιο αυτό αναφερόμαστε στα δύο προγράμματα που 
χρησιμοποιήθηκαν για την παραγωγή datasets προς επαλήθευση των 
προτεινόμενων μεθόδων που αναπτύχθηκαν στα κεφάλαια 3 και 4. 
Το πρώτο είναι το Blackenergy που είναι ένα πραγματικό Bot. Με τον builder του, 
μπορεί να παραμετροποιηθεί το bot που παράγεται και να συνδεθεί σε όποιο C&C 
server θέλουμε. O C&C server μπορεί να στηθεί πολύ εύκολα σε ένα υπολογιστή 
που έχει apache, php και mysql. To bot αυτό μπορεί να εκτελέσει επιθέσεις ICMP, 
UDP Flood, SYN Flood και HTTP Flood. Το δεύτερο πρόγραμμα είναι το BoNesi, το 
οποίο είναι ένας εξομοιωτής Botnet. Μπορεί να εκτελέσει επιθέσεις ICMP, UDP Flood 
και TCP(HTTP) Flood με ορισμό διευθύνσεων IP χρησιμοποιώντας τεχνικές spoofing. 
Οι επιθέσεις έγιναν και με τα δύο προγράμματα σε ελεγχόμενο περιβάλλον και 
σαν στόχος χρησιμοποιήθηκε ένας εξυπηρετητής του πανεπιστημίου, ο οποίος 
παρέχει υπηρεσίες εύρεσης δουλείας στην Ελλάδα και στο Εξωτερικό. Ο λόγος της 
επιλογής αυτού του εξυπηρετητή είναι η μεγάλη επισκεψιμότητα του καθώς και το 




Κεφάλαιο 3: Ανίχνευση και καταστολή επιθέσεων διαθεσιμότητας (DDoS) 
web υπηρεσιών με χρήση fuzzy estimators 
Στο κεφάλαιο αυτό προτείνεται μια νέα μέθοδος ανίχνευσης επιθέσεων DDoS που 
επιτυγχάνεται με τη κατασκευή ενός fuzzy estimator με βάση το χρόνο άφιξης των 
πακέτων. Το πρόβλημα χωρίστηκε σε δυο προκλήσεις από τις οποίες η πρώτη 
αφορά την πραγματική ανίχνευση DDoS εκδηλώσεων που διαδραματίζονται, ενώ η 
δεύτερη αφορά την ταυτοποίηση των επιτιθέμενων IP διευθύνσεων.  
Όσον αφορά την πρώτη πρόκληση έχουμε επιβάλλει αυστηρούς περιορισμούς σε 
πραγματικό χρόνο. Αναφορικά με τη δεύτερη, επιβάλαμε πιο χαλαρούς 
περιορισμούς για την ταυτοποίηση των διευθύνσεων.  
Μέσω εμπειρικής εκτίμησης επιβεβαιώσαμε ότι η ανίχνευση μπορεί να εκτελεστεί 
μέσα σε όρια πραγματικού χρόνου και ότι χρησιμοποιώντας fuzzy estimators αντί 
των crisp statistical descriptors μπορούμε να χαλαρώσουμε τις απαιτήσεις και 
υποθέσεις του μοντέλου διαδικτυακής κίνησης (όπως το poisson).  
Επιπλέον κατορθώσαμε να επιτύχουμε αποτελέσματα σε διάστημα κάτω των 3 
sec. 




Κεφάλαιο 4: Ανίχνευση και καταστολή των πλαστογραφημένων (Spoofed) 
IPs κατά την επίθεση προσβασιμότητας web υπηρεσιών 
Η πλαστογράφηση των διευθύνσεων IP (IP Spoofing) χρησιμοποιείται συχνά σε 
επιθέσεις DDoS για να προστατεύσει την ταυτότητα των επιτιθέμενων bots αλλά και 
για να αντιμετωπίζει επιτυχώς ελέγχους και φίλτρα που στηρίζονται σε πρωτόκολλα 
Διαδικτύου (IP).  
Το συγκεκριμένο κεφάλαιο έχει ως στόχο να προτείνει ένα νέο πολυεπίπεδο 
μηχανισμό ανίχνευσης κακόβουλου IP Spoofing, που τον ονομάζουμε Fuzzy Hybrid 
Spoofing Detector (FHSD) και ο οποίος στηρίζεται σε Source MAC Address, μετρητή 
απόστασης των Hop, GeoIP, OS Passive Fingerprinting και στο φυλλομετρητή του 
χρήστη (Web Browser User Agent).  
Ο αλγόριθμος μέτρησης της απόστασης των Hop έχει βελτιστοποιηθεί ώστε να 
περιορίσει την ανάγκη για συνεχείς αιτήσεις traceroute υποβάλλοντας ερωτήσεις 
στο υποδίκτυο του πρωτοκόλλου Διαδικτύου (IP Address Subnet) και πληροφοριών 
GeoIP αντί για ξεχωριστές διευθύνσεις πρωτοκόλλου Διαδικτύου (individual IP 
Addresses).  
Ο μηχανισμός FHSD χρησιμοποιεί εμπειρικούς κανόνες και τη μέθοδο Fuzzy 
Largest of Maximum (LoM) για τον εντοπισμό επιθέσεων σε IPs και μειώνει την 
κακόβουλη κίνηση δεδομένων.  
Το προτεινόμενο σύστημα αναπτύχθηκε και υποβλήθηκε σε δοκιμές με τον 
εξομοιωτή DDoS BoNeSi με ιδιαίτερα ενθαρρυντικά αποτελέσματα τόσο στην 
ανίχνευση των επιθέσεων όσο και στην απόδοση (αναγνώριση επιθέσεων σε μικρό 
χρόνο με μικρή χρήση υπολογιστικών πόρων). Πιο συγκεκριμένα, ο μηχανισμός 
FHSD ανέλυσε 10,000 πακέτα και αναγνώρισε σωστά 99,99% της κακόβουλης 
κίνησης δεδομένων (spoofed traffic) σε λιγότερο από 5 δευτερόλεπτα. Επιπλέον, 




Κεφάλαιο 5: Μελέτη αποτελεσματικότητας open source triage εργαλείων, 
για forensic ανάλυση και εύρεση τεκμηρίων συμμετοχής σε botnet 
Η προσέγγιση στο κεφάλαιο αυτό είναι επικουρική και γίνεται χάριν πληρότητας 
της διαδικασίας ανίχνευσης των επιθέσεων.  
Η άμεση και γρήγορη διαλογή δεδομένων/πειστηρίων κατά την αντιμετώπιση 
ενός περιστατικού ασφάλειας μπορεί να συμβάλει στην επιτυχία μιας 
εγκληματολογικής έρευνας ή να την καταστρέψει. Αυτή τη στιγμή είναι διαθέσιμα 
στο Διαδίκτυο διάφορα εργαλεία διαλογής ψηφιακών πειστηρίων, χωρίς όμως να 
υπάρχει μέχρι στιγμής κάποιο δοκιμασμένο framework για τη δοκιμή και αξιολόγηση 
τους. Δεδομένης της προαναφερθείσας έλλειψης η παρούσα διατριβή θέτει σε 
δοκιμή τρία εργαλεία διαλογής ψηφιακών πειστηρίων ανοιχτού κώδικα, με στόχο να 
προσδιορίσει κοινά προβλήματα, πλεονεκτήματα και μειονεκτήματα των εργαλείων 
αυτών.  
Τα εργαλεία αυτά αξιολογούνται ως προς την αποδοτικότητα και την αξιοπιστία 
τους, καθώς και ως προς κοινά αποδεκτές αρχές εγκληματολογικής διερεύνησης 




(ACPO). Τα αποτελέσματα που προκύπτουν από τις δοκιμές δείχνουν πως εξαιτίας 
της αυξανόμενης πολυπλοκότητας και της μεγάλης ποικιλίας παραμέτρων 
συστήματος, τα εν λόγω εργαλεία θα πρέπει να είναι περισσότερο 
παραμετροποιήσιμα, είτε δυναμικά είτε χειροκίνητα. 
 
Κεφάλαιο 6: Συμπεράσματα – Μελλοντική εργασία 
Η ανίχνευση και καταστολή μιας επίθεση DDoS σε μια ιστοσελίδα με μεγάλη 
επισκεψιμότητα είναι αρκετά δύσκολο εγχείρημα. Σε μια τέτοια επίθεση ο χρόνος 
ανταπόκρισης είναι καθοριστικός παράγοντας για την βιωσιμότητας της.  
Στο κεφάλαιο αυτό, κάνουμε μια ανασκόπηση των στόχων της διατριβής που 
αναφέρθηκαν στην κέφαλαιο 1 καθώς και αν αυτοί έχουν επιτευχθεί. Στην συνέχεια 
προτείνουμε κάποιες βελτιώσεις στις μεθόδους που αναπτύχθηκαν στα κεφάλαια 3 
και 4 καθώς και στα εργαλεία triage που αναφέρονται στο κεφάλαιο 5 που θα 
αποτελέσουν σκοπό μελλοντικής έρευνας.  
Τέλος, το κεφάλαιο μας κλείνει προτείνωντας ένα νέο σύστημα αποφυγής 
κακόβουλων δικτυακών επιθέσεων που μαζί με αισθητήρες σε διάφορες συσκευές 
και με τη χρήση των Fuzzy και Fuzzy estimators, θα μπορούσε να βοηθήσει 
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1.1 Introduction and motivation 
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a relatively simple, yet very 
powerful technique to attack Internet resources (Douligeris and Mitrokotsa, 2004). 
Perhaps the most representative DDoS attack in terms of social, political and 
national impact was the 2007 attack on Estonia which literally “unplugged” the 
Internet from the country (Goth, 2007; Jenik, 2009). Moreover, “Anonymous”, a 
hacktivist group of people around the world, has drawn a lot of attention and 
caused similar problems to worldwide infrastructures, such as bank and 
government websites, by performing DDoS attacks which brought entire "giants" 
to their knees and raised the need to secure seemingly secure infrastructures 
against various types of attacks, with possibly the most important being DDoS. 
DDoS attacks are recognized to be part of cyber warfare tactics but are often 
employed for blackmail and extortion, for financial gain purposes and for activism. 
    In principle a posteriori DDoS detection is trivial, in the sense that it is noticed 
once it is successful. However, a DDoS maintains a manifestation phase where the 
attack develops and reaches a threshold which compromises the availability of a 
legitimate service. Depending on both the attacker and victim resources, the DDoS 
manifestation phase may range from a few seconds to minutes.  
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks affect organisations on a daily basis. As reported 
in the 2012 Information Security Breaches Survey, a third of large businesses, 
15% of small businesses and nearly half of all telecom providers have been 
affected in the last year (Pwc, 2012). Based on the same survey, 78% of 
respondents reported a frequency of at least one DoS incident per day, whereas a 
smaller minority of 1% experienced hundreds of such attacks every day.  The cost 
of a DDoS attack is substantial enough to necessitate the need for detection and 
mitigation, as according to Neustar (2012), more than half of respondents (65%) 
experienced average costs per incident to be up to $10K per hour. A further 35% 
reported cost of over $10K per hour, and a combined 34% experienced loss of 
over $50K per hour. The direct monetary cost is of course not the only impact of 
DDoS, as affected companies could suffer from long term effects, such as loss of 
reputation, loss of revenue, poor customer experience, and eventually even job 
losses. According to a research provided by the Yankee Group, a mid-size 
enterprise with annual revenue of $10 million would lose an additional $20,000 
(.02% of revenue) in the longer term. According to Techdata (2011), the most 
common target is unprotected websites (86%), but DDoS also tends to affect DNS 
(70%), e-mail (31%), IP telephony (17%) and even IRC (9%) services. The most 
common attack vector for web services is HTTP GET (76%), followed by more 
sophisticated tools such as LOIC, HOIC, XOIC, PyLoris, Slowloris, Apache Killer and 
SlowPost (Neustar, 2012). Virvilis and Gritzalis (2013a & 2013b) reflect upon the 
reasons for the continuous rise of successful attacks. Apart from web servers 
which are frequent targets, DDoS attacks can be performed on the whole breadth 
of Internet services such as VoIP (Stachtiari et al., 2012) and UMTS (Kambourakis 
et al., 2011). 
 




DDOS attacks may cause a severe impact on security-critical information 
systems. For example, early research in the field of medical data protection has 
demonstrated that in the case of health information systems, such a type of attack 
may have a vital impact to a human’s well-being, or even cause the loss of human 
lives (Lekkas, 2007; Gritzalis, 1997; Gritzalis, 1998).  
This is also true with modern processing architectures, where the management 
of the computing infrastructure lays away from the local information system 
administrators / owners. The Cloud computing platforms is a typical – and in some 
instances extreme - example of this case (Theoharidou, 2013; Tsalis, 2013; 
Kandias, 2010). 
As such, in order to thwart a DDoS attack, not only the detection of the event 
must be completed during the manifestation phase, but the offending hosts need 
to be identified in order for an incident response control to be effective. In terms of 
incident response effectiveness, the underlying control must be able to block 
network traffic belonging to the DDoS attack vector. 
 
1.2. Scope, goals and objectives 
The main research question of this thesis is expressed as follows: 
 
Is it feasible to detect a DDoS attack within an acceptable timeframe and to the 
fullest extent? 
 
Before we proceed with the goals and objectives of the present thesis, the 
qualifiers in the above research question must be defined. The acceptable 
timeframe is defined as the maximum time for identifying a DDoS attack before 
this attack has an impact to the availability of the web service. As mentioned 
earlier, a (D)DoS can be trivially detected and this is done by the end users of the 
service who experience its disruption. As such, the proposed approach should be 
capable of detecting the attack before the users do. The service disruption 
designates a successful attack and is the final stage. Therefore, the detection 
should concentrate on monitoring the resources and the network based requests 
and search for anomalies in order to quickly issue an alert that will be handled 
automatically or manually (by an administrator). The swift detection requirement 
justifies the real time nature of the proposed approach. Although the exact 
timeframe figure depends upon the underlying infrastructure, in this thesis it is 
considered that real timeliness implies making a decision and responding to the 
incident within a few seconds. 
Detecting whether a DDoS attack is taking place is only one aspect of the 
incident response exercise. Detection on the fullest extent would involve the 
identification of all offending IPs which, in the case of a DDoS attack, will be many 
and sometimes hidden or spoofed. The identification of the offending IPs is 
typically performed with network forensics techniques. Once an IP is identified, the 
physical location of the corresponding host needs to be identified and a first 




responder would then perform a so-called triage on the host in order to capture 
the volatile data and to examine the host. 
Against the above discussion, the scope and main goal of this thesis focuses on 
the detection of hosts participating in a botnet performing a DDoS attack on a web 
server. The corresponding objectives are as follows: 
O1. To improve detection times in the case of a DDoS attack; 
O2. To improve detection rates of offending IPs; 
O3. To improve detection of IP spoofing; 
O4. To develop an appropriate incident response plan for proactively protecting 
the web resources and minimising the damage; 
O5. To develop a methodology for forensic analysis of the identified attack 
sources. 
 O5.1 To evaluate and improve open source triage tools. 
 
1.3 Research methodology 
1.3.1 Literature review 
The review of the current literature will contribute to identifying the current state 
of the art on DDoS attacks against web resources as well as the performance of 
the published detection techniques. As such, the literature covers the following 
main areas: 
 Botnets and their modus operandi in DDoS attacks. It is widely known that 
botnets are deployed in a diverse range of cyberattacks. This thesis focuses 
on the use of botnets to conduct DDoS attacks. In this thesis a typical DDoS 
modus operandi is described and a specific botnet is studied which is used 
as a vehicle to develop and evaluate the proposed solution. 
 Intrusion detection, and more specifically those techniques that are capable 
of detecting DDoS attacks. As intrusion detection techniques fall into two 
categories – namely misuse and anomaly detection – the study focuses on 
the latter and more particularly it investigates efficient tools and algorithms. 
 Incident response. This covers the techniques and procedures for handling 
security incidents upon their discovery. This thesis is interested in the 
procedures a first responder may follow provided that an offending host has 
been identified and the responder has access on it. 
 
1.3.2. Analysis and investigation 
 
The proposed approach is evaluated against primary and secondary data. More 
specifically, custom datasets were generated by deploying botnets and tools 
capable of emulating botnet based behaviour. In order to compare the developed 
method with published results found in literature, publicly available datasets were 
also used. 
The incident response aspects were evaluated by setting up a number of 
different hosts with differing operating systems and configurations and performing 




triage operations by employing open source forensic toolchests. Currently, as there 
are no existing evaluation criteria on triage tools, this thesis will also propose a set 




Two main testbeds were developed for the purpose of conducting the research 
of the thesis: 
 
 DDoS traffic creation testbed. This involved the attacking hosts, a web 
server and the network dump component. 
 Incident response testbed. This involved a virtualization environment 
consisting of different host configurations. This testbed was used for 
evaluating the triage tools. 
 
 
1.4 Novel aspects of the thesis 
Finding the right model to use for DDoS detection was a non trivial task. As the 
main idea was to focus on the packet arrival time, the first thing one calls to mind 
upon considering time, is the Poisson distribution. The problem with that was that 
Paxson and Floyd (1995) explicitly argued that Internet traffic could not be 
expressed by Poisson arrival. After an extensive literature review, it was found 
that HTTP traffic can follow the Poisson arrival, but in order to relax the strict 
boundaries of Poisson Fuzzy Estimators were introduced. Thus, by applying Fuzzy 
Estimators the study has succeeded in overcoming the Poisson limitation and 
developing an application that could successfully detect a DDoS attack and 
Offensive IPs before the victim service suffers from exhaustion of resources due to 
the attack. 
The second problem raised was the IP spoofing. Even though a lot of research 
work has been done on HOP counting, some problems were found to occur both in 
the detection process and in the time needed for this process. Moreover, there was 
some degree of difficulty in the attempt to integrate some methods into systems, 
as this required significant modifications on routers such as firmware alterations. 
So, the research in IP spoofing, focused on the so called userland, which includes 
the server that was also running the Fuzzy Estimator DDoS detection engine. In 
this work Fuzzy Logic along with source MAC address, hop count, GeoIP, OS 
passive fingerprinting and Web Browser User Agent were employed, in order to 
identify spoofing from legitimate IPs and to limit the need for continuous 
traceroute requests for finding unknown IPs HOPs by querying the subnet IP 
Address and GeoIP information instead. Also the technique used for finding HOPs 
using GeoIP and subnet, speed up the process of about 97% as it needs 45 
traceroute requests for a range of 2000 IPs in comparison to HCF which in IPv6 
will be very helpful. 




The novel features of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Development of a methodology for the systematic creation of datasets to 
enable the study of DDoS attacks. Currently the research community 
suffers from lack of datasets. The DARPA datasets are considered the de 
facto standards for testing the intrusion detection methods but are out of 
date as they are more than a decade old and there are no suitable 
alternatives. 
 Real time detection of a DDoS attack on a web server. More specifically, a 
fuzzy estimator suitable of performing an attack detection within a strict 
timeframe was designed and tested. 
 Use of a fuzzy estimator to enumerate offending hosts. Following a 
positive identification of an attack, the fuzzy estimator is used for 
identifying the hosts that participate in a DDoS attack. 
 Fuzzy logic, HOP Counting and GeoIP, helped to detect Spoof IPs on a 
DDoS attack. Also the use of GeoIP helped to improve the time needed to 
find HOPs for an IP and the traceroute requests. 
 Metrics for evaluation of triage forensic toolchests. A crucial point in 
identifying the modus operandi of an attacker includes the actions taken 
by a first responder to collect the relevant information pertaining to the 
attack on the offending host end. As there are no metrics and evaluation 
criteria for such a task currently in the literature, the proposed thesis 
used three widely used triage tools as a vehicle to identify issues and 
challenges and link them with quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
metrics. 
 
1.5 Dissertation Outline 
DDoS attack procedure starts with the attacker trying to create a botnet by 
exploiting vulnerable internet computers and installing a client on them, in order to 
control them. These PCs, which are also called “zombies”, communicate with a  
C&C Server, who issues attack commands to them (when, how and where to 
attack). In this dissertation the main idea was that a DDoS attack is taking place 
on a Job Seeking website. In this DDoS attack event spoofed IPs were also 
included. Three challenges were investigated in this concept with each challenge 
being thoroughly developed in separate chapters which constitute the main body 
of the thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 aim to mitigate DDoS traffic and find the spoofed 
IPSs. Chapter 5 assumes that in the DDoS attack IPs computers from the local 
organization have been located, which are part of the Botnet and it further starts 
an on scene criminal investigation analysis, in order to locate the C&C Server and, 
if this is possible, to locate also the mastermind behind this attack.  
 





Figure 1.1: Dissertation Main Contribution Chapters 
A brief overview of the chapters of this thesis is given below: 
Chapter 2 
This chapter provides a mathematical background on Fuzzy Logic and Fuzzy 
Estimators (Chrysafis and Papadopoulos, 2009), as well as some technical details 
about the Blackenergy Bot and C&C Server along with the BoNesi DDoS emulator, 
which were used to attack Job Seeking Website.  
 
Chapter 3 
By constructing a fuzzy estimator on the mean packet inter arrival times this 
chapter proposes a method for DDoS detection. Through empirical evaluation it is 
confirmed that the detection of DDoS and offensive IPs can be completed within 
improved real time limits and that by using fuzzy estimators instead of crisp 
statistical descriptors the shortcomings posed by assumptions on the model 
distribution of the traffic can be avoided. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter aims to propose a new multi-layer IP spoofing detection 
mechanism, called Fuzzy Hybrid Spoofing Detector (FHSD), which is based on 
Source MAC Address, Hop Count, GeoIP, OS Passive Fingerprinting and Web 
Browser User Agent. The Hop Count algorithm has been optimised to limit the 
need for continuous traceroute requests, by querying the subnet IP Address and 
GeoIP information instead of individual IP Addresses. FHSD uses Fuzzy empirical 
rules and Fuzzy Largest of Maximum (LoM) Operator to identify offensive IPs and 
mitigate offending traffic. The proposed system was developed and tested with 




BoNeSi DDoS emulator with encouraging results in terms of detection and 
performance. Specifically, FHSD analyzed 10,000 packets, and correctly identified 
99.99% of spoofed traffic in less than 5 seconds. It also reduced the need for 
traceroute requests by 97%. 
Chapter 5 
This chapter puts three open source triage tools to the test, in an attempt to 
identify common issues, strengths and limitations. It evaluates them both in terms 
of efficiency and compliance with published forensic principles. 
Chapter 6 
This chapter offers a comprehensive summary of the present work while 
underlining the main research contributions of the thesis. It further provides an 
overview of on-going and future work. 
Appendix A 
Tshark is the command line utility of the famous open-source packet analyzer 
Wireshark. It is very flexible with a lot of commands and can be used with 
scripting languages, such as Bash for Linux and Batch for Windows. It also 
provides the means for an easy and fast analysis of large files. Here you will find 
scripts used for analyzing tcpdump files in both Windows and Linux Platforms. 
Appendix B 
Useful C# Function that was used in the development of Fuzzy estimators 
application. 
Appendix C 




Related work done by other researchers 
 

























2.1 Fuzzy Logic 
2.1.1 Introduction to Fuzzy Logic  
Fuzzy Logic was introduced in the mid 1960s by Lotfi A. Zadeh and constitutes 
the theoretical body for the implementation of a large category of Intelligent 
Systems.  
Fuzzy Logic is the generalization of a classical logic, according to which a 
concept may hold some degree of truth anywhere between 0 and 1. This classical 
logic applies only to concepts that are totally true (namely, they have degree of 
truth 1) or they are completely wrong (that is to say, they have degree of truth 0). 
Such generalizations allow us to use a number of certain terms such as "young", 
"small", "possible", which can belong simultaneously to two or more different sets 
of values.  
The systems based on fuzzy logic use a collection of fuzzy membership functions 
and fuzzy "IF-THEN" rules. This is compared with the high programming 
languages, where the program consists of IF-THEN rules.  
Fuzzy logic is particularly useful in cases where classical-conventional 
technologies are not effective, as, for example, in systems and machines which 
cannot be described accurately by mathematical models, also in systems that show 
specific confusions or conflicting conditions and finally in systems that are 
linguistically monitored.  
In recent years, fuzzy logic techniques have been widely applied in many 
industrial applications, as, for example, in the production of cameras, video-
cameras, washing machines, air conditions, decision-support systems etc. 
     
2.1.2 Basic Principles of Fuzzy Logic  
  
In our everyday life there is a tendency to use concepts and information that 
are by their nature imprecise, such as the phrases "tall man", "beautiful girl", 
"little boy", etc. In contrast with this, as far as mathematics is concerned, the 
description must be accurate because math can recognize only numbers rather 
than labels and concepts. As a matter of fact, this is not possible, as few things are 
simple and accurate; in this sense, some verbal terms used by people daily in their 
natural language, such as "small", "medium" and "large", cannot be outlined or 
distinguished in the same way by a machine that deals with numbers. This gap is 




filled up by Fuzzy Logic, which, through the representation of the verbal terms of 
fuzzy sets, forms the bridge between man and machine.  
  
2.1.3 Basic Terms  
  
In classical set theory, a set consists of a finite or infinite number of elements 
and can be represented by the enumeration of its elements as follows:  
             
 1, 2, 3,...., nA a a a a                              
 
 
The elements of all sets that are under discussion belong to a universe of 
discourse.  
If these data αi( i=1,….,n ) of A are all together a subset of the universe of 
discourse X, then set A can be represented by all the elements x Є X in the typical 
function  












                                              (2.1)  
In classical set theory μΑ(x) has only the values 0 (“false”) and 1 (“true”) which 
are the values of truth. Such sets are also called crisp sets. The non-crisp sets are 
called fuzzy sets. 
  
Fuzzy set is any set that allows its members to have different degrees of 
membership functions in the unit interval [0,1].  
For fuzzy sets a function can also be defined which is called Membership Function. 
  
Membership function (or MF) defines the degree of truth as an extension of 
valuation in which set x belongs to set A, that is to say  
                        ( ) : [0,1]x X                                  (2.2)                                            
 
 




            
 
Figure 2.1: Typical membership function of a classical crisp set (left) 
and a fuzzy set (right)  
 
  
Fuzzy sets are often represented by sets of ordered pairs as follows  
  
     
'
/ /A x x x x for x X                       (2.3) 
Symbols  and  express the set rather than the classic integral or sum. In its 
simplest form, the above equation (2.3) can be also given by 
  
        1 1 2 2/ , / ,....., / ,n nx x x x x x x                    (2.4) 
 
2.1.4 Basic Properties of Fuzzy Sets    
  
Some basic properties of fuzzy sets are:  
 The height of a fuzzy set A, hgt (A), is defined as  




                                (2.5) 
Fuzzy sets whose height is equal to 1, are called normal.  
  
 The core of a fuzzy set is the subset of the membership function domain for 
which the value field takes values equal to a unit.  
 ( ) \ ( ) 1core A x X x              (2.6) 
 The support set of a fuzzy set is a set of the elements of the domain of 
discourse X for which the following applies 




 supp( ) \ ( ) 0A x X x              (2.7) 
Normal fuzzy set is the fuzzy set whose core is not an empty set, that is to say, 
there is at least one such element of it so μΑ(x) =1 
a – cut set Αα a is a classic or crisp set which contains all the elements x Є X that 
have a greater degree of membership from an α value.  
 \ ( ) 0 1aA x X x a where a                 (2.8) 
Convex fuzzy set is the fuzzy set which has stereotyped increasing or decreasing 
membership function.  
 
Figure 2.2: Height, support and core of a fuzzy set  
 
 
2.1.5 Membership Functions  
  
There are different types of Membership functions (or MF) which represent fuzzy 
sets such as triangular mf, trapezoidal mf, generalized bell mf or gbell mf, 
gaussian mf, s mf, Pi mf, z mf, sigmoidal mf or even a specific mathematical value.  
  
 Triangular membership function (triangular mf) depends on three scalar 
parameters {a, b, c}, as given by:  
( ; , , ) max min , ,0
x a c x
triangle x a b c
b a c b
    
   
   
 
 






Figure 2.3: Example of triangular membership function (x; 20, 50, 80) 
  
  
 Trapezoidal membership function (trapezoidal mf) depends on four 
parameters {a, b, c, d}, as given by:  
( ; , , , ) max min ,1, ,0
x a d x
trapezoid x a b c d
b a d c
    
   





Figure 2.4: Example of trapezoidal membership function (x; 20, 40, 60, 80)  
   
  
 Generalized bell membership function (or gbell mf) depends on three 
parameters {a, b, c}, as given by:  
2
1
( ; , , )
1
b









Figure 2.5: Example of generalized bell membership function (x; 20, 4, 50)  




 Gaussian membership function (gaussian mf) depends on two 
parameters {σ, c}, where σ defines the width of the membership function 
(mf), and c represents the center of mf:  
 
2
( ; , )
x c
gaussian x c e 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 2.6: Example of Gaussian membership function (x; 10, 50)  
 
  
 Sigmoidal membership function (sigmoidal mf) depends on two 
parameters {a, c}, as given by:  
( )
1
( ; , )
1 a x c







Figure 2.7: Example of sigmoidal membership function (x; 0.4, 50)  
 
2.1.6 Fuzzy Set Operations  
  
Among fuzzy sets, certain operations are defined, such as the union, the 
intersection, the product, the probor and the complement of a fuzzy set.  
  
 The union of two fuzzy sets A and B in X is defined as follows:  
  




( ) ( ) ( ) max[ ( ), ( )]A B A Bx x x x x x X                        (2.9) 
  
 The intersection of two fuzzy sets A and B in X is defined as follows:  
  
( ) ( ) ( ) min[ ( ), ( )]A B A Bx x x x x x X                      (2.10) 
    
 The product of  two fuzzy sets A and B in X is defined as follows:  
  
( ) ( ) ( )A Bx x x      x X                          (2.11) 
  
 The probor of  two fuzzy sets A and B in X is defined as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )A B A B A Bx x x x x x X                            (2.12) 
  
 The complement of a fuzzy set is defined as follows:  
1 ( )AA x x X                                   (2.13) 
  
If the membership function of a fuzzy set A is less than or equal to the 
membership function of a fuzzy set B, then fuzzy set A is a subset of fuzzy set B:  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )A B x x x X                                  (2.14) 
 
Identical fuzzy sets are two fuzzy sets A and B of which the membership functions 
in all their points are equal:  
  
( ) ( )A B x x x X                                              (2.15) 
  
 
Figure 2.8: Minimum (left) and Product (right) of two fuzzy sets 







Figure 2.9: Maximum (left) of two fuzzy sets and Probabilistic sum (right) of two 
fuzzy sets  
  
 
Figure 2.10: Complement of a fuzzy set  
   
  
  2.1.7 Linguistic Modifiers or Linguistic Hedges 
  
Fuzzy sets express general concepts which are used in our daily natural 
language, as, for example, the verbal terms “short”, “medium” and “tall”. Such 
fuzzy concepts have the potential to produce other fuzzy concepts by using 
linguistic modifiers or linguistic hedges, such as “very”, “very very”, “slightly”, 
“rather”, “plus” and “minus”. For example, using the above linguistic modifiers, the 
verbal term “tall” produces fuzzy concepts such as "very tall", "very very tall", 
"slightly tall" etc.  
If "A" is a verbal term and μΑ(x) the membership function, then according to 
the above, the modified terms which will be produced, will have the equivalent 
membership functions:  
  
 “Very A”:                  2veryA Ax x                                          (2.16) 




 “Very Very A”:        4veryveryA Ax x                (2.17) 
 “Plus A”:                 1.25plusA Ax x              (2.18) 
 “Minus A”:              0.75MinusA Ax x              (2.19)           
 “Slightly A”:          slightlyA Ax x              (2.20)          
 
  
2.1.8 If-then Rules  
  
A single fuzzy if-then rule assumes the form 
“If x is A then y is B” 
where the if-part of the rule «If x is A » is called the antecedent or premise while 
the then-part of the rule «then y is B » is called the consequent or conclusion.  
If-then rules are used to formulate the conditional statements and constitute 
essential structural components of fuzzy inference systems. To understand this 
better, the components of the above rule must be explained:  
 A, B are the fuzzy sets which are combined together,  
 x is the value of an input variable which takes a degree of membership in 
the fuzzy set A (fuzzification process),    
 y is the output of the system extracted from the inference engine in a fuzzy 
form and gives the decision of the rule.  
The fuzzy inference then is defuzzified by the mechanism of defuzzification 
assigning at the end a definite value to the output. 
In case there are more than one input variables x1, x2, x3,…xn the rules take the 
following format:  
If x1 is A1 and x2 is A2  and…. xn is An  then y is B 
Then there may be more than one output variables.  
2.1.9 Fuzzy Logic Controllers  
 






 The Knowledge base in which if-then rules are stored for the process 
control.  
 The fuzzy sets which are used to represent the input and output variables 
with the verbal terms.  




 The fuzzifier which converts the true values of the input into fuzzy sets.  
 The inference engine which edits the outputs of the fuzzifier and tries to 
derive fuzzy set inferences from the knowledge base. 
 The defuzzifier which converts the inferences drawn from the inference 
engine in crisp numbers in order that the control activity can be transmitted 
to the procedure.  
 
 
Figure 2.11: Typical diagram of fuzzy inference flow 
  
The inputs in a fuzzy controller are signals (that is to say crisp variables) and 
therefore the designer of a fuzzy controller must follow the steps listed below:  
 
1. Verbal input distribution: The designer must represent the input and output 
variables with verbal terms.  
2. Rules Formulation:   Fuzzy sets after the distribution of inputs and outputs 
are saved on the computer in the form of membership functions; then the 
distribution of rules follows.  
3. Type Specification of Fuzzy implication: After the formulation of the rules is 
completed, it is necessary to define the type of fuzzy inference. Most commonly 
used fuzzy implication methods are the so-called:  
a) Mamdani, where max-min operator is used. This operator receives the smallest 
degree of membership from the fuzzification values and produces the degree of 




fulfilment for each rule. The degree of fulfilment of the rule indicates the 
importance of the rule inference.  
b) Larsen, where max-product operator is used. This operator determines the 
degree of fulfilment of the rule by increasing the degrees of membership of the 
fuzzification values. 
4. Defuzzification: defuzzification method transforms a firm or crisp value into a 
fuzzy set. It is in short, the opposite of fuzzification. There are different methods 
of defuzzification:  
 Centroid defuzzification or center of area or COA, which calculates the 















          (2.21) 
  
 Middle of Maxima or MOM, which gives the mean of all value having 
maximal membership grades. This technique can be expressed as:  




                  (2.22) 
  
 Smallest of maxima or SOM, which assumes from the maximum output 
values, the one with the smallest membership function. 
  
 Largest of maxima or LOM, which gives from the maximum output values 
the one with the highest membership function. 
  
  
Centroid defuzzification technique or COA is the most commonly used, because it 
is more accurate as it displays fewer errors in relation to the other methods.  
  
2.1.10 Fuzzy Logic Systems  
  
Fuzzy Logic Systems vary depending on the forms in which a rule can be 
transformed. The most common forms are:  




 Mamdani type: is the form mentioned above, namely "If x is A then y is 
B", and was named in honor of Ebrahim Mamdani, who proposed the method. 
The rule outputs of this form are fuzzy sets.  
 Sugeno – Takagi type: is a rule which takes the form "If x is A then y is 
c", where c is a number or a crisp fuzzy set.  
 Takagi - Sugeno - Kang or T-S-K type: is an extension of the previous 
rule, and constitutes one of the main fuzzy rule types; it is used in many 
applications of fuzzy systems development. It takes the form "If x is A then y 
is c0 + c1 x", where c0, c1 Є R. The rule outputs of this form are input 
functions.  
   
2.1.11 Mamdani Fuzzy Model                
  
Mamdani fuzzy model was proposed as the very first attempt to control a 
system – more specifically a combination of a steam engine and a boiler – with a 
set of fuzzy if-then rules.  
In Mamdani’s model the fuzzy inference procedure is initially performed with the 
fuzzification of the input values, rule evaluation, aggregation of rule outputs and 
finally defuzzification (see Figure 2.12 where the steps of this procedure are 
depicted).  
Step 1: The fuzzification procedure determines the degree to which these inputs 
belong to each of the appropriate fuzzy sets. 
Step 2: Next, the fuzzified inputs are applied to the antecedents of the fuzzy 
rules. If a given rule has multiple antecedents, then the operators AND or OR are 
used to obtain a single number that represents the result of the antecedent 
evaluation.  
If the AND operator is used then there are two cases: a) If the AND is used as 
min (Mamdami’s minimum operator) then the smallest number is given that 
reflects the rule evaluation, while b) if it is used as a prod (Larsen product 
operator) then a number is given that represents rule evaluation product. 
Also if OR operator is used then there are two cases: a) If OR is used as max 
(Mamdani’s maximum operator) then the largest number of rule valuation is 
given while b) if it is used as probor (2.12) then a number that represents the 
algebraic sum of rule evaluation is given.  
This number can be applied to the membership function of the consequent. The 
consequent membership function can be presented either with a straight-line cut 
(clipping) or with graduated cut (scaling) at the level of the truth value of the rule 
antecedent. The method where the consequent membership function is 
represented with a clipping cut is called Correlation Minimum, while the method 
which is represented with a scaling cut is called Correlation Product.  
 




Correlation Minimum method is preferred for its simplicity and its fast 
mathematical calculations, although it shows some loss of information because the 
top components of the membership functions are cut-off. On the contrary, 
Correlation Product method preserves the form of the fuzzy set better; this results 
in less loss of information, as the membership function of the rule consequence is 
adjusted to the multiplication of degrees of membership value of the rule 
premises. 
Step 3: At this point, the inferences of all rules are aggregated. Aggregation thus 
is the process during which the membership functions of all rule consequents 
previously clipped or scaled are combined. Specifically, the membership function of 
all inferences is combined into a single fuzzy set. 
Step 4: Defuzzification method is the procedure during which a fuzzy set is 
converted into a crisp value. As mentioned above, there are various defuzzification 














If AND (prod) is used, Rule 1 can also be presented as follows (Figure 2.13):   
 
Figure 2.13: AND product operator in the fuzzy inference  
  
If OR (probor) is used, Rule 2 can also be presented as follows (Figure 2.14):  
  





Figure 2.14: OR probor operator in fuzzy inference  
  
2.1.12  Sugeno Systems type  
 
Apart from the Mamdani systems, discussed above, which are the most widely 
used, another method can also be mentioned known as Sugeno. Sugeno method 
was introduced in 1985 and is similar to Mamdani method in many respects. For 
example, the first 2 steps (that is to say, fuzzifying the inputs and applying the 
fuzzy operator) are exactly the same. The main difference between the two 
systems is that the Sugeno output membership functions are either linear or 
constant.  
  
A typical fuzzy rule in a zero-order Sugeno-type model has the form:  
  
if x is A and y is B then z = k  
  
where A and B are the fuzzy sets of the premise while κ is the numeric value. 
Since the result of the rule is a constant, then step 3 retrogrades into a simple 
multiplication while step 4 aggregates all constants.  
 
 
Figure 2.15: Mamdami Example  





A first-order Sugeno-type model will have rules with the typical form  
if x is A and y is B then z = p*x + q*y + r 
  
where A and B are fuzzy sets of the premise while p, q, r are constants.  
  
The easiest way to visualize first-order Sugeno systems is to think of each rule 
as defining the location of a moving singleton. This singleton can move around in a 
linear fashion in the output space, while its place depends on the input values. 
 
Higher-order Sugeno-type models are possible, but they introduce significant 
complexity with little obvious merit.  
 
2.2 Fuzzy Estimators 
The importance of estimating the parameters of a probability distribution 
function of a random variable X is well known from a statistical point of view. This 
estimation can be done, given a dataset of observations for this random variable. 
The importance of point estimators relies on the fact that without knowing the 
probability function of the random variable, a first estimate of the parameters can 
be achieved using only the observations. The appropriateness of the estimators 
depends on whether they satisfy certain properties. One of the basic requirements 
of this thesis for an estimator is to be an unbiased one. 
Let X be a random variable and let also 1 2, ,.... nx x x  be observations on X. It is 
known that the sample mean X  is an unbiased estimator for the mean μ of X, or in 
other words, the expected value of X  equals to μ. 
It can be said therefore that x  is an unbiased estimator for μ with degree 1. The 
rationale is that any value of x near x  will be an unbiased estimator with lower 
degree. When x tends to x , then the above degree tends to 1. 
Since point estimation is not a very precise approach for μ, the estimation with the 
help of confidence intervals for μ (and other parameters of course) plays a crucial 
role. The motivation is the following: if the confidence intervals for the mean μ are 
the α-cuts of a fuzzy number A.  
An analytical form for these fuzzy estimators is defined and the non-asymptotic 
fuzzy estimators are introduced. That is, instead of considering the confidence 
intervals as α-cuts, fuzzy estimators in a more natural way are constructed using 
all the α-cuts and doing an appropriate transformation, such that, on the one 
hand, compact support is ensured for these estimators and on the other hand, an 
analytical form of them is given. The method adopted was originally developed and 










To begin with, some basic notions and definitions from Statistics are given. Let 
X be a random variable and 1 2, ,..., n    be a random sample. It is known that an 
unbiased estimator of the mean μ is X . This means that the expected 
value ( )E X  . 




This means that:  2 2( )E S Var X    
 
If the sample is large enough and the variance is considered to be known, then 










and Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function,  
 
 (that is S~N(0,1)). 
 
Now, let us give some well-known definitions and notations from the theory of 
fuzzy sets which will be used below. 
 
Let Χ be a crisp set. Then every function from Χ to [0,1] is called a fuzzy set or 
a fuzzy subset of Χ. In this dissertation X will be considered to be the set of real 
numbers R. 
A fuzzy set A is called normal if there exists x R such that A(x) = 1. 
A is convex if for every t [0,1]  and 1 2x ,x R , we have 
    1 2 1 2A 1 x + tx min A(x ),A(x )t   
 
If A is a fuzzy set, then by α-cuts we mean the sets 
 A x R : A(x) α     
It is known that the α-cuts determine the fuzzy set Α. 
For a set Β, B denotes the closure of B. 
A is defined as a fuzzy number if the following conditions hold: 
(i) A is normal, 
1
2 2












































( i i )A  is a convex fuzzy set,  
(iii) A is upper semi-continuous, 
(iv) The support of A  α (0,1]suppA A x : A(x) 0

    is compact. 
 
Now, the operations between fuzzy numbers can be achieved using the following 
“laws”.  
 
If A and B are fuzzy numbers then the following hold: 
 
1)   BABA  )(  
 
2)   AA )(  
 
3) If   
1 1 1







     
   
  
 
4) If   [ , ], [ , ]a aA l r B m n
 
   ],[ 
 nmB   then ( ) [ , ]A B l n r m         
 
2.2.2 Non-Asymptotic Fuzzy Estimators 
 
In this section, a more natural way of constructing fuzzy estimators is presented, 
in order to achieve compact support while not changing the shape of the curve. 
 
Proposition: Let 1 2, ,..., n    be a random sample and let 1 2, ,... nx x x be sample 










the base of which is exactly the 1-β confidence interval for μ and the α-cuts of this 
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2.3 Bots, Botnets and C&C Servers 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
Botnets are also called “Zombie Army”. They are internet computers that are 
infected and compromised by malware, and are controlled remotely by main 
servers called Command and Control Servers (C&C Servers). These C&C Servers 
belong to cybercriminals and there are very difficult to detect. Victims computers 
are often referred to as “bots” or “zombies”, thus the word “Zombie Army”. These 
compromised hosts (bots) are carrying out a cybercriminal’s orders without the 
victim’s knowledge and they are used for DDoS attacks, e-mail spamming, credit 
card stealing and many other "deeds" according to cybercriminals' needs.  
According to the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, during the first six 
months of 2006, there were 4,696,903 active botnet computers. The most 
dangerous botnets of 2012 are given below, based on their impact published by 
Kindsight Security Labs report (Messmer E., 2012). 
First in the list is the Grum botnet, which is responsible for sending 18 billion 
spam messages per day. That corresponds to 18% of the world’s spam. It used 
victim computers to distribute pharmaceutical spam e-mail. The takedown of Grum 
in July 2012 was considered a huge win for the security community. But even after 
its takedown, spam levels quickly resurged to the same level, most likely because 
of other spamming botnets. Lethic, the second botnet in the list, is responsible for 
28% of the world’s spam. Even if it was taken down in early 2010, it is still alive. 
Unlike other spamming botnets, Lethic proxies all traffic between the spammer 
and the destination mailserver. Also it uses simple encryption which is very 
effective in hiding its traffic. Moving down to the list, Festi is also included. Festi is 
one of the world’s largest spam botnets. After the takedown of the Grum spambot, 
Festi surged to infect at least 250,000 unique IP addresses. In 2010, Cutwail was 
responsible for distributed DoS attacks against hundreds of websites, including 
those for the CIA and FBI. Earlier this year, Trustwave (formerly M86 Labs) 
identified large-scale spamming campaigns with malicious HTML attachments, 
attributed to Cutwail. Zeus was the King of the ancient Greek Gods. It is also 
called the “God of DIY botnets”. Zeus enables cybercriminals to steal banking 
information and other sensitive data. It includes a control panel and a builder to 
create executables and infect victim computers. In the newest version of Zeus the 
cybercriminals employer the peer-to-peer protocol to maintain contact with its C&C 
Server. 944 Zeus C&C servers were estimated in October 2012.  
Next in our list is SpyEye. It is designed to steal banking information and login 
credentials. By using these details it steals money from its victims while it offers 
reassurance that the money are still sitting in their bank accounts. In early 
October 2012, 278 SpyEye C&C Servers were estimated. Based on Zeus’ original 
code, Citadel features new capabilities and has been called “Zeus on steroids.” 
Earlier this year, its developers created a social network to serve as technical 
support for Citadel, helping cybercriminals report any bugs, suggest new features 
and connect with other customers. In April 2012, RSA reported a 20% increase of 




Citadel in analyzed Trojan attacks. ZeroAccess, has grown, over the past few 
months, from 1 million to more than 2 million super nodes globally making it the 
fastest-growing botnet. Its primary function is ad-click fraud. Victim computers 
receive instructions from a controller directing them to click on ads on specific 
websites. The website owner gets paid by the advertiser on a per-click basis, 
usually through the intermediary of an ad network. It circumvents safeguards by 
simulating normal human browsing behaviour. In July 2012, Kindsight Security 
Labs reported that victims of the ZeroAccess botnet were downloading a 
bandwidth equivalent of 60 GB per month. TDL-4, also known as TDSS or Alureon, 
is a sophisticated botnet that made major headlines in September 2012. Once 
installed, it removes competing malware, hides itself from detection and installs a 
master boot record. A new variant of TDL-4 has infected approximately 250,000 
unique victims and can generate “disposable” C&C domain names, making it 
especially difficult to track. Last in the list is Flashback that ends the immunity 
myth of Apple Mac’s. Its current focus is to collect passwords from sites like 
Google and Paypal, so that cybercriminals can take over those accounts. In April 
2012, it infected 10% of home networks with Mac computers. 
 
2.3.2 Anatomy of a DDoS attack 
 
This section outlines step by step the procedure that a cyber criminal is 
following to create a botnet and attack servers. There are many bots that a 
cybercriminal can use to infect his targets and create Botnet Servers. In the 
demonstration which follows, emphasis is given on the BlackEnergy Bot in order to 
show the procedure applied for the creation of a Botnet. In addition, this bot was 
used to generate the datasets used in Chapter 3. The procedure may slightly vary 
according to the Bot that is going to be used. If the Bot is using IRC, the procedure 
of setting up the Botnet is different but the main steps represented in Figure 2.17 
are the same.  
The BlackEnergy Bot is an HTTP-based botnet used primarily for DDoS attacks. 
Unlike most common bots, this bot does not communicate with the botnet master 
using IRC but using the widely used World Wide Web. It also has the ability to 
encrypt the communication data with the server (Figure 2.18) 
 
Figure 2.17: DDoS Anatomy 





The Blackenergy Bot uses the files below: 
 builder.exe - builds two versions of the same backdoor (encrypted and 
unencrypted) 
 crypt.exe - is required by builder.exe to encrypt the backdoor 
 cadt.dll - is required by crypt.exe to encrypt the backdoor 
 db.sql - is the Mysql database structure of the C&C system 
 www directory - contains all PHP scripts used by the C&C 
 index.php - is the main C&C web interface page. 
 stat.php – core HTTP communication engine of the botnet. It receives and 
sends responses. 
 flags directory - contains flag icons used to identify bot country 
 config.php - is the C&C interface config file. 
 common.php – common php functions used by the C&C components 
 cmdhelp.html – commands listings and helps syntax in Russian language 
 Net directory - contains GeoIP.php application used to associate bot IP to a 
country 
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Web server 


















































Controller sets via web the 
commands parameters
 
Figure 2.18: HTTP Operation of the BlackEnergy botnet 
 
 





2.3.3 Preparing the bot for the 
Client 
 
In this step the right parameters 
must be passed to the program that 
will produce the bot executable. 




Figure 2.19: Blackenergy Bot Builder 
 
The main value that MUST be set 
is the "Server" attribute. It is set 
with the DNS name of the Command 
and Control Server. In this case it 
was "botserver.com". Also the boxes 
“use crypt traffic” and “polymorph 
exe and antidebug future” are 
checked. All other values for the 
bot's behaviour are changeable from 
the C&C server. You can set specific 
values to these attributes if you 
want the bot to perform specific 
tasks in case of loss of 
communication between the bot and 
the C&C. After the "Build" button is 
clicked, the bot executable is 
produced and the “vulnerable” hosts 




-- Create Database 
CREATE DATABASE botdb; 
USE DATABASE botdb; 
-- Table structure for table 
`opt` 
CREATE TABLE `opt` ( 
  `name` varchar(255) NOT 
NULL, 
  `value` varchar(255) NOT 
NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY  (`name`) 
); 
 
-- Dumping data for table 
`opt` 
INSERT INTO `opt` 















-- Table structure for table 
`stat` 
CREATE TABLE `stat` ( 
  `id` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `addr` varchar(16) NOT 
NULL, 
  `time` int(11) NOT NULL, 
  `build` varchar(255) NOT 
NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY  (`id`) 
); 
 






2.3.4 Setting Up the Command and 
Control Server 
 
At first, a host with Apache, PHP and 
MySQL, already working to copy the php 
files of the C&C server, are needed. Then, a 
database for the application and a table that 
will keep records of our bots using a simple 
sql command (Listing 2.1) must be created: 
In table stat bots register themselves using 
POST methods of php code by calling the file 
stat.php.  Because of the “time” field the 
application is capable to provide statistical 
data of the exact number of active and total 
bots (Figure 2.20). 
 
 
Figure 2.20: Stat table in C&C Server 
Database where the bots that are registered 
to the server can be also found 
 
After the creation of the database, the 
C&C php file is uploaded to the webserver 
running php and apache and config.php file 
is modified with mysql and application's 
credentials. If everything is done correctly 
the Login Screen appears asking for the 
Listing 2.2 
refresh rate - the time 
interval (in minutes) after 
which the bots will 
connect to the server to 
get the commands (the 
more - the less the load 
on the server)  
Syntax of commands: 











as targets can be 
specified ip address or 
domain name, you can 
also specify multiple 
targets through the 
comma; 
 
if you select the type of 
attack syn, udp, or data, 
then after the goal can 
optionally specify the port 
number for the attack (or 
multiple ports through the 
comma) if it is not 
specified, then each 
packet will be sent to a 
random port; if you select 
the type of attack http, 
after the target can 
optionally specify a script, 
which will be sent to GET-
request (eg: flood http 
host.com index.php or 
flood http host.com 
cms/index.php) if this 
option is not specified the 




Flooding of the options: 
Flooding packet sizes in 
bytes and the time 




credentials as contained in config.php. After successful logging in the command 
screen appears as shown in Figure 2.21. 
 
In this web interface menu, the bots settings can be changed and also the bot 




2.3.5 Performing the attacks 
 
Four attacking scenarios were selected to perform against a webserver running 
a job seeking website with 8000 visits per hour. The following three attributes 
were constantly monitored:  
 
 
Figure 2.21: Command and Control Menu modified version  
 
Web server's availability, memory usage and network utilization. A packet 
capture with tcpdump on another machine (IDS) with a mirrored ethernet interface 
was also performed. These two hosts (victim and ids) were connected to the same 
Cisco WS-C2960G-24TC-L switch. The commands used to mirror traffic in global 
configuration were 
a) monitor session 1 source interface Gi0/7 
b) monitor session 1 destination interface Gi0/6 
Below some commands are given that can be used in the command field of C&C 
Server menu in order to activate bots and attack victim.duth.gr. 





a) flood http://www.victim.duth.gr/cms/index.php 
b) flood icmp victim.duth.gr:80 
c) flood data http://www.victim.duth.gr:80 




2.3.5.1 ICMP attack 
 
From the command server an icmp attack was ordered to be performed while 
the botnet consisted of 15 bots with default parameters. In this case, the DoS 
attack was non-surprisingly unsuccessful; ICMP attacks strive to consume the 
available bandwidth on victim's side and with 1 gigabit interface such an attack 
was not effective. 
 
 
Figure 2.22: ICMP attack 
2.3.5.2 UDP flood attack 
 
The second scenario involved a udp flood attack. Once more no availability 




Figure 2.23: UDP flood attack 




2.3.5.3 SYN flood attack 
 
During the SYN flooding attack the performance of the server remained within 
acceptable levels, since the amount of bots was small. 
 
 
Figure 2.24: SYN flood attack 
2.3.5.4 HTTP flood attack 
 
The last, yet successful, attack was HTTP flooding against the server from only 
15 bots, but from a high bandwidth network. The server went off-line since mysql 
reached the upper limit of concurrent open connections.  
 
 











2.4 BoNeSi DDoS emulator 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
BoNeSi is a Tool to simulate Botnet Traffic in a testbed environment on the wire. 
It generates ICMP, UDP and TCP (HTTP) flooding attacks from a defined botnet 
size (different IP addresses). It is also highly configurable with rates, data volume, 
source IP addresses, URLs and other parameters. What makes it different from 
other tools, is that is the first tool to simulate HTTP-GET floods from large-scale 
bot networks and also tries to avoid generating packets with easy identifiable 
patterns (which can be filtered out easily). 
2.4.2 Installation 
 
For the installation procedure a Linux Ubuntu 12.04 system is used. First the 




Then we untar the archive 
#tar –zxvf  bonesi-0.2.0.tar.gz 
And then we cd to the folder and build the source following the commands below. 
# cd bonesi-0.2.0.tar.gz 
#./configure 
#make && make install 
After the compilation finishes the BoNeSi binary is installed in the bin of our 




Since non spoofed IP connections require correct routing setup, this tool can 
only be used in closed testbed setups. It can establish several thousands of HTTP 
connections from different IP addresses defined at iplist.txt making this the 
appropriate tool to simulate advanced bot networks.  
 How does TCP Spoofing work?  
 BoNeSi sniffs for TCP packets on the network interface and responds to all 
packets in order to establish TCP connections. For this feature, it is necessary that 
all traffic from the target webserver is routed back to the host running BoNeSi.  




HTTP-Flooding attacks cannot be simulated in the internet, because answers from 
the webserver must be routed back to the host running BoNeSi.  
 It can be used to test firewall systems, routing hardware, DDoS Mitigation 
Systems or webservers directly. 
According to the authors manual BoNeSi has the following options:   
Usage: bonesi [OPTION...] <dst_ip:port> 
 Options: 
  -i, --ips=FILENAME  filename with ip list   
  -p, --protocol=PROTO  udp (default), icmp or tcp   
  -r, --send_rate=NUM  packets per second, 0 = infinite (default)  
  -s, --payload_size=SIZE size of the paylod, (default: 32)  
  -o, --stats_file=FILENAME  filename for the statistics, (default: 'stats') 
  -c, --max_packets=NUM 
maximum number of packets (requests at tcp/http), 0 = 
infinite (default) 
  --integer 
IPs are integers in host byte order instead of in dotted 
notation 
  -t, --max_bots=NUM  determine max_bots in the 24bit prefix randomly (1-256) 
 -u, --url=URL     the url (default: '/') (only for tcp/http)  
 -l, --url_list=FILENAME  filename with url list (only for tcp/http)  
 -b, --
useragent_list=FILENAME filename with useragent list (only for tcp/http) 
 -d, --device=DEVICE network listening device (only for tcp/http) 
 -m, --mtu=NUM  set MTU, (default 1500)   
 -f, --frag=NUM  set fragmentation mode (0=IP, 1=TCP, default: 0) 
 -v, --verbose print additional debug messages  
 -h, --help   print this message and exit   
 
In the current attack scenario (figure 2.27) the command given below will be 
used: 
#bonesi –i /home/stavros/bonesi/50k-bot –p tcp –u / -d eth2 –b  
/home/stavros/bonesi/browserlist.txt –ttl 64-v 192.168.10.106:80 
The above command is divided and explained in parts below in order to be better 
understood: 
 -I /home/stavros/bonesi/50k-bot: Bonesi will use   
/home/stavros/bonesi/50k-bot file that contains 50000 different IPs for the 
attack 
 –p tcp : tcp protocol will be used for the attack 
 –u / : the mount point of the victim server is /. This can be modified 
according to the victim's server. Most of them are / 




 -d eth2 : the local interface to send the packets to the victim is eth2. Most 
Linux default interface is eth0. In our system many interfaces for tests were 
available so eth2 was used for this attack.  
 –b  /home/stavros/bonesi/browserlist.txt: Bonesi will use   
/home/stavros/bonesi/browselist.txt for useragents string in order to appear 
as a normal client to the webserver 
 –ttl 64 : the initial ttl value is set for the packet to 64, which is the default 
for linux 
 -v 192.168.10.106:80 :  the victim ip address and port 
 
Figure 2.26 represents the CPU and Memory of the victim before the launch of 
the attack. 
 
Figure 2.26: Victim CPU and Memory before attack 
As the attack is launched, the syslog (Figure 2.28) file of the connection and the 
apache log are flooding with connections and the CPU is hitting 100% in a Dual 
Core system in 2 seconds time (Figure 2.29). 
 
Figure 2.27: BoNeSi attacking a website with 50000 different IPs and Browsers 





Figure 2.28: Victim TCP connections 
 
 
Figure 2.29: Victim CPU and Memory during attack 
BoNeSi is a great tool for testing a system against DDoS attacks and spoof IPs. 
These tools were used to collect datasets for our tests done in Chapter 4. 















Real time DDoS detection using 
Fuzzy Estimators 
 











The Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack leverages multiple sources to 
create the denial-of-service condition. By using multiple sources to attack a victim, 
the mastermind behind the attack is not only able to amplify the magnitude of the 
attack, but can better hide his/her actual source IP address. Although the methods 
and motives behind Denial of Service attacks have changed, the fundamental goal 
of attacks, namely to deny legitimate users resources or services, has not. 
Similarly, attackers have always, and will continue to look for methods to avoid 
detection. The evolution in DoS attacks goes hand-in-hand with the use and 
popularity of botnets. Botnets provide the perfect tool to help magnify the impact 
of an attack while distancing the attacker from the victim.  
In this chapter, a method for DDoS detection is proposed by constructing a 
fuzzy estimator on the mean packet inter arrival times. The problem is divided 
into two challenges, the first being the actual detection of the DDoS event taking 
place and the second being the identification of the offending IP addresses. 
 
3.2 Related Work 
Detection of security breach attempts such as network intrusion and DoS 
attacks fall into two main categories, namely pattern (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2004) 
or misuse detection and anomaly detection (Katos, 2007; Patcha and Park, 2007). 
In the former, patterns of behaviour that are classified as malicious and should 
these be observed within the network traffic are explicitly defined, it is assumed 
that the underlying system is under attack. In anomaly detection, it is modeled 
what normal or benign behaviour is and if any outliers emerge outside the 
prescribed envelope, this leads to the conclusion that the system is under attack.  
As such, DDoS detection focuses on distinguishing DDoS traffic bursts with 
benign type of bursts, such as flash crowds for example. In anomaly detection 
terms it is necessary to define what normal behaviour is. On the network level, 
this is typically done by adopting a packet arrival model. However, choosing a 
suitable model is problematic.  
Although the most prevalent theoretic model in networking is Poisson (Park et 
al. 2006) which has been used for many years, the modern Internet has triggered 
a heated discussion and dispute in the literature. In their landmark paper, Paxson 
and Floyd (1995) explicitly argue that Internet traffic cannot be expressed by 
Poisson arrival. Although this position has many followers, their claim is directly 
disputed by Gribble and Brewer (1997). As it seems that no consensus can be 
reached in the selection of the model, the inference drawn from this is that the 
model must depend upon a particular number of parameters (such as type of 
protocol, whether it is human generated or not, temporal scope) and context. In 
Wang’s et al. (2002) words, “it may not be possible to model the total number of 
TCP connections at all times by a simple parametric model”. For example, flash 
crowds are assumed to be Poisson (Li et al., 2008; Ari et al., 2003), whereas HTTP 
traffic as a whole may or may not be display Poissonity; the work by Guerin et al. 
(2003) captures these contradictions. 




However, there seems to be a slight precedence of Poissonity in the literature 
when it comes to modeling human generated HTTP traffic. This is true when the 
temporal window of analysis is relatively small, as in the opposite case the arrivals 
may be non-stationary and will in effect depart from a Poisson model. A small 
window is desirable in DDoS attack detection, and therefore deviations from the 
Poisson model may reveal that the packet arrival times may not be human 
generated (i.e. botnet driven DDoS attacks).  
This work was motivated against the above and it is argued that Poisson can be 
considered for DDoS detection, but only in conjunction with fuzzy estimators. A 
fuzzy estimator will in essence capture all statistical information within a fuzzy 
number (in our particular case alpha-cuts, α-cuts are used). By doing this, any 
error introduced due to the adoption of inappropriate model tends to zero, as the 
fuzzy estimator allows for this uncertainty. The limitation though of using such an 
approach is the dependency upon historical data and therefore lack of such data 
does not allow the application of the approach. However, lack of historical data is 
rather uncommon in real life, production systems.  
Another constraint set out in this chapter is the real time requirement. It is 
argued that any DDoS method in order to be effective and offer added value to the 
infrastructure it protects should be able to perform in real time. The upper limit for 
detection delay is considered to be equal to the capacity of the server which is 
being protected.  In a recent paper (Wang and Yang, 2008) a “real time” detection 
of DDoS was achieved by using fuzzy rules on the Hurst parameter. The time 
needed for the attack to be detected successfully was 13 seconds which can be 
classified as real-time in a certain context. The Hurst parameter was also 
considered (Xia et al., 2010) which in this case was calculated through statistical 
traffic analysis and more particularly through the discrete wavelet transform 
(DWT) and the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). Wei et al. (2006) augment 
fuzzy classification approaches with cross correlation in order to improve the 
accuracy of DDoS detection. Although combination of methods is expected to 
produce improved accuracy results, the real-time requirement is not met due to 
the increased computational costs. 
The nature of the DoS attack has encouraged the employment of many 
statistical tools (Feinstein et al., 2003). Apart from their appropriateness, 
statistical tools are also preferred in DDoS detection because of their high 
responsive potential (Oshima et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2006). In (Sengar et al., 
2008; Tang et al., 2009) the authors make use of the Hellinger Distance which is a 
metric used to measure the distance between two probability distributions. The 
detection method is applied to the domain of VoIP communications. Covariance 
analysis (Jin and Yeung, 2004; Yeung et al., 2007) is also used to statistically 
distinguish normal traffic behavior from flooding.  
Other categories of DDoS detection tools include the use of entropy (Lakhina et 
al., 2005; Feinstein et al., 2003; Yu et al., 2008), neural networks (Arun Raj 
Kumar and Selvakumar, 2011), fractals and wavelets (Li and Lee, 2003; Li, 2004; 
Rincón and Sallent, 2005), as well as Support Vector Machines (Ramamoorthi et 




al., 2011; Shon et al., 2005), Genetic Algorithms (Lee et al., 2011; Li et al., 2008) 
and FCMs (Siraj et al., 2004). 
 
 
3.3 Description of the proposed method 
Consider a web site with varying, benign hits throughout a period of time (say a 
day). Since the number of hits varies, the corresponding time series will be non-
stationary; in our case this will be the tcp packet arrival times related to the HTTP 
traffic. The period needs to be broken into smaller time windows where the length 
of each time window would be small enough so that it is comparable to the real 
time detection DDoS limits and that it fits to a Poisson model. For each period the 
average packet arrival time is calculated. If it were to guarantee that the 
underlying model is Poisson, then during an attack the recorded, historical mean 
could be statistically compared with the current, observed one. In the case of an 
attack, it should be tested whether the new mean is statistically smaller than the 
historical one. However, since an attack – being non-human – may not fit a 
Poisson description, the statistical comparison is not appropriate. Therefore, the 
model assumption must be relaxed. In this chapter, this is achieved by the 
introduction of fuzzy estimators and more specifically with the so called α-cuts 
which are formally described in the next section. The method adopted in this 
research is explained in Chapter 2 section 2.2. 
Upon detection of a DDoS attack, the next step would be to identify the 
offending hosts. This is a challenging phase for two reasons. First, the accuracy of 
the method needs to be high in terms of false negatives and positives. Second, in 
order for the method to be practical and offer added value, it needs to be able to 
detect the hosts in real time, that is within certain tight limits. Since the mean 
would already be expressed by a fuzzy estimator, all the information needed to 
perform a computationally inexpensive comparison is given. Detection is done by 
measuring the mean packet arrival for each IP against the fuzzy estimator. Our 
proposed method falls into the anomaly detection category. From a practical 
perspective, a DDoS attack is associated with bursting traffic (Li et al., 2003). 
 
3.3.1 Non-Asymptotic Fuzzy Estimators: Our approach 
The network parameter which was selected to monitor is the packet arrival 
interval and the fuzzy estimator that this chapter attempts to construct is the 
mean packet arrival time. As stated in Chapter 2, section 2.2.2, the fuzzy 
estimator is capable of capturing all the statistical information generated from the 
historical data in a single (fuzzy) number. In a DDoS event the observed packet 
arrival time will be less than the mean packet arrival time. A description of how to 
derive this fuzzy estimator of the mean is given. 
 
Using Chapter 2 Section 2.2.2 theory we have the following:  
 
 









the base of which is exactly the 1-β confidence interval for μ and the α-cuts of this 
fuzzy number are the closed intervals: 
                                                                    (3.2) 
 
 
which are exactly the   1 1 βa   confidence intervals for μ, where  
 
 





Now let us consider the Poisson density function 
 
   
 
which has distribution function F(t)=1-
qte  
 
In this case q  equals to the number of attacks/seconds. 
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 is a given probability. 
 
Solving this inequality, 
 
 
considering that qtTE )(  first the estimation needs to be done qttTE )( . 
 
Then, the confidence intervals for mean are taken and the fuzzy estimator for tc is 
formed using the formula 2 
 
Let ],[  rl  be the  -cut for the fuzzy number }(TE . 
 
Then, )]([ TE ],[  rl  and hence, the cut  for the fuzzy number ct can be found 
as follows: 
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Upon detecting a DDoS attack, the second challenge needs to be addressed, 
which is identifying the offending IP addresses as follows. In a specific time 
window (typically this is in the region of 1 second in order to satisfy the real time 
requirement) the density of each unique IP address is calculated (that is the 
number of packets generated by unique IP) and from that the mean inter-arrival 
time tc can be recalculated as described above, but for this time on a per-IP basis. 
In a similar manner, if tc is below the mean of the fuzzy estimator, the 
corresponding IP address is classified as part of the DDoS. Naturally, this approach 




3.4 Empirical evaluation 
3.4.1 Datasets 
 
The publicly available LLS_DDOS_1.0 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation 
datasets were used and also our own datasets were generated. The primary data 
were generated by attacking a popular job seeking site residing on the university 
campus (Figure 3.1). The site has around 8000 visits per day and is considered to 
be the most commercially successful graduate job seeking site on a national scale. 
The fact that the site is hosted on a university campus network was particularly 
suitable as DDoS activity could be emulated without causing any network 
bottlenecks and the effectiveness of the proposed method was able to be assessed 
and more particularly its real time aspects.  
The data were collected by mirroring the server’s Ethernet port and by 
capturing the inbound traffic on ports 80 and 443. This was considered to be the 
most appropriate approach as all other traffic was blocked at the firewall level. 
 
Figure 3.1:  Job seeking site statistics 





Two attacks in different days and conditions were executed, generating two 
datasets. The first day the server was attacked during a low visit period, whereas 
the second day the server was attacked during a high peak visit period. For our 
experiment hping and the BlackEnergy Bot, which is an HTTP-based botnet used 
primarily for DDoS attacks, were used. This Bot was explained in details in Chapter 
2, Section 2.3. The bot was setup in a fully controlled environment. The total 
number of bots utilized was 6, communicating with the C&C Server (Figure 3.2). 
For more information on the attack refer to Shaeles and Psaroudakis (2011).  
 
Figure 3.2: The testbed 
 
3.4.2 Empirical results 
 
tc and α-cuts were calculated according to the approach described in Section 
3.2.1. tc for normal traffic was calculated during the busiest hours of the server. 
Then this attribute was converted to a fuzzy estimator and consequently the 
values were used to identify the IPs involved in the DDoS in the imported dataset 
as follows. Firstly, the α-cut boundaries were calculated in line with Figure 3.3 
presented below. The peak of the curves denotes the expected mean value of tc. 
This value essentially splits the graph into two areas. Values of tc residing on the 
left side of    are considered to be DDoS attacks. Values of tc residing on the right 
side of  have a degree of possibility to be a DDoS attack. More analytically the α-
cuts were empirically obtained as follows. Normal traffic data were split into files 
with 500, 1000, 5000, 10000, 20000, 30000, 40000, 50000, 100000, 150000 and 
200000 network packets – with each packet denoting a network event – and tc 
graphs were produced for each of the files; the split allows us to consider the 
differences of the traffic as a finer granularity of the  can be achieved. 
The Figures below present graphs that show in our sample 4 seconds of normal 
traffic corresponding to approximately 1000 packets (Figure 3.3) and 12 seconds 
normal traffic on a lesser busy period, corresponding to the same number of 
packets (Figure 3.4). It should be noted that the orders of  are comparable, as 
they are shown in a different scale of the x-axis. 




                     Figure 3.3: 4 seconds of normal traffic tc α-cuts 
                   Figure 3.4: 12 seconds normal traffic tc α-cuts 
 
In contrast, the 4-second DDoS traffic contains more than 100000 packets in 
the csv file and the 12 seconds of DDoS traffic is in the area of 610000 packets in 
the file. The graphs or DDoS traffic are shown in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. 
 
 
                      Figure 3.5: 4 seconds DDoS traffic tc α-cuts 
 





Figure 3.6: 12 seconds DDoS traffic tc α-cuts 
 
From visually inspecting the above graphs it can be established that for up to a 
period of 2 seconds, the curve forms for DDoS and normal traffic are not 
particularly distinguishable; however, in the case of a DDoS, smaller values are 
considerably obtained. If the sample size is increased, then the results shown in 
Figure 3.3 are obtained, which it is expected as all our traffic is closer to . Similar 
results were obtained with the DARPA dataset. The dataset (LLS_DDOS_1.0-
inside.dump) was slipt into chunks of 5000, 10000, 20000-100000, 150000 and 
200000 packets which corresponded to approximately 2 minutes to 1.5 hour 
periods. The import time for each chunk ranged from less than half a second to 23 
sec. It was established that 5000 packets for this dataset were sufficient to 
perform successful detection. The detection time was 2 sec. 
3.4.3 Performance, accuracy and limitations 
 
The execution of the implemented algorithm for our datasets took around 1 
minute to import 610000 packets and 40 seconds to analyze them and return 
potential IPs that participate in the DDoS attack (Shaeles and Psaroudakis, 2011). 
The system used was Intel Core Quad Q9950 with 8GB of RAM. Both in terms of 
performance and accuracy, the proposed approach provided significant results as it 
could identify successfully 3/5, 5/5 or 5/6 IPs (depending on the dataset chunk) 
involved in the DDoS in 1.5 to 5.9 seconds respectively. The corresponding packet 
count ranges from 5000 to 20000.  
 




Figure 3.7: Results from 4 seconds (100 000 packets) 
 
Following the test results, it is evident that successful DDoS detection is possible 
after collecting about 5000 network events but best results occur after 20000 
packets. With 20000 packets the computation was completed in 1.8 seconds. With 
respect to training, the detection requires a minimum of 5000 packets or 2 
seconds worth of traffic. During a DDoS flood, 2 seconds of traffic may correspond 
to up to 100000 packets. This means that 20000 packets will be captured in 
400ms. As such, the total time for detection is expected to be in the region of 2.4 
seconds.  
With respect to the DARPA dataset, the proposed method detected successfully 
the 2 attacking IPs and 4 spoofed IPs as false positives. According to the dataset 
description there were three attacking IPs, but the third one did not have any 
traffic to the victim server in the scenario that was investigated and therefore it 
was non-surprisingly not detected. Another point was that with the DARPA dataset 
the attacks were on various ports apart from port 80. Since the proposed method 
depends only on the arrival time, the attack was detected. As other ports (such as 
telnet and ftp) definitely do not follow a Poisson model, our results confirm the 
independence from the Poissonity requirement. It should also be noted that the 
historical data of the DARPA dataset were limited. 4 seconds worth of packets were 
used for the training which was sufficient to yield fairly accurate results. According 
to the DARPA dataset specifications, there were three offending IPs in total. Our 
method detected successfully the two IPs, but after inspecting the dataset it was 
observed that the third IP communicated only with the attack host rather than the 
victim server. As such, the effective success rate was 100%. 
Table 3.1 presents a summary of the datasets and some quantitative attributes. 
There is a strong linear relation between the number of packets and analysis time. 
The total response time is proportional to the total number of unique IPs. Figures 
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Figure 3.8: Processing overheads for botnet dataset (time vs. number of packets) 
 





Figure 3.9: Total DDoS response time for syn flood attack using hping dataset 
(time vs. number of packets) 
 
Comparing this method with other published research, it must be noted that all 
papers consulted on real time DDoS detection display their time performance 
abilities, but most of them do not explicitly state the data import delays. Naturally, 
data import delays are expected to be independent of the actual detection 
algorithm performance, but this chapter argues that when proposing a practical 
real time solution, the total time (or computational complexity) needs to be 
included, as the data import and preparation needs may be different for each 
detection algorithm. For instance, our implementation requires that the data are 
sorted by IP numbers. Although an efficient sorting algorithm is used, the 
overheads due to the sorting complexity are present and cannot be avoided. As 
such, the total response times presented above include also data import delays. 
For example, Gavrilis and Dermatas (2005) who develop an efficient and effective 
neural network classifier, claim DDoS detection within a 6 second window, but 
there is no information on the total time. If it is assumed that this 6 second 
window is the best case scenario, then our proposed approach is about 2.5 times 
fold more efficient. Such significant difference is anticipated as our approach uses 
only one feature (arrival time). 
In general the proposed method is prone to false positives for spoofed IPs or 
NAT arrangements. This is expected because of the limited granularity of attributes 
that the proposed method has. Real time detection methods are preferred to be 
susceptible to false positives which can later be corrected by other means (ex. 
packet inspection), rather than the opposite. As there is no silver bullet for DDoS 
detection, in production environments integrated threat management systems are 
needed including a component which focuses on the real timeliness of DDoS 
detection. IP spoofing would therefore need to be addressed by augmenting or 
integrating the proposed methods with other ones (see for example MIT’s spoofer 
project, Beverly & Bauer, 2005) as well as network and firewall configurations (for 




example, block the 10.0.x.x and 192.168.x.x spoofed packets, or implement 
packet inspection).  
Finally, in the case of flash crowds, it is expected that the method will detect 
this as DDoS but will not be able to classify any IP as an offending one. Flash 




The method proposed in this chapter is capable of detecting a DDoS and 
identifying the malicious IPs before the victim service suffers from exhaustion of 
resources due to the attack. The empirical evaluation showed that the proposed 
method can have an over 80% success rate (which corresponds to 20% Type-II 
errors). 
The method can run on a mid-range PC and can provide near-real time DDoS 
detection. However, its full potential would be appreciated if run on a higher end 
PC or by employing the parallel architecture of graphics cards. The current 
algorithm developed, can be easily transformed and implemented in NVidia’s CUDA 
framework and also a non-preemptive OS kernel is considered for future 
development. The non-preemptive kernel is required in order to improve the 
import and analysis times. 
Although the proposed method uses the arrival time as the main metric for 
discriminating benign from DDoS traffic, it is expected that additional features will 
substantially improve the accuracy and possibly the speed of the proposed 
method, as it will require a smaller amount of data. In general, as this method is 
very accurate in detecting the DDoS attack and fairly accurate for identifying the 
offending IP addresses within strict time limits that allow the system to respond in 
real time, the identification challenge can be further refined by the application of 
other methods. The proposed method depends upon the time parameter (and 
more specifically on packet inter-arrival times) so a finer granularity by introducing 
other aspects (ex. packet parameters, protocols and so forth) is expected to 
improve the identification accuracy. Also, as it is mentioned, in our limitations it 
was observed that this method did not distinguish spoofed traffic from normal or 
attack traffic. Chapter 4 below will attempt to address this issue. 
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4.1 Introduction  
A common defence mechanism against DDoS attacks is to block the offending 
source IPs. However, attacks have evolved to employ IP spoofing, mainly as a way 
to defeat such mechanisms (Yaar et al., 2003). Also, as Thing et al. (2007) reveal, 
bots often utilise random spoofing, subnet spoofing or fixed spoofing in DDoS 
attacks in order to hide their identity and make mitigating DDoS attack harder. 
Although ingress and egress filtering can help significantly towards minimizing the 
problem, the potential for IP spoofing still exists (Ehrenkranz and Li, 2009). 
According to the MIT Spoofer Project, which provides an aggregate view of ingress, 
egress filtering and IP spoofing on the Internet, 23% of Autonomous Systems, and 
16.8% of IP Addresses are spoof able; this means that an estimated 560 million 
out of 3.32 billion IP Addresses can still be spoofed (MIT, 2013).  
As such, the aim of this chapter is to propose an IP spoofing detection model for 
web-based DDoS attacks. The proposed work is an extension of Chapter 3, where 
a DDoS detection mechanism was proposed based on fuzzy estimators on the 
mean time between network events. The inability to identify spoofed IPs and 
remove false positives generated by spoofed traffic was a limitation of the method 
proposed in the previous Chapter and the purpose of the present Chapter. 
 
4.2 Related Work  
A considerable amount of literature has been published on identifying spoofed 
IPs in DDoS attacks. These methods can be divided into two categories: Router 
Based and Host based (Ehrenkranz and Li, 2009). The main difference between 
these is that the former needs routers software modification, whereas the latter 
can run on an end host as a program. 
Pi and StackPi (Yaar et al., 2003, 2006) is a Router Based approach, which 
introduces a new packet marking mechanism where a fingerprint is embedded in 
each packet to identify the path it takes through the Internet. Following a similar 
approach, Ali et al. (2007) have tried to detect spoofed IPs at the source network 
based on their arrival rate threshold and at a victim network by marking spoof 
packets based on the IP source arrival rate using their respective TTL value. Using 
cryptographic techniques to encrypt hop count and router to maintain the Hop 
count to IP address tables, KrishnaKumar et al. (2010) have also tried to defend 
against spoof IPs in a DDoS attack. In addition, a novel defence mechanism was 
proposed by Wei et al. (2008); this new mechanism makes use of the edge routers 
that connect end hosts to the Internet to store and detect whether the outgoing 
SYN, ACK or incoming SYN/ACK segment is valid. This is accomplished by 
maintaining a mapping table of the outgoing SYN segments and incoming SYN/ACK 
segments and by establishing the destination and source IP address database. All 
these ideas are really interesting and promising but they are difficult to implement 
in real life, as they require modifications of networking infrastructure on a global 
scale. 
Host Based approaches have also attracted significant interest by research 
communities. Wang et al. (2007) were the first to propose a novel Hop Count-




based Filter (HCF) in the end system that builds an accurate IP-to-Hop Count 
(IP2HC) mapping table. The initial IP2HC was created using traceroute and GeoIP 
from actual hop-count distributions. Based on the IP2HC table, they compared the 
arriving TTL values to identify spoofed IPs. For example, if the arriving TTL was 60, 
the assumption would be that the initial TTL was 64, and the source IP was 4 hops 
away. A selection of concurrent traffic from different networks, but with exactly the 
same arriving TTL, would indicate a higher probability of spoofed traffic. Similarly, 
if the traceroute results reveal different hop count, this would also suggest spoofed 
traffic. They included a secure mechanism to update the IP2HC mapping table, and 
eventually protect it against poisoning attacks as well as take into account changes 
in dynamic network conditions. Although HCF was a significant first step, it had 
some limitations. First, it used strict TTL values, without margins for error, which 
made it prone to false positives and false negatives (Zhang et al., 2007). Also it 
did not check the OS of the source IP to validate the assumed initial TTL value. 
Continuing the example above, where the assumed initial TTL was 64 (the default 
initial TTL for Linux), it would be beneficial if the O/S of the packet was determined 
to validate the result. Furthermore, the method is memory and network intensive, 
which lowers performance as well as its resistance to a DDoS attack. DHCF (Wang 
et al., 2009) is an improved version of HCF, as it adopts a distributed model and 
has the advantage of overcoming the problems of exhausting network bandwidth 
and host resources at a single location. However, it would be worth investigating if 
alternative approaches with less memory and network intensive designs could 
potentially alleviate the problem. A probabilistic model was proposed by Swain and 
Sahoo (2009), who managed to reduce the computation and memory 
requirements of HCF, but they still have the low detection problems of the initial 
method. 
Wu and Chen (2006) moved beyond the IP layer to improve detection of IP 
spoofing by adopting a multi-layer approach. They used HCF to block the majority 
of spoofed traffic and then a SYN Proxy Firewall on transmission layer to filter TCP 
Half-Open connections. The last step was to limit application layer DDoS traffic 
that uses legitimate HTTP requests. The three-layer inspection manages to 
improve detection, but the chapter does not specify how legitimate HTTP requests 
are distinguished from malicious ones. Also, the inherent limitations of HCF were 
not addressed. Zhang et al. (2007) have also adopted a multi-layer approach, by 
using an improved version of HCF, SYN cookies and a SYN proxy. The new method 
is called Hop Count Proxy (HCP) and it overcomes HCF’s problem of strict TTL 
values by applying a wider TTL threshold. Also, a SYN proxy and SYN cookies are 
used to filter out malicious TCP Half Open connections. HCP regularly updates the 
IP2HC mapping table, when not under attack. In the drawbacks of HCP it can be 
added that it has some issues with machines behind NAT boxes leading in faulty 
results. Moreover O/S information is not used to validate the arriving TTL, which 
increases the risk for false negatives. Finally, the method is limited to the network 
and transport layers only, and not the application layer; hence it is more suitable 
as a SYN attack DDoS mitigation method. 




Apart from adopting multi-layer approaches, Covarrubias et al. (2007) have 
tried to improve detection by using fuzzy logic along with HCF to setup a flexible 
threshold of decision. Their method will modify the routing table every time there 
is a change in Hop Count (HC) tables. However, the problems associated with HCF 
are still present. 
To overcome the problems of router implementation the proposed method 
focuses on end host systems. It also adopts a multi-layer approach, by focusing on 
the link-layer, network, transport, and application layers, which have shown 
improved detection results. The novel contribution of this work is that it explores 
the extent to which additional metrics, such as Source MAC Address, OS 
information, GeoIP, or Web Browser Header information (User Agent) can help 
improve detection of IP spoofing. Finally, the proposed research also attempts to 
optimise performance, to allow the detection system to operate in DDoS attack 
conditions. 
 
4.3 Fuzzy Hybrid Spoof Detector Conceptual Model 
The proposed Fuzzy Hybrid Spoof Detector (FHSD) adopts a multi-layer 
approach to provide an efficient IP spoofing detection mechanism that is able to 
run under attack conditions. Therefore, the proposed approach needs to meet the 
following operational requirements: 
Multi-layer approach based on Source MAC Address, hop-count, passive OS 
fingerprinting, HTTP User Agent, and HTTP Request method 
Improve detection by cross checking hop-count with passive OS fingerprinting 
results and HTTP User Agent 
Minimise network and resource requirements for repeated traceroute queries by 
considering GeoIP, subnet address, rather than queries for single IP Addresses. 
Take into account changing network conditions and incomplete results by 
adopting flexible TTL values, along with GeoIP and subnet information for Hop 
counting. 
The proposed hybrid multi-layer approach considers as input a large selection of 
metrics, such as Source MAC Address, hop count, passive OS fingerprinting, HTTP 
User Agent, and HTTP Request Method. The rationale for selecting Source MAC 
Address stems from Dumbare et al. (2012), which recognises the potential of 
pairing MAC and IP Addresses to control IP spoofing. Therefore, the proposed work 
aims to test this hypothesis. The reason behind using passive OS fingerprinting, 
and HTTP User Agent is to allow cross-checking of hop-count and HTTP User Agent 
with passive OS fingerprinting to lower false positives and false negatives. 
Changes in User Agent requests and User Request methods (POST, GET) are also 
considered to signify illegitimate HTTP traffic. This is based on the assumption that 
legitimate HTTP Requests will have lower variability than abnormal traffic (Kandula 
et al., 2005). Finally, calculating hop count is influenced by previous work on HCF 
and HCP (as discussed in section 2). In this case, the hop count method is 
optimised to reduce the number of slow and sometimes-incomplete traceroute 
queries, by looking up class C subnet addresses, rather than individual IP 




addresses. Also, GeoIP information provides an extra dimension on the 
geographical location of a subnet. The hop count method also adopts flexible TTL 
values, to take into account changing network conditions.  
    Figure 4.1 depicts the network flow diagram of the proposed model. According 
to Figure 4.1, the Fuzzy Hybrid Spoof Detector (FHSD) receives web traffic for 
inspection from the Firewall. FHSD then retrieves hop count information from the 
GeoIP Hop Count Update Module, which is responsible for the estimation of hop 
count and GeoIP Information. It initially checks if there is an existing entry in the 
Database for either the IP Address or the class C subnet, before initiating a GeoIP 
Hop Count query on the Internet. Once an answer is provided, the Database is 
updated and the relevant information is passed to FHSD, which in turn calculates 
the IP Risk for each IP Address. The IP Risk is saved in the Database, and it is 
used to distinguish legitimate traffic. When the IP Risk is HIGH, FHSD 
automatically assigns a firewall rule to reject traffic from this IP address, whereas 
legitimate traffic is allowed to progress to the web server. FHSD can be configured 
via a Web Report module, which provides configuration and logging functionality.  
The Network Administrator is able to monitor the results of the FHSD scoring using 
the Web Report Module. They can also issue blocking commands directly to the 
firewall, e.g. when FHSD misses malicious spoofed IPs that need to be blocked. 
 
Figure 4.1: Network Flow datagram of our proposed method 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the core modules of FHSD, where connection flows are 
buffered before they are passed for analysis. FHSD passes data to the analysis 
modules whenever one of the following conditions is met; either once the number 
of connections exceeds a certain threshold or after a specified amount of time 
elapses. Both metrics can be configurable, and the present chapter assumes a 
threshold of 10,000 connections and a time threshold of 2 seconds. The buffer 




extracts the following data from raw traffic: a) IP Source, b) Source MAC Address, 
c) IP TTL, d) HTTP User Agent, and e) HTTP Request method. 
Once buffer data is passed for analysis, three simultaneous processes start. The 
first process starts with MAC Address and IP pairing. This process checks data 
according to the list of MAC address of local systems, to detect compromised hosts 
in the local network that act as zombies. The second process uses passive OS 
fingerprints and compares them with the operating system information that is 
retrieved from the User Agent string. If the two values are equal, the result is set 
to 0; otherwise it is 1 until the IP is changed. Next the comparison continues 
through the TTL. The default initial TTL values of operating systems are 
considered, as shown in Table 4.1 (Lloyd, 2012), according to the results achieved 
from the second process. After initial TTL is set, the program checks for IP Hops. If 
it finds the hops for the particular IP, it uses it to find the difference between initial 
TTL and Hop Count. If the results are incomplete, it uses the subnet address 
instead or the Country and City, and considers TTL boundaries of 2 , as per Zhang 
et al. (2007) and Technical Report 070529A (2007). This calculated TTL is 
compared with the TTL value reported in the Network Data to detect 
inconsistencies, and count the number of times that they change. The variability of 
TTL in a normal session is usually very low, where the TTL value largely stays 
unchanged, or sometimes moves up/down to 1 or 2 hops. Finally, the third process 
counts User Agent changes and frequency of User Request methods (POST, GET). 
Then, the results are collected and passed from a fuzzy rule set, as depicted in 
Figure 4.2. For the input membership function the triangular membership function 
is used (Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.2: FHSD module steps 






TCP UDP ICMP 
Linux 64 64 255 
FreeBSD 64 64 255 
Mac OS X 64 64 255 
Solaris 255 255 255 
Windows 
95/98/ME 




128 128 255 
Table 4.1: Operating Systems TTL Values 
 
Figure 4.3: Fuzzy Triangular Membership Function 
The inputs were defined on a domain interval of 0-1. Each domain, except TTL 
Result and P0F Result that are Boolean, was divided into 3 regions of Low, Medium 
and High as shown in Figure 4.4 with the values given in Table 4.2. Note that 
Table 4.2 values can be changed according to the needs of the domain or the 
dataset. All input domains are normalized to the same input range. With the fuzzy 
input set the rules of the fuzzy system are constructed. Fuzzy rules are written 
using empirical network administrator experience. For the output, these rules are 
combined with Largest of Maximum (LoM) operator. 




Table 4.2 – Range of Input 




To best understand these empirical rules an IP attack example is shown below. 
 
Fuzzy IP http requests count Number = IP http requests count / TOTAL IP COUNTS 
 
Fuzzy IP http empty requests count Number = IP http empty requests count /  
 
TOTAL IP COUNTS 
 
Fuzzy User Agent variation count Number = User Agent variation count / TOTAL IP 
COUNTS 
 
Fuzzy IP TTL variation count Number = IP TTL variation count / TOTAL IP COUNTS 
 
The result of each variable is a number. This number is checked in the triangular 
membership function to find the Risk that is belonging. Then these results are 
passing from two rules: 
 
Rule 1: 
IF (IP http requests count == Low) AND (IP http empty requests count == 
Medium) 
THEN “IP RISK” == Medium 
 
Rule 2: 
IF (IP User Agent variation count == Medium) AND (IP TTL variation count == 
High) 
THEN “IP RISK” == High 
 
The result of the two rules is passed to LoM (Largest of Maximum) operator 
that will report the crisp number of the output, using also triangular membership 
function. The crisp number of the output can be used with other systems that are 
developed in order to compare the results and have a more clear output of IP Risk. 
In this system if the LoM is in the High area the output is marked as High. After 
that, the output result of IP Risk is weighted with the TTL binary variable, which 
takes two values; 0 if it is OK according to Hop Count and 1 if not. All this 
combination produces the final IP Risk. If the TTL is equal to 1 then this is also 
High, so in combination with the High from the LoM it will report the system as 
High in the final IP Risk. 
The empirical fuzzy rules used in our model are shown in Tables 4.3-4.5 while 












Low Medium High 
Low Low Medium High 
Medium Low Medium High 
High Low Medium High 
Table 4.3 – Group 1 Empirical Fuzzy If-Then Rules 
 
IP User Agent 
variation 
count/ IP TTL 
variation 
count 
Low Medium High 
Low Low Medium High 
Medium Medium Medium High 
High High High High 





Low Medium High 
0 Low Low Medium 
1 Medium High High 
Table 4.5 – Final Result Fuzzy If-Then Rules 





Figure 4.4: Fuzzy with empirical rules method used 
 
 




4.4 A prototype implementation of FHSD and Experimental design 
Based on the conceptual model presented in section 3, this chapter proceeds to 
present a prototype implementation of FHSD and the experimental design that was 
used to investigate its detection efficiency. The prototype implementation uses 
binary files for storing our data instead of a database. This was in the interest of 
time, and simplicity. Extending FHSD to use a database would be feasible, as it can 
be easily converted to do so. That would speed up the result process even further, 
although the results process is already fast enough; under 5 seconds in i5, 8GB 
machine for 10000 packets. Therefore, using binary files was deemed suitable for 
a proof of concept tool. 
The FHSD prototype prepossesses tcpdump capture files with tshark and it 
exports values IP Source, Source MAC Address, TTL, User Agent and Request 
method in csv format. Consequently, the collected Web Traffic for the 10000 IPs, 
which correspond to approximately 1 or 2 second of traffic, is passed from p0f 
v3.0 to identify the OS per IP. The result of p0f is passed to FHSD along with 
traceroute data, pre-processed GeoIP data and the tshark file. As Figure 2 shows, 
MAC Address and IP pairing are initially checked against the list of local MAC 
addresses and then data are sorted per IP and each IP is checked against p0f 
exported file and User Agent. If the two values are equal the p0f flag is set to 0. 
Otherwise the p0f flag gets the value of 1 until the IP is changed. Next the 
comparison continues through the TTL using the User Agent string to setup the 
initial TTL of Operating System and Table 4.1. After the initial TTL is set, the 
program checks for IP Hops in the traceroute and GeoIP file. If it finds the hops for 
the particular IP, it uses this value to find the difference between initial TTL and 
Hop Count. If the result is incomplete, it uses the class C subnet address to find 
the difference with 2  boundaries. This value is compared with the TTL value from 
the Network TCP stream, and if different, it counts the number of times the TTL 
changes. Similarly, FHSD also counts User Agent changes and User Requests 
(POST, GET). Then the results are passed to a fuzzy ruleset, using Mamdani 
Method (Figure 3) and it outputs the IP Risk Score.   
As part of the experimental evaluation, FHSD is tested against normal and 
illegitimate web traffic. The DDoS tool BoNeSi (BoNeSi, 2008) was used, which is a 
network traffic generator for different protocol types. It has the ability using 
various parameters, to control the attributes of the created packets and 
connections as, for example, send rate, payload size or even all attributes can be 
randomized. Also in HTTP mode Attack, it behaves as a real Botnet. This is also the 
reason that BoNeSi is chosen, as it can emulate real bot behaviour. BoNeSi was 
used as an alternative, as a way to overcome the practical difficulty and ethical 
problems of obtaining or renting real bot software. 
BoNeSi HTTP Request Attack was used against an Apache 2.2.20 Web Server, 
which hosts PHP dynamic web pages. In order to make the HTTP requests more 
realistic, 45 /24 IP subnet ranges (listed in Table 4.6) and 10 different User Agents 
(listed in Table 4.7) were used. BoNeSi then produced spoof IPs within the IP 
range of each subnet. For example, the first IP subnet triggered BoNeSi to start 




sending requests from random IPs within the range of 1.2.3.1 - 1.2.3.254. So the 
total number of distinct Spoof IPs that could reach the Web Server would be 11385 
(the product of 45 subnets by 253 IPs per subnet). Also, the TTL values and 
Source Ports of the attack IPs were generated randomly, in an attempt to make 
the spoof data more realistic. As for the selected sample of User Agent strings that 
are shown in Table 4.7, it was obtained from UserAgentStrings.com. Although the 
word “Mozilla” appears in all entries, these actually represent a wide selection of 
browsers, such as Internet Explorer, Opera, Safari, Chrome, not just Mozilla 
browsers.  According to UserAgentStrings.com, all browsers include the string 
“Mozilla” in their User Agent String. 
 
A pseudocode of the implementation is shown below: 
P = SortPacketsPerIP(); 
FOR each packet in P  
 IP = GetIPfromPacket(P); 
 OP = CheckOperatingSystem(P); 
 Browser = CheckBrowser(P); 
 UserAgentCount = CountUserAgentChanges(P); 
 TTL = CheckTTL(IP); 
 If  (TTL found in database)  
     TTLVALUE=TTL    
    Else  
      TTLVALUE=GEOIP_LOOKUP_WITH_SUBNET_CHECK(IP); 
         IF (TTLVALUE found)  
          AddtoDatabase(IP); 
           Return TTLVALUE;          
         Else  
            Mark As Unknown;  
   Traceroute(IP) in the background 
                AddtoDatabase(IP); 
        END IF 
  END IF  
 CountPG  = Count Post and Get Requests(P); 
 CountTTLVar = Count_TTL_Changes(P); 
END FOR 
FinalResult_Per_IP = Summarize_All_Values(); 
 
The experiments considered four datasets: one dataset with only legitimate 
users’ traffic; the DARPA LLDOS Inside 1.0 dataset; and two datasets with 
legitimate users traffic along with BoNeSi spoof DDoS attack traffic. The first 
dataset was legitimate users traffic and was exported from a busy Job Seeking 
website used also in Shiaeles et al. (2012) It contained 30,000 network packets 
over a period of 4 minutes and 157 unique IP addresses. The second dataset was 
an attack dataset and was exported using a virtual machine as web server and 
another one as attacker with BoNeSi. The two machines resided on the same host 
and the web server machine could be accessed from the Internet. The dataset 
contained 180000 network packets over a period of 3 minutes, and it involved 15 
legitimate IPs and 2546 Spoof IPs. BoNeSi generated around 115000 amount of 
HTTP traffic and was configured to spoof packets from Table 4.6 IPs subnet using 
the max-bot flag. 




The third dataset was also an attack dataset and was exported from the Job 
Seeking website used in Shiaeles et al. (2012). The dataset contained 1,600,000 
network packets over a period of 4 minutes. During the capture of legitimate users 
sessions on this website, a DDoS attack was launched from two different locations 
using BoNeSi. BoNeSi was configured to use a list of Spoof IP Addresses, which is 
shown in Table 4.6. The max-bot flag was not used in BoNeSi, in this dataset. For 
User Agents Table 4.7 was used. BoNeSi generated around 1,550,000 packets of 
attacking traffic involving 170 distinct Source IPs, where the 45 were the attack 
IPs of Table 4.6. 
The last and forth dataset was DARPA LLDOS Inside 1.0 dataset Inside (MIT, 
2000). This dataset contained 649787 packets over a period of 3h 14min. The http 
sessions in this dataset are limited. 
Spoofed IPs file that BoNesi get the subnet of each IP 
0.1.125.174 0.1.91.98 0.10.138.194 
0.10.180.83 0.100.194.86 0.100.4.147 
0.101.118.61 0.101.253.178 0.101.79.119 
76.92.199.150 76.93.12.254 76.94.211.44 
76.94.27.31 76.94.67.128 76.96.122.8 
76.98.67.241 76.99.14.245 77.10.210.127 
77.101.139.127 77.101.185.177 77.103.220.1 
77.104.169.154 77.105.240.217 77.106.168.16 
77.177.67.106 77.178.90.218 77.26.237.147 
77.26.242.166 77.27.51.26 77.29.51.117 
77.29.96.223 99.95.56.17 100.12.130.16 
100.212.131.16 100.212.132.16 100.212.133.16 
100.212.134.16 100.212.135.16 100.212.136.16 
100.212.137.16 100.212.138.16 100.212.139.16 
100.212.140.16 100.212.141.16 100.212.142.16 
Table 4.6 – BoNeSi spoofed IP list used 
 




User Agents file 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; 
Trident/6.0) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; 
InfoPath.2; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; WOW64) 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 
10_7_3; Trident/6.0) 
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/5.0) 
Mozilla/1.22 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows 3.1) 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 9.0; en-US) 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 9.0; en-US) 
Table 4.7 - BoNeSi User Agents list used 
4.5 Results 
First the DARPA LLDOS 1.0 Inside data set (MIT, 2000) was used. According to 
DARPA LLDOS 1.0 scenario an attacker compromises three machines inside the 
local network. These hosts are mil with IP 172.16.115.20, pascal with IP 
172.16.112.50 and locke with IP 172.16.112.10. Using all three compromised 
hosts and spoof IPs, the attacker attacks victim IP 131.84.1.31 for 5 seconds. Our 
program identifies this attack in the first stage, using MAC Address Pairing, so the 
second stage was not needed. Also the second stage was not possible to be used 
in DARPA because it does not contain Web Traffic. Specifically, User Agents are 
missing from many IPs. 
The second test was done using the dataset from the two virtual machines on 
the same host. According to this scenario the attacker machine had BoNeSi 
installed in order to spoof IPs and attack the second’s machine web server. Also in 
this experiment the spoofing IPs were identified from the MAC address that was 
changing. 
Next, the third and fourth datasets, that were more realistic and that could 
happen in live situations, were tested. The third dataset dealt with attacking a Job 
Seeking website (also used in Shiaeles et al., 2012) from two geographically 
different locations using BoNeSi with spoofed IPs. Our method successfully found 




all the spoof IPs in the second stage because the first stage of MAC filter cannot be 
used in Internet traffic. 
 
Figure 4.5: Attack Data packets per time 
Finally, the fourth dataset was legitimate data from the Job Seeking website as 
well. In this scenario the success rate was 99,99%. Some minor misclassifications 
appeared, as values set as Medium while they should have been set as Low. There 
were no IP’s classified in the High state, which is a reasonable expectation given 
that the dataset was legitimate user data. 
Figure 4.5 shows the number of attack packet arriving over time, whereas 
Figure 4.6 depicts the number of normal packet arriving over time. Both figures 
show a different pattern for normal vs. attacking traffic. Specifically, the volume of 
distinct attacking IPs is much higher, than normal IPs. 
  
Figure 4.6: Normal Data Packets per time 




Figure 4.7 depicts a screenshot of the prototype, showing the outcome of the IP 
Risk classification, using the first and second stages. 
 
Figure 4.7: Program Results 
4.6 Discussion 
The DARPA DDoS dataset is based upon DDoS attacks from compromised hosts 
in the Local LAN. Also the attack is not specific for Web Server so there was not 
much information about the User Agent and some other features that are needed 
for our method to find the offensive IPs in the second stage of check. Moreover, 
the IP and MAC pairing is changing during the DDoS attack using the spoof IPs and 
having this information in the dataset makes it easier to find spoof IPs. In a real 
DDoS attack against a Web Server, the MAC address of the attacker would not be 
available at the victim side. In the victim site only the MAC address of the router is 
visible that forwards the packets. As a result, the DARPA DDoS dataset was not 
considered appropriate to export correct results for the proposed method. What is 
more, the second dataset allowed us to successfully identify the spoofed IPs with 
two ways: First with the MAC- IP pair changes and secondly using the Hop 
counting, TTL and User Agent filtering method.  The third dataset was a real DDoS 
scenario. The aim was to collect data and analyze them to see if the proposed 
method was effective. Using a Hop counting table for some of the spoofing IPs, not 
all of them, geographical locations and OS fingerprinting techniques used by p0f in 
comparison with User Agent, the proposed method showed encouraging results by 
identifying 99,99% of spoof IPs.  Similar results were produced in the fourth 
dataset that was live data capture using tcpdump from the Job Seeking website. 
This particular dataset did not have attack IPs and our method corresponded 
correctly to this scenario but with a few false positives in the state of Medium 
score. The reason of this false positive was the use of proxy server in the settings 
of the user browser that visited our web site; the initial TTL was 64 which is the 
initial value of a Linux Operating System but the User Agent reported Windows 




Operating System which has initial TTL 128. Thus the system reports it as 
anomaly, which is correct. 
FHSD provides improved results, in comparison to HCF and other approaches. 
The additional metrics, such as HTTP Request method, User Agent and IP TTL 
value change, proved to be particularly valuable in accurate classifications, without 
introducing significant overhead. This is evident by the reasonable system 
performance. A major factor contributing towards a robust solution was the 
optimization of hop count queries by introducing the GeoIP and subnet TTL. By 
reducing the need for repeated traceroute requests, the number of traceroute 
queries was 45 out of 2000, which is approximately a 97% reduction in 
comparison to HCF, which is a significant improvement of network usage. 
 
Figure 4.8: FHSD and HCF comparison based on Detection Rate and False Positive 
Rate 
Figure 4.8 shows a comparison between FHSD and HCF, based on Detection 
Rate and False Positive Rate. The detection rate for spoof IPs in FHSD is 100% 
even though some false positive IPs are detected in the rate of 2%. The cpu usage 
was between 37 – 52%. According to Jin et. al. (2003), the corresponding figures 
for HCF are 90% detection rate and 8% false positive rate. It should be noted that 
the results from Jin et. al. (2003) are based on a different dataset, therefore, it is 
not possible to perform a direct comparison of the two methods. Similarly, other 
alternative methods to HCF base their findings on private datasets, making a direct 
comparison to FHSD impossible. Wu, Z. and Chen, Z. (2006) show the most 
promising results with their Three-layer approach using SYN Proxy, reporting 
98.93% detection rate. No performance data were published though in their work.   





Figure 4.9: Computational time per number of packets 
In terms of performance, Figure 4.9 shows the computational time based on the 
number of packets our developed system had to process at a time. Based on these 
results, it was decided to use the optimal threshold of 10,000 packets or 2 
seconds. It should be noted that the FHSD prototype is using csv files to calculate 
spoof IPs and the test was performed on a Intel Quad Core Machine with 8 GB 
RAM and 1TB 7200-rpm Hard Disk. It is not known how these results would vary if 
the implementation was done using database or if dedicated hardware like GPU or 
FPGA was used.  
 
4.7 Limitations 
The proposed method uses Hop counting, geographical location, User 
AgentAgent and passive OS fingerprinting. This means that a database with 
correct TTL values from most IPs of the internet should be maintained with country 
and city. Because the subnet and geographical location of the IP were used, this 
shrinks the area of IPs a little. But for better results a good database with IP hops 
should be maintained. Additionally, the passive OS fingerprinting and User Agent 
database should be updated with new Operating System signatures and the User 
Agent new browsers respectively. All these data can be updated daily or when 
needed by a new proposed method or even use already proposed methods like 
SYN Proxy (Zhang F. et al., 2007). 
In the current developed application the data are stored in files instead of 
database. Our intent was to test the efficiency of our proposed method and not its 
speed, even though the file parsing techniques that have been used made the 
results appeared in seconds. To test our scenarios some IP using traceroute and 




GeoIP had to be pre-processed and stored in a file. An example of the process file 
is shown in Figure 4.8. As seen in Figure 4.8, in some cases the traceroute did not 
lead to the end IP (see column COMPLETED). In these cases the system checks the 
subnet and if the IP is in the same subnet with another that is completed it takes 
this value in the field (CLOSES_TTL); if not, then, it checks the GeoIP using County 
and City and if it finds the IP that the traceroute completed and is in the same 
Country and City it takes the higher value. In a different case, it takes the value of 
the LAST_HOP_ENDED which is the last reply from the traceroute. This could be 
avoided if a good database is kept with correct values from the subnets for more 
accuracy and not giving false positives. 
 
Figure 4.10: Traceroute preprocess file 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
The method proposed in this chapter achieved two main goals, as confirmed by 
the empirical results. First, the detection rate was substantially high in the region 
of 100%. This was due to the use of a number of parameters such as HTTP 
Request method, User Agent and IP TTL value change. It should be noted that 
application level parameters together with the IP ones allowed effective correlation 
and significantly reduced the surrounding uncertainty of a network event, 
promoting correct classification of attacks. 
Secondly, by using techniques that leverage GeoIP, subnet and TTL histories the 
number of traceroute queries were reduced significantly (e.g. from 2000, to 45 
which is approximately a 97% reduction) in comparison to HCF. This, apart from 















On scene criminal investigation of a 
“zombie” computer 








5.1 Introduction  
Triage is a term deriving from medicine. According to the Free Merriam-Webster 
dictionary it is defined as “the sorting of and allocation of treatment to patients 
and especially battle and disaster victims according to a system of priorities 
designed to maximize the number of survivors”. In a similar manner, in incident 
response (Brownlee and Guttman, 1998) triage is defined as the stage where a 
security expert assesses an incoming report about a security incident, prioritizes it, 
relates it to other ongoing incidents and deems whether the report is valid. From 
these definitions it is evident that the overall success of a digital investigation is 
heavily influenced by the early actions of the first responder. Correct prioritization 
and handling of the live system may offer the key to an encrypted partition, or 
might reveal the valuable remote IP.  
In this chapter three widely available open source triage tools are used as a 
vehicle to study and understand the issues surrounding digital triage processes in 
a computer member of a Botnet.  The chapter studies the effort required and the 
practical challenges a responder may face and evaluate these tools against the 
requirements set out by a published practice guide for digital forensics. Having 
employed some of these tools in real case situations where they had to be 
modified on the field, a secondary goal of this chapter is to propose ways of 
improving these tools.  
 
 
5.2 Related Work 
When an incident is being reported, digital forensics processes are called upon 
to examine the incident, collect and analyze digital evidence in order to assess the 
nature of the incident, identify a potential perpetrator and maybe establish 
whether a cyber-crime has been committed. A bug that causes a server to hang 
will be an incident response scenario where no human perpetrator is actually 
involved. However, in a website defacement case, for example, the collection of 
evidence from the underlying live system may be necessary, since potentially 
malicious processes may still be resident in memory. In such case, digital triage 
forensics will be required in order to investigate the digital crime scene and collect 
evidence based on the order of volatility, as defined in RFC 3227 (Brezinski and 
Killalea, 2002). “Digital Triage Forensics (DTF) is defined as a procedural model for 
the investigation of digital crime scenes including both traditional crime scenes and 
the more complex battlefield crime scenes” (Pearson and Watson, 2010). Rogers 
et al. (2006) define a computer forensics triage model (CFFTPM) as “investigative 
processes that are conducted within the first few hours of an investigation and 
provide information used during the suspect interview and search execution 
Phase”. The goal is to identify useful evidence while at the crime scene in order to 
guide the investigators and help them identify both other potential evidence, which 
might be “hidden in plain sight”, as well as assess the perpetrator’s “danger to 
society”. As triage is part of the digital forensics life cycle and involves the 
collection of evidence that may be later presented in a court of law, the adherence 




of all employed triage tools and processes to forensic principles ensuring the 
admissibility of the collected evidence is non questionable. A typical and well 
developed set of principles is described in the well known Association of Chief 
Police Officers (ACPO) Good Practice Guide for Computer Based Electronic Evidence 
(ACPO, 2008). The guide comprises of four Principles which are rather generic in 
order to be easily understood and followed in many circumstances. More 
specifically, Principle 1 states that “No action taken by law enforcement agencies 
or their agents should change data held on a computer or storage media which 
may subsequently be relied upon in court.” However, where a live system is 
involved or the need arises to access original data held on a computer or on 
storage media, Principle 2 states that the investigator accessing the live system or 
the original data “must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of his actions”. In each and every 
case an audit trail of all processes applied to computer-based electronic evidence 
must be created and preserved (Principle 3). Consequently, the digital forensics 
triage tools have to be able to keep an audit trail of their actions, so that a) an 
independent third party can follow them up and end up with the same result, b) 
the investigator can explain how these tools are relevant to his investigation and 
how they changed the examined system without setting his investigation in 
danger. At the same time, these tools have to be able to collect evidence 
beginning from the volatile to the less volatile (Brezinski and Killalea, 2002) while 
collecting as many forensic artifacts as necessary. A good resource on potential 
forensic artifacts is the ForensicArtifacts.com database and SANS resources such 
as the Sans-Digital-Forensics-and-Incident-Response-Poster-2012 or Sans forensic 
cheat sheets, where an investigator can find a wide variety of evidence that he has 
to look for, depending always on the type of investigation (in an internet-related 
crime for example, the focus would be on the suspect’s browsing habits and 
history), as well as the tools he can utilize (in the internet-related crime example 
Nirsoft’s web browsers’ tools package might be useful).   
Rogers et al. (2006) in their proposed triage process model highlight the 
importance of prioritization prior to moving into the collection of the various 
system and user data. Emphasis is given on the data that have short time to live 
such as routing tables, processes and temporary files. The authors conclude that 
forensic examiners need a repertoire of tools as there is no tool that can weight all 
possible technical and legal considerations a first responder may face in a specific 
case. This suggests that the triage tool will need to be flexible and maintain the 
ability to respond to the evidence during collection by changing its acquisition 
behaviour.  
An important trait of a triage tool is the requirement to collect data in a 
relatively short time window. This is often overlooked in practice as the tools are 
becoming complex in order to preserve as much information as possible, later to 
be used in analysis. Horsman et al. (2011) attribute this drawback to the fact that 
triage tools are descendants from traditional forensic tools that are designed to 
perform a post mortem analysis. It is argued that in order to achieve a suitable 
tradeoff between the speed of the triage process and the appropriateness of the 




collected data, the triage tool must need to have adaptiveness capabilities. 
SPEKTOR triage tool, for example, attempts to support some degree of 
automation, but this is done in order to be used by people with no particular 
technical abilities. This is in clear violation of ACPO’s second principle and as such 
it is considered to be a poor practice. In fact, it is argued that a triage tool will 
need to support automation in order to simplify the first responder’s work, but this 
should not be done by sparing the expertise and skills of the responder. 
A key dilemma in incident response is the decision to perform a complete 
memory acquisition versus a live response. Memory acquisition can be very 
informative but it is rather slow. In addition, memory acquisition will take a 
snapshot of the execution state of the system and the analyst will not have the 
opportunity to perform some further acquisition based on the findings. Yet, 
hardware evolution leads to ever increasing memory sizes suggesting that a 
memory image may provide information of past and completed processes which 
cannot be mined through live response tools (Aljaedi et al., 2011). Live response, 
on the other hand, can be very effective if the first responder is well prepared on 
the underlying case. However, it requires a portfolio of tools that are typically 
executed from a script. In addition, the tools need to be configured in order to be 
compatible with the suspect system. Waits et al. (2008) conclude that both 
approaches should be followed, with the incident response tools fulfilling the role of 
the triage phase, collecting the minimal information possible in order to allow 
further planning. Once more, minimal information required well preparation and 
customization of the triage tool.  
From the above discussion, it is evident that a triage tool needs to balance a 
number of requirements in terms of performance, complexity and adaptability. In 
the following sections three open-source triage tools are put to the test, their 
behaviour is assessed and a series of conclusions are extracted as to their ability 
to meet the expectations of the first responder. 
 
 
5.3 Methodology  
For our primary research the TriageIR, TR3Secure and Kludge triage / 
incident response tools were tested. Their behaviour was examined in various 
Microsoft Windows operating systems and the results that they produced were 
compared. Emphasis was given on Microsoft’s Windows operating systems as, 
according to statistics, MS Windows type OS remains the most popular operating 
system used by home users (Netmarketshare, 2012). 
For our primary research a testbed was set up which included machines running 
various MS Windows OS that a typical home end user would use.  
 
 
5.4 Testbed setup procedure 
The base host operating system was Windows 7 SP1 64-Bit with Quad Core, 8 
GB RAM and 2 TB Hard Disk. On this Host VMware Player 8 was installed. 




Subsequently, 8 virtual machines (VMs) were created according to the 
specifications summarized in Table 5.1. 
Network 
Mode 
C disk for 
MS 
Windows 
E disk for 
triage tools 
RAM CPU Cores 
Bridge 60 GB 10 GB 1 GB 2 
Table 5.1: Virtual Machine hardware specifications 
 
Initially, each created VM was loaded with a default installation of a Windows OS 
system (XP SP3 32bit, XP SP2 64bit, 7 32bit, 7 64bit, 7 SP1 32bit, 7 SP1 64bit, 8 
32bit and 8 64bit). Following the installation of the OS on the VM, Sandboxie 3.74 
was installed, in order to be able to execute the triage tools in sandboxed 
environment. Sandboxie could be installed on all VMs except Windows XP 64 bit, 
where an incompatibility was encountered, as Sandboxie is not supported in such 
OS. Next step, TriageIR v.79, Kludge-3.20110223 and TR3Secure were copied on 
our “Ε: disk” which served as an external USB drive following our test scenario. 
This is a typical setting where the forensic examiner or first responder introduces 
an external USB drive to the system in order to run his triage tools and collect the 
incident data. Furthermore, in Windows 7 64 bit and Windows 8 64 bit Sandboxie’s 
configuration file (Sabdboxie.ini) had to be modified and the value of 
DropAdminRights had to be changed from y to n, in order to be able to run some 
programs that are part of the triage tools and can only produce results if run under 
administrator privileges. This setting is required due to changes in the kernel of 
Windows 64bit operating systems. It should be noted that “DropAdminRights is a 
sandbox setting in Sandboxie.ini, which specifies whether Sandboxie will strip 
Administrator rights from programs running in the sandbox”. 
Our testbed is depicted in Figure 5.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Triage testbed setup 




5.5 Testing Triage Tools 
All tools were tested with all their options enabled and in two different execution 
modes; sandboxed environment and “normal” execution. A sandboxed 
environment was utilized in order to find out which files are created in the 
examined system’s hard disk and an investigation on how the integrity of the 
examined system is being affected was made. The tools were executed in “normal” 
execution mode in order to see how the tools actually perform when not restricted 
in an isolated “sandboxed” environment. For the Windows 7 and Windows 8 OS 
(32bit and 64bit) it was necessary to enable for all the tools the “Run as 
administrator” option, as UAC prevented some programs, such as win32dd.exe and 
Memoryze.exe (programs that image the system’s memory in dd format) called by 
the tools, from running correctly. 
 
5.5.1 TriageIR v.0.79 
 
The first tool that was tested was TriageIR v.0.79. According to the 
documentation manual, TriageIR needs the following tools added in a folder named 
“tools”, residing in the program’s folder, in order for it to run correctly. These tools 
are: a) DumpIt memory utility, b) Sysinternals Suite, c) RegRipper, d) md5deep 
and sha1deep, e) 7Zip Command Line. 
The “tools” folder structure should look like as in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: TriageIR v.0.79 Tools Folder 
 
After all the tools were placed in the respective folders, the “Triage - Incident 
Response.exe” was executed. The tool provides 6 tabs – “pages” containing a 
variety of options concerning System Information (see Figure 5.3), Network 
information, and so forth. In order to fully assess the tool’s functionality it was 
executed with all its options marked in our two test modes.  





Figure 5.3: TriageIR v.79 GUI 
 
In the sandboxed environment TriageIR produced some errors when it tried to 
load some drivers (ex. the win32dd.sys used by win32dd.exe in order to create a 
memory dump). This behaviour is normal, as “programs running under the 
supervision of Sandboxie are stripped of privileges required to start drivers”1, thus 
resulting in less data being collected, as the tools associated with these drivers 
and services do not function properly (the tools crash). In normal mode the tool 
executed smoothly in every different operating system and collected incident data 
in a folder that is automatically created. This folder is in the same location where 
the Triage - Incident Response.exe was executed, which in our case is on the E: 
disk. The tool failed only in Windows 8 OS 64 bit, where the win64dd.exe program 
cannot be loaded resulting in the system’s memory image not being collected. 
However, it was observed that win64dd.exe stops failing if the execution of 
TriageIR is interrupted by the user once or twice and then executed again (always 
as Administrator or with UAC disabled). It is assumed that this problem exists in 




Next in our tests was the TR3Secure data collection script. The tool uses a .bat 
script to call a series of tools that are either native Windows tools, located in the 
Windows\System32 folder, or tools that need to be downloaded from the Internet 
and placed into a folder named “tools”, which resides in the tool’s folder (Figure 
5.4). Additionally, a text file which is named diskpart_commands.txt and contains 
specific commands in separate lines (list disk, list volume) needs to be created in 
the “tools” folder with specific commands placed on separate lines. The “tools” 
folder structure is depicted in Figure 5.5.  
                                                          
 
1 http://www.sandboxie.com/index.php?SBIE2103 






Figure 5.4: TR3Secure main folder structure 
 
 
Figure 5.5: TR3Secure “tools” folder structure 
 
The testing procedure was carried out selecting option 4 from the tool’s menu 
(see Figure 5.6) in order to use all available capabilities. A slightly modified version 




Figure 5.6: TR3Secure Main Menu 
 




The.bat script met most expectations in all operating systems, but some issues 
in 64-bit systems were noticed, as some of the utilities invoked by the tools are 
not compatible with such systems. In addition, the code in this script had to be 
modified relating to the path of the tools in Windows 7 and Windows 8 32-bit and 
64-bit in order for it to succeed in locating the tools. It should be noted though 
that the script will not need such code modification, if it is run through a trusted 
command prompt shell -that is a shell running from the investigator’s usb drive. In 
64-bit operating systems a memory image could not be collected possibly due to 
the fact that Memoryze is not supported in a 64-bit OS.  
 
5.5.3 Kludge 3.20110223 
 
Lastly, Kludge-3.20110223 was tested. Kludge is created with the idea of being 
run remotely through a network by using the administrative shares in the target 
pc. In this way, it copies all the files required by the tool to the remote computer 
and then it runs them in order to collect the required data. This could be 
considered a poor digital forensics practice as the tool makes many modifications 
to the hard disk of the remote computer. Additionally, if remote administrative 
shares are disabled in the Windows remote system, then the tool cannot be 
executed without the investigator enabling them. Thus, in order to keep our initial 
setup, which entailed running triage tools from an external usb drive and the 
investigation data being saved in the same drive, the Kludge.bat file was modified. 
This .bat file is the tool’s main executable file and is located in the kludge-
3.20110223.zip file. The kludge-3.20110223.zip file contains the kludge.zip file, 
which, as the tool is designed, is uploaded to the remote machine and afterwards 
unzipped to a temp folder (C:\WINDOWS\Temp\analysis\). Following our 
modifications, the script could run from our external usb disk without any issues 
and store the collected incident data to the same disk (see Figure 5.6 and 
Appendix A.1 for a link to download our modified code). From there onwards, the 




Figure 5.7: Kludge script execution 




5.6 Results  
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the triage tools with respect to the 
order of volatility it is necessary first to define what the order of volatility is for a 
typical system based on RFC3227 (Brezinski and Killalea, 2002), and secondly, to 
define each scale in the order of volatility hierarchy. CPU registers and cache 
represent the most volatile state of data as these locations change most frequently 
(typically in an order of milliseconds). Memory is the source of a wealth of 
information such as running processes, open connections, thus it is best that 
memory is imaged with minimum alterations. Next in line are data kept in the 
memory such as process tables, which can help direct an investigation, when a 
“suspicious” process is noted. A temporary file system can be defined as a file 
location, such as the Windows\Temp folder, where programs load temporary files, 
which are later on deleted or “forgotten” when the programs terminate. Storage 
media such as hard disks contain a wealth of information and are not altered as 
easily as the previous described items. Remote logging data are data that can be 
collected, for example, from IDS sensors or from the examined system itself and 
can help the investigator identify what the system under examination was doing at 
the time of acquisition or before. As these data reside in different devices, it is not 
so easy to be altered either by the investigator’s tools or by malicious software 
running in the system under examination2. Physical configuration and network 
topology constitute more long term and less volatile data that can be gathered at a 
later stage as they are not so changeable. The same applies to archival media such 
as cd-roms, dvds, and so forth.  
 
                                                          
 
2 See http://help.papertrailapp.com/kb/configuration/configuring-remote-syslog-from-windows for examples on 
how to remotely log windows OS. 
Order Of Volatility (from more volatile 
















Network-related data -> ARP 
cache 
X X X 
Network-related data -> 
Routing table 
 X X 
Network-related data -> DNS 
cache and resolution 
 X  
Network-related data -> DNS 
Information 
X  X 
Network-related data -> A 
records 
  X 
Network-related data -> Host 
file 
  X 





 Network-related data -> Netbios routing 
table 
X  X 
Network-related data -> Netbios 
information(sessions, connections, file 
transfer over netbios) 
X X X 
Network-related data -> Port to process 
mapping 
 X  
Network-related data -> TCP/UDP active 
connections 
X X X 
Network-related data -> TTL   X 
Network-related data -> Firewall (info, 
status) 
  X 
Process data -> Process File Handles X X X 
Process data -> Running Processes-DLLs X X X 
Process data -> Services   X 
Process data -> Process to exe mapping  X  
Process data -> Process to user mapping  X  
Process data -> Child processes  X  
Process data -> Process dependencies  X  
Process data -> Process dumps   X 
Process data -> Process memory   X 
User’s activity -> Active logon sessions  X  
User’s activity ->  Logged on users X X X 
User’s activity -> Recent files X   
User’s activity -> Internet browsers history   X 
User’s activity -> Jump Files X   
User’s activity ->  Clipboard-contents  X X 
Registry hives -> Sam X  X 
Registry hives -> Security X  X 
Registry hives -> System X  X 
Registry hives -> Software X  X 
Registry hives -> HKCU X  X 
Registry hives -> NTUSER.dat X  X 
Registry hives -> USRCLASS.dat X  X 
Various timelines -> IE Timeline   X 
Various timelines -> FF Timeline   X 
Various timelines -> Hard disk timeline   X 
Various timelines -> Prefetch info   X 
Various timelines -> Recycle Bin timeline 
and contents 
  X 
Memory image   X 
System configuration -> VSS service status   X 






 Prefetch files X X  
NTFS data streams  X X 
UnSigned-executables -> Uptime  X  
Prefetch files X X  
NTFS data streams  X X 
UnSigned-executables -> Uptime  X  
Temporary 
file systems 
System event logs -> evt files X  X 
System event logs -> evtx files X   
Processed event logs -> System X  X 
Processed event logs -> Security X  X 
Processed event logs -> Application 
event logs 
X  X 
Antivirus logs   X 
No data collected  X  




data that is 
relevant to 
the system in 
question 
Network-related data -> Open shared 
files 
X   
User’s activity -> Remotely logged on 
users 
 X  
User’s activity -> Remote users IP-
addresses 
 X  
User’s activity -> Remote users IP-
addresses 
 X  





Network-related data -> Network 
configuration 
X X  
Network-related data -> Network 
Adapter info 
  X 
Network-related data -> Routing 
table 
X  X 
Network-related data -> Host File X  X 
Network-related data -> Enabled 
network protocols 
 X  
Network-related data -> Promiscuous 
adapters 
 X  
User’s activity -> Logged on users X   
System configuration -> User 
accounts policy 
X   
System configuration -> User groups  X  






 System configuration -> Startup 
information 
X X  
System configuration -> Directory 
structure 
X   
System configuration -> Mounted 
disks information 
X   
System configuration -> Hostname X   
System configuration -> Local shares X  X 
System configuration -> Schedule 
tasks 
X  X 
System configuration -> Kernel build X   
System configuration -> Register 
organization and owner 
X   
System configuration -> OS-version  X  
System configuration -> Group policy 
listing and RSOP 
 X  
System configuration -> Installed 
software 
 X  
System configuration -> Installed 
software 
 X  
System configuration -> Security 
settings 
 X  
System configuration -> Hardware 
devices 
 X  
System configuration -> Number of 
processors and their type 
X   
System configuration -> Amount of 
physical memory 
X   
System configuration -> System’s 
install date 
X   
System configuration -> System 
variables 
X   
System configuration -> System 
configuration 
  X 
System configuration -> Firewall 
configuration 
X   
System configuration -> Services X   
System configuration -> Type of 
installation 
X   
System configuration -> NTFS 
partition info 
X   





Table 5.2: Tested Tools – collected forensic artifacts vs Order of volatility scale 
 
Table 5.2 presents a consolidated view of the incident data that these tools were 
able to collect as part of the triage process. The table column headers represent 
the order of volatility scale, while the row headers represent the tested tools.  
As depicted in Table 5.2, quite expectedly none of the tools collect evidence 
from registers and cache, since collecting this type of data maybe has barely some 
meaning in triage processes. This, in part, has to do with the fact that the content 
 Certain applications -> Version and 
Signing info for Acrobat 
  X 
Certain applications -> Acrobat 
Reader 
  X 
Certain applications -> Flash   X 
Certain applications -> Java   X 
Certain applications -> Firefox   X 
Certain folders structure -> Program 
Files 
  X 
Certain folders structure -> 
Documents and Settings 
  X 
Certain folders structure -> Windows   X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Computer 
name 
  X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Autoruns   X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Startup 
apps 
  X 
UnSigned-Executables -> BHO’s   X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Hotfixes 
and service packs 
  X 
UnSigned-Executables -> 
Environment Variables 
  X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Uptime   X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Operating 
System Information 
  X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Drive 
Information 
  X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Partition 
info 
  X 
UnSigned-Executables -> Users   X 
UnSigned-Executables -> USB device 
history 
  X 
Registry files   X 
Archival 
media 
Not applicable X X X 




of CPU registers, for example, is difficult to be analyzed. All of the tools collect the 
routing table and the ARP cache, whilst preserving other data such as Netbios-
related data (general information and sessions), active connections, network 
adapter information, DNS information and other. All of the tools collect significant 
amount of information on processes, such as running processes and process file 
handles. TR3Secure collects kernel statistics, while all the tools collect information 
relating to the kernel build. All of the tools image the system’s memory, whilst 
preserving Prefetch files. Two of the tools (TriageIR, Kludge) collect registry files, 
in unprocessed format (.reg, .dat, .hiv, .log files) and in processed format (.txt 
files produced using Regripper). All tools collect data on users’ activity (locally- 
logged-on-users, active-logon-sessions), whereas two of them (TriageIR, 
TR3Secure) collect clipboard contents. In addition, TriageIR also collects recent 
and jump files and Kludge collects NTFS data streams.  
With regards to temporary file system acquisition, two of the tools (TriageIR, 
Kludge) collect system event logs (.evt files), with one of them acquiring .evtx files 
also. In practice the tools only collect .evt event logs, since during our tests 
TriageIR failed to collect any .evtx event log files (in Windows 7 or Windows 8 OS). 
In addition, Kludge also collects antivirus logs pertaining to specific vendors 
(McAfee and Symantec) and sometimes specific software versions. Acquiring a 
hard disk image has no meaning during the triage process, as a hard disk image is 
something that needs to be analyzed later in a lab, with the same applying to 
archival media. 
Regarding remote logging and monitoring data, TriageIR collects open shared 
files information, whereas TR3Secure collects information on remotely-logged-on-
users and remote-users-ip-addresses. Concerning physical configuration and 
network topology, all tools collect a variety of data on system configuration 











































































































Table 5.3: Tools' effectiveness 




 Table 5.3 summarizes the tool effectiveness for every operating system. A tool 
is considered “effective” if it performs without any errors and collects all the data 
according to the prescription of the order of volatility. A tool is considered 
“medium effective” if it produces a few errors, when executed, but collects most of 
the data that the order of volatility prescribes. A tool is considered “less effective” 
if it produces a large number of errors when executed. A tool is considered 
“ineffective” if it fails to collect vital evidence (memory for instance) that the order 
of volatility prescribes. As depicted above, TriageIR is deemed “medium effective” 
in all operating systems as it produces a few errors during execution resulting in 
some incident data not being collected. It is worth noting that TriageIR is not 
Windows 8 ready as it encounters problems in some of the utilities (win64dd.exe, 
at.exe) that it uses due to deprecation or incompatibility of these utilities with the 
latter OS. TR3Secure is deemed “medium effective” in 32-bit operating systems 
and “ineffective” in 64-bit operating systems, as in 64-bit OS it fails to acquire the 
system’s memory. It is worth noting that TR3Secure collects less data than the 
other two triage tools. Kludge is deemed “medium effective” in Windows XP 32-bit 
operating system and “less effective” in the other Windows OS, because the 
version of “Hobocopy” included in the downloadable Kludge package and used to 
copy, for example, event logs, is not supported in OS other than Windows XP 32-
bit. Thus, a significant amount of incident data is not collected. 
In Table 5.4 a consolidated view of the modifications performed by each tool on 
the registry and file system of the corresponding OS is presented. All the 
modifications were recorded by using a) Buster Sandbox Analyzer 1.87 (BSA) in 
conjunction with Sandboxie and b) Sandboxie in a standalone setting. The number 
of modifications depicted below is a rough estimate as Sandoboxie itself reports 
that, for example, “Windows may store copies of programs files in the Prefetch 
folder even when the programs were executed under Sandboxie”3, which means 
that BSA will not log files such as Prefetch as part of the file system modifications. 
The same applies to event log and potentially other files. It is worthwhile noting 
that the modified version of Kludge was the most consistent over all systems and 
the most “forensically friendly” of all three tools. More information on the critical 
modifications can be found in the Sandbox analyzer log snippets in Appendix C. 
 
           
Tool 
OS 




FM*: 39 (mainly prefetch 
and /system32/CatRoot) 
RC: 33 







FM: 84 (mainly prefetch 
and logfiles) 
RC: 379 
FM :4 (mainly 
logfiles) 
RC : 71 
FM: 1 (temp 
appdata) 
RC: 6 
                                                          
 
3 http://www.sandboxie.com/index.php?PrivacyConcerns  




Win 7  FM: 39 (prefetch and 
user appdata) 
RC: 134  
FM : 26 (mostly in 
prefetch, one in 
/system32/) 
RC: 131 





FM: 138 (prefetch and 
user appdata) 
RC: 354 
FM: 45 (mostly in 




Win 8 FM:29 (prefetch and user 
appdata) 
RC:131 
FM: 19 (2 in 
/system32/) 
RC: 127 
FM: 1 (temp 
appdata) 
RC: 8 
*FM: File creations/modifications – RC: Registry changes 
Table 5.4. Summary of file system and registry modifications 
 
Advantages  
5.6.1 TriageIR 0.79 
 
TriageIR collects information about the examined computer’s startup process 
which can be proven useful for malware analysis. Specifically, it utilizes the “wmic 
startup list full” command which “shows a whole bunch of stuff useful in malware 
analysis, including all files loaded at Startup and the reg keys associated with 
autostart” (Skoudis, 2006). Additionally, it locates and copies all usrclass.dat files, 
files that represent each user’s profile settings, by using sleuthkit’s ifind and icat 
commands. Moreover, the tool rips all registry hives, by means of the Regripper 
utility. Another advantage of TriageIR is the fact that it produces MD5 and SHA-1 
hashes of evidence files (logs, Prefetch, recent links, jump lists and registry files). 
This functionality can be used to prove the integrity of the evidence data. Finally, 
the tool creates a compressed file of the produced incident report (excluding .dat1 




From a forensics practice perspective TR3Secure includes the desirable 
functionality as it provides the first responder with the capability to set a) case 
identifier, b) analyst’s name, c) drive letter for the volume storing the tools, d) 
drive letter for the volume to store the collection data, e) current date and time. 
Additionally, it logs every step of the triage process apart from the produced errors 
and it runs through a single command shell window, allowing the examiner to 
observe any occurring errors. 
  
5.6.3 Kludge 3.20110223 
 
Kludge collects digital evidence that the other two tools do not. First of all, it 
collects internet browsers history from Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer, which 




can be proven very useful if, for example, the examiner is working on a case 
relating to a plethora of common offenses such as grooming, bullying, spam, and 
so forth. Additionally, it collects antivirus logs and reports on the firewall state. 
Furthermore, it collects process dumps and process-related memory for each 
running process.  
 
From a forensics perspective Kludge creates timelines of system activity by 
using fls. This functionality can be useful for the examiner, as this type of triage 
report “gives an investigator clues regarding where to probe further”4. Finally, 
Kludge produces an html file, through which the investigator can navigate the 
collected digital evidence. This simplifies the work of the investigator and 
potentially speeds up the triage process. 
 
5.7 Drawbacks  
 
None of the triage tools state in their manuals that the examiner has to employ 
for all the tools the “Run as administrator” function in Windows Vista, 7 and 8 
operating system environments, as UAC prevents some programs, such as those 
that collect memory, from running correctly.  
 
5.7.1 TriageIR 0.79 
 
TriageIR presents some design errors that might be caused by programming 
faults or incompatibility of the utilities the tool uses in various operating systems. 
First of all, the tool does not collect any Netbios information, as the Nbtstat 
command utilized by the tool for this specific purpose seems to fail in all tested 
operating systems. Additionally, the tool collects partial event log information in 
Windows 7, 8 and XP 64-bit operating systems, as robo7 utility fails to copy .evtx 
files in Windows 7 and 8 due to incompatibility, while the tool’s author seems to 
have not catered for collecting event log files in Windows XP 64-bit operating 
systems. Moreover, the tool does not collect the security registry hive in Windows 
XP, as the operating system does not allow the administrator to “navigate his way 
through the HKLM\SECURITY hive”5 by default resulting in the tool not being able 
to collect the hive in question due to access restrictions. The tool does not record 
the hard disk’s directory structure in Windows XP 64-bit, although the command 
utilized (tree c:\ /f /a) is seemingly correct. The tool also fails to collect, although 
so designed, various information from the examined computer (hosts file, current 
logon user, user logons and firewall configuration). This is due to the fact that the 
tool’s author has omitted to call the functions collecting this information through 
the tool’s GUI. In order to correct this omission, the author has to a) create the 
                                                          
 
4 http://wiki.sleuthkit.org/index.php?title=Timelines  
5 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Registry for information on Registry in general and 
http://www.registryonwindows.com/registry-security-1.php in regards to the HKLM\SECURITY hive in particular.  




appropriate checkboxes in the tool’s graphical interface (through the tool’s 
TriageGUI() ), b) correlate the Firewall, Hosts and LoggedOn .ini settings with the 
corresponding checkboxes in the tool’s GUI (through the tool’s Ini2GUI() ) and c) 
call the appropriate functions (“Firewall”, “Hosts”, “LoggedOn”) through the tool’s 
INI2Command(). It should be noted here that the LoggedOn function calls the 
logonsessions utility by using the command “logonsessions -accepteula c”, which is 
not correctly syntaxed thus unable to execute. Furthermore, the tool fails to collect 
Prefetch files in Windows 7 64-bit with no service pack installed. The tool leverages 
the command whoami to collect current user info. However, this command does 
not function in Windows XP, unless Windows XP SP2 support tools are installed. 
Lastly, scheduled tasks data are not collected in Windows 8, as the utilized AT 
command has been deprecated and the user is advised by the operating system to 
use schtasks.exe instead. 
By inspecting the execution and results, the tool seemed to violate a number 
of expectations on forensic soundness. First of all, the tool utilizes Sysinternal’s 
ntfsinfo utility to record ntfs information. The utility requires as a parameter a hard 
disk partition letter in order to operate. TriageIR takes for granted that the 
examined windows partition letter is c: and attempts to read ntfs info on that 
partition. If Windows OS is not installed on the c: partition ntfsinfo will not collect 
any ntfs information regarding the operating system partition. The same applies to 
the usage of absolute paths (C:\Users\, C:\Documents and Settings\) for the 
collection of user profiles (USRClass.dat files), recent links, jump lists, event logs 
and directory structure. Furthermore, the tool adds registry keys required for the 
execution of the Sysinternals tools but does not seem to undo these registry 
alterations. Additionally, it does not record all executed commands in the created 
incident log file. As such, the examiner is not in a position to know which 
commands executed correctly, which failed and why. Traceability of the execution 
becomes even more difficult as the tool calls a separate command shell for each 
utility invoked, which vanishes after execution resulting in the examiner not being 
able to inspect the produced errors. However, although TriageIR creates MD5 
hashes of the evidence files, it does not produce similar hashes for all the reports 
(ex. ARP Info, Network Connections, etc.), which are created during execution. 
This can be justified in part, as these reports are not reproducible (in a second 
execution some of these reports will entail different information). However, it is 
our belief that the tool should create also hashes of the reports, in order to be able 
to maintain a proper chain of custody for all digital evidence collected or produced 
by the tool. Finally, if the tool’s compression functionality is used, certain items 




The tool exhibited a number of errors during execution. The most serious one 
was that it seems to run smoothly on 32-bit operating systems but it fails on 64-
bit OS as some of its tools, including the one that images the memory, are built for 




32-bit OS. For example, pv.exe is used to map running processes to executables, 
but, when run on a 64-bit OS environment, it seems to map only 32-bit running 
processes. In Windows 7 64-bit the tool could not find the path of the “tools” 
folder, thus certain variables must be defined, in order for the tool to execute 
correctly.  
 
The tool, when run in OS that use a different codepage (for example Greek 
codepage 737) produces text files that need to be viewed with specific viewer (as 
for example, with Wordpad), in order for the results to be viewable.   
 
5.7.3 Kludge 3.20110223 
 
Kludge presents some out-of-the-box errors that may have been caused by 
programming faults or incompatibility of the utilities the tool invokes in various 
operating systems. First of all, the Hobocopy utility which Kludge utilizes for 
copying certain files, crashed in Windows 7 and 8 OS, 32-bit and 64-bit versions, 
resulting to event logs and registry files not been collected. It appears that the 
version included in Kludge downloadable package is old and, according to the 
utility’s website, is destined for Windows XP 32-bit systems. In order to run the 
Hobocopy utility in Windows 7 and Windows 8 OS (32-bit and 64-bit versions) it 
was necessary to replace the version in question with a version that supports 
Windows 7 and 8 and also to install Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 Redistributable 
Package in order for the utility to execute and produce the desired results. 
 
Additionally, “At.exe”, “Netstat.exe”, “Ifconfig.exe”, “Arp.exe”, “Route.exe”, 
“Net.exe” and “Streams.exe” utilities invoked by Kludge in Windows 7 and 8 OS, 
(32-bit and 64-bit versions) crashed as these tools depend on netapi32.dll 
architecture, which is different in Windows 7 and 8 systems. Also, the wmic utility 
which parses mof files, does not execute in the aforementioned operating systems. 
Moreover, Kludge may collect AV logs, which is an advantage, but it collects 
specific AV logs (Symantec Antivirus Corporate Edition 7.5, Symantec Endpoint 
Protection, McAfee\VirusScan, McAfee\MSC). This is a drawback that limits this 
useful functionality as Symantec and McAffee share only 15% of the antivirus 
market (OPSWAT, 2012). This means that in at least 85% of the cases Kludge will 
collect no antivirus logs. It also reinforces the fact that the first responder must be 
fully aware of the capabilities and limitations of the triage tool he decides to 
employ. Additionally, Kludge does not collect .evtx files, which means that the tool 
does not acquire event logs in Windows Vista, 7 and 8 OS. With regards to forensic 
practices, the tool does not keep a detailed log of the utilities invoked making it 
difficult to check which utilities / commands were actually executed during the 
triage process. 
Another peculiar feature of Kludge is that it is designed to run only remotely 
through administrative shares. Therefore, in order to collect data from a remote 
machine, administrative shares must be enabled in Windows operating systems. 




Another important issue is that Kludge uploads its tools to the remote machine in 
c:\Windows\Temp\ folder in a zipped format file and then unzips them, in order to 
execute them by using the wmic utility. The results, including the system’s 
memory dump, are saved in the same folder. Provided that nowadays computer 
systems have at least 2GB of RAM the examined system would significantly be 
altered. In addition and similar with TriageIR, the tool does not remove upon 
completion the registry keys it adds to the system; these registry keys relate to 
the execution and functionality of the Sysinternals utilities.  
 
5.8 Adherence to ACPO Principle 2  
Triage is inevitably linked with accessing the original data from a live system. 
The admissibility safeguard captured by Principle 2 suggests that the investigator 
accessing the live system should be competent enough and capable of explaining 
the relevance and implications of their actions. Consequently, the investigator’s 
competence would also be related to their understanding on how the triage tool 
interferes and disturbs the configuration, states of the live system and the 
underlying data. In the following subsections the behaviour of the tools examined 
in this chapter is highlighted.  
 
 
5.8.1 TriageIR 0.79 
 
TriageIR modifies the hard disk of the system pertaining to the operating 
system it is executed in. As the tool invokes its repertoire of utilities items relating 
to the actual Windows OS functionality, such as Prefetch, recent files, jumplists 
(Windows 7 and Windows 8), CryptnetUrlCache and temp folders, are altered. The 
same applies to registry keys, which are altered or added. In Windows XP SP3 32-
bit, wbem logs (C\WINDOWS\system32\WBEM\Logs) are altered, whereas in 
Windows XP, 7 64bit (SP1 and no SP1), 8 (32-bit and 64-bit) the event logs folder 
is altered. In cases where a utility crashes (Windows 7 64-bit and 8 64-bit), 
appcrash reports are created in a specific folder (C:\users\all 
users\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\). In all Windows OS versions, 
except Windows 7 64-bit SP2, files are created in the 
C\Windows\system32\CatRoot2\ folder, while the tool loads, in all Windows OS, a 
Sysinternals driver named "PROCEXP152.SYS". Similarly, the tool loads in all 
Windows OS drivers named “win32dd.sys” or “win64dd.sys”, in order to image the 
memory using the win32dd or win64dd utilities. In all operating systems, triageIR 
creates a “commands.log” file in the windows drive, which contains a limited log of 
the executed commands.  
Against the above discussion, it is concluded that all modifications are 
justifiable, of a limited extent and can be explained and eventually defended in 
court.  
 






TR3Secure presents an almost consistent behaviour in all operating systems it 
is executed in. Similar to TriageIR, the utilities invoked by TR3Secure result to 
altering Windows OS components such as Prefetch files. This also appears in some 
cases (Windows Xp, Windows 7 64-bit – SP and no SP -, Windows 8 32- and 64-
bit) with temp and recent activity files. In all operating systems TR3Secure loads 
drivers (sysinternals’ PROCEXP141.SYS, mandiant tools driver, Nirsoftopened files 
driver) in certain folders (c:\windows\system32\drivers, 
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\), alters or adds registry keys, creates or modifies 
C:\Windows\WindowsUpdate.log and modifies C:\WINDOWS\SoftwareDistribution\ 
folder. In Windows 7 and 8, where utilities such as “uptime” and “pslist” fail to 
execute, appcrash reports are created in specific folders (C:\users\all 
users\Microsoft\Windows\WER\ ReportArchive\ and 
C:\users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Report Archive\). Finally, in 
Windows 8, folder C:\Windows\INF\ is modified. 
Similar to TriageIR, it is concluded that all modifications are justifiable, of a 




5.8.3 Kludge 3.20110223 
 
Kludge network edition does not respect ACPO Principle 2 because the changes 
that it makes to the examined system are extensive, as incident data and called 
utilities are firstly written in the C:\Windows\Temp folder of the system under 
investigation. Considering that modern computer systems have at least 512 MB, 
more than 512 MBs are written to the hard disk of the examined system, as 
Kludge executes. Thus, although the modifications to the examined system are 
explainable, they are not justifiable and thus not acceptable. However the modified 
version of Kludge, respects Principle 2. 
In detail, in all operating systems Kludge alters or adds registry keys, creates 
files in C\Windows\system32\CatRoot2\ folder, attempts to create at least one 
driver (sysinternals PROCEXP.SYS) in certain folders 
(c:\windows\system32\drivers, C:\Windows\SysWOW64\) and modifies Prefetch 
as well as the users’ recent activity and temp files. In Windows 7 family appcrash 
reports are created in specific folder (C:\users\all users\Microsoft 
\Windows\WER\ReportArchive\) as specific utilities (hobocopy and streams) called 









5.9 Conclusion  
The triage tools need to have two types of dynamically adjusting behaviour: 
 
1. Before the acquisition in order to operate correctly and 
minimize the risks of errors. This is similar to the make config command 
in Linux systems, which inspects the variables, paths and other 
dependencies in a system.  
2. During execution, in order to maximize their effectiveness and 
purpose. For example, forking of unrelated utilities not affecting one 
another may reduce the triage period. In addition, the invocation of 
utilities could be modified depending on the acquired data (for example, if 
a suspicious network connection is discovered it may be worthwhile to 
also capture the traffic). 
 
By observing the behaviour of the three tools it seems that disabling Prefetch 
on Windows systems is a highly advised action since this will result to less system 
alterations. This can be achieved by modifying the registry value controlling 
Prefect, and upon completion the tool must restore the registry key to its’ original 
value (see Appendix B). Registry modifications when done in a controlled manner 
are more easily justifiable than alterations caused when Prefetch is enabled and 
such tradeoff seems to be unquestionable. Additionally, the execution speed of 
robocopy can be increased by using the “XJ” switch (ex. robocopy.exe 
%sys_drive% %vol_outpath%\preserved-windowspartitionlog-files\ *.evt *.log 
*.evtx /S /ZB /copy:DATSOU /r:1 /w:1 /ts /FP /np /XJ") to exclude junctions from 
the robocopy file collection, as junctions might lead to creation of nested triage 
data. Furthermore, it is suggested that the tools keep a detailed log of all actions 
performed including, if possible, errors produced during execution, as traceability 
of the tools’ execution is a very important part of the forensic process. Moreover, it 
is recommended that the tools record and undo all registry changes, which they 
knowingly perform to the examined system.  
It is also advisable that all triage tools include functionality for collecting 
internet activity artifacts (history, cookies, archived passwords, etc.) pertaining to 
all known browsers. 
 
5.9.1 TriageIR 0.79 
 
The tool is not Windows 8-ready. Additionally, the tool must have been 
designed with a specific environment in mind as it predicts triage collection (for 
specific evidence items) in the specialized winxpe OS environment (destined to 
“enable rapid development of the most reliable and full-featured connected 
devices”) but not in Windows XP 64-bit.  
 






The tool needs to be adjusted in order to be better compatible with Windows 
64bit OS, thus it is recommended that the code is modified and more utilities are 
included, which will cover the 64bit OS aspect. Additionally, the tool will benefit if 
it is modified in order to be able to collect registry files, scheduled tasks, 
peripherals, installed printers, user logons and internet activity artifacts. 
 
5.9.3 Kludge 3.20110223 
 
The tool was built for specific situations, that is why it searches for certain 
Antivirus products and why the author of the tool has commented certain lines of 
code which point out to rootkit scan with Sophos Anti-rootkit and GMER. 
Additionally, the tool must be modified, in order for it to run from a usb stick or an 
external drive and save the results there. Moreover, some tools need to be 
replaced in order to run in Windows 7 and 8. 
 
 















Conclusion and future work









This chapter summarises the findings of the thesis. These consist of evaluation, 
conclusions and observations, followed by suggestions for further research. 
6.2 Literature 
The literature used has investigated various sources, such as journals, indexed 
search on electronic libraries, as well as sources on the Internet. This has provided 
an extensive source of relevant information. In addition, personal communication 
with authors in the field of DDoS and network security was useful. Cross-
references from bibliographies and references in sources were also investigated. 
 
6.3 Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis were: 
O1. To improve detection times in the case of a DDoS attack;  
O2. To improve detection rates of offending IPs; 
O3. To improve detection of IP spoofing; 
O4. To develop an appropriate incident response plan for proactively protecting 
the web resources and minimising the damage; 
O5. To develop a methodology for forensic analysis of the identified attack 
sources. 
 O5.1 To evaluate and improve open source triage tools. 
 
6.4 Evaluation 
6.4.1 Evaluation and improvements on DDoS detection 
 
DDoS detection is particularly challenging in sites with a large average number 
of hits, as the detection methods typically generate false positives and are not 
practical. Yet, when a DDoS attack is detected, it is imperative to identify the 
offending hosts in a timely manner in order to offer added value intrusion 
response. 
Chapter 3 attempted to relax the strict requirements of poisson model using 
Fuzzy Estimators, as this is problematic, instead of trying to find a better model 
which, as it was presumed, it would be a futile exercise. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to assume some models as a point of reference, and the most obvious 
and popular one was Poisson. In order to validate and demonstrate this 
assumption, a DDoS detector program was developed in C# to validate our claims 
with real DDoS attack datasets collected from a busy Job Seeking website that 
resides within the university campus. The results showed that Poisson along with 
Fuzzy Estimators in HTTP DDoS attack can provide fast and accurate results in 
detection of DDoS attack and also in detection of offensive IP address. This 




method has not been tested on flash crowds as firstly there were no datasets 
available and secondly it was not the aim of this method. Concerning IP spoofing, 
the initial proposed method failed as it recognized IP spoofing as real IPs, so it 
classified them according to the attack rate as offensive or normal IPs.  
6.4.2 Evaluation and improvements on IP spoofing detection 
 
In Chapter 4 the proposed method is an extension of the method introduced in 
Chapter 3 and, as the results showed, it was effective in identifying spoof IPs with 
high detection rate, close to 100%.  
The final idea of the developed method is shown in Figure 6.1. This system will 
be used later with Fuzzy Estimator to mitigate DDoS or identify and mitigate 
network anomalies, in real time. The offensive IPs will be saved in a database and 
various sensors being placed on computers, smart phones and tablets across the 
network will collect useful data in order to support network Administrators in their 
regular administrative tasks. The first defence of the Fuzzy System is to 
automatically block the IP Addresses that are scored as HIGH. Also a good 
measure that can be added is to count the subnet attack IPs and if this number is 
increasing to automatically block all the subnets as a precaution of a DDoS attack 
or even block entire country IP range as Amazon does in a case of DDoS attack. 
This can be achieved by creating a communication with a statefull firewall and by 
inserting automatic rules that will block this IPs or subnets. This way only the 
legitimate users will get responses from Web Servers. Also a Web Reporting 
System could be developed, which by using some metrics from the sensors and 
firewall data will report important events to the network administrator; be that as 
it may, the network Administrator can investigate them and tune the system. 
 
6.4.3 Evaluation and improvements on open source triage tools 
 
In Chapter 5, it was empirically confirmed that by far there is no silver bullet for 
an all-purpose, highly effective, robust triage tool. Such conclusion was intuitively 
expected due to the high variety and complexity of modern computer systems. As 
the complexity is not expected to decrease, and variety in the users’ needs and 
user practices in terms of software and processes will tend to be pluralistic, this 
work recommends the following considerations a first responder should consider in 
order to manage risk and handle uncertainty surrounding a triage phase: 
 
 Maintain a profile of the capabilities of the tools. This profile can consist of a 
number of qualitative and quantitative metrics and will assist the responder 
to select the most appropriate tool for the occasion through an informed 
decision. From the empirical study of the three tools, the following metrics 
are proposed: 




o Effectiveness. This refers to the effectiveness metric introduced in 
Section 4 and captures the ability of the tool to collect a large variety 
of different incident data. This can be either a qualitative (i.e. on an 
ordinal descriptive scale of “low”/ “medium”/ “high”) or a quantitative 
metric (number of types of evidence collected as a percentage of a 
total number of evidence). 
o (Un)reliability. This metric refers to the amount of errors the tool 
produces. This can be quantitative and described by two values, the 
mean of the percentages of failed utility executions to total number of 
executions, and the standard deviation. This metric can be further 
specified by OS. 
o Invariability. Invariability shows whether the tool behaves 
consistently across different systems. This can be a result of a 
statistical test.  
Some intuitive relations may exist between the metrics. For example, it is 
expected that an effective and highly reliable tool will have low invariability, since 
in order for it to have an outstanding performance with a particular OS it will not 
perform as well when applied to other systems. Relationships and utilization 
strategies of these metrics are a subject of future research. 
One of the advantages of using open source tools is that the first responder will 
have the opportunity to prepare well in advance by modifying the tool himself, in 
order to fit his needs. This would be particularly useful if there is detailed 
advanced knowledge on the systems to be seized and may help overcome 
potential limitations (say a limited RAM in an embedded system, prohibiting the 
use of a large tool). However, it should be highlighted that this will require a 
significant amount of programming knowledge on the tool’s software technology. 
Open source approaches are a double-edge sword; although they give a significant 
amount of control to the user, the final product may not have been extensively 
tested and verified for various errors that can lead to catastrophic situations during 
a triage exercise. In any case, the competent examiner must modify the tool 
keeping in mind a list of desirable properties and characteristics the tool should 
maintain (see, for example, the work by Mislan et al. (2010) for a comprehensive 
list of requirements for triage inspection tools). 
Another point is the need of having a portfolio of triage tools, for the reason that 
some tools may be recognized as viruses from the installed antivirus software and 
as such their execution may be hindered. In situations where the execution of a 
triage tool is affected by the antivirus, the first responder’s alternatives are: a) 
disable the antivirus software, b) use a different tool and c) have an obfuscated 
version of the tool. Alternative (a) would be the preferable alternative in most 
situations as the changes to the suspect system can be well documented (ACPO 
Principles 2 and 3) and at the same time the most preferable to the first responder 
tool will be employed. Alternative (c) is considered to be the least preferable action 
because it requires a higher degree of preparation. In addition, despite the fact 
that there are obfuscation tools that trivially transform the executable code to 




another congruent form, yet there is no guarantee that the code will be fully 




6.5 Open issues for future research 
 
DDoS Fuzzy Estimators proposed method is possible to work with other models 
as well as with IPv6, which is an area of future research along with flash crowds.  
FHSD proposed method for detecting IP spoofing, could include the validation of 
FHSD with flash crowds and whether it can discriminate them from spoof IPs.  
Similarly, further work could investigate the implementation of FHSD for IPv6 and 
how it performs in IPv6 traffic.   
 
Figure 6.1: The final idea of this project. 
Last, a future research effort plan is to revisit the triage tools and assess them 
from a usefulness and quality perspective, to determine if the triage data collected 
are immediately exploitable by the examiner and if they provide valuable 
information on a case-by-case basis. Subsequently, a research goal is to build a 
triage tool that combines useful functionality from all three tested tools and 
produces, in a case-by-case basis, results that enhance the triage process. 











Tshark scripts to analyze pcap files 










A.1 Windows bat script code 
 
@echo off 














echo Please Wait. I am currently exporting the data to csv file... 
tshark.exe -r "%mypath1%\%mydatafile%" -T fields -e frame.number -e 
frame.time_epoch -e ip.src -e eth.src -e tcp.srcport -e ip.dst -e eth.dst -e 
tcp.dstport -e tcp.checksum_bad -e tcp.time_delta -e tcp.time_relative -e tcp.flags 
-e tcp.flags.syn -e tcp.flags.ack -e tcp.flags.fin -e tcp.flags.cwr -e tcp.flags.ecn -e 
tcp.flags.ns -e tcp.flags.push -e tcp.flags.res -e tcp.flags.reset -e tcp.options.sack 
-e ip.flags.df -e tcp.options.time_stamp -e ip.ttl -e ip.id -e tcp.window_size -e 
frame.len -e tcp.len -e ip.len -e http.user_agent -e http.request.method -e 
http.request.uri -e http.host -e http.response -E header="y" -E separator="|" -R 



















rm -rf $resultfolder*.txt 
rm -rf $resultfolder*.csv 
 









tshark -r ${f} -T fields -e frame.number -e frame.time_epoch -e ip.src -e eth.src -
e tcp.srcport -e ip.dst -e eth.dst -e tcp.dstport -e tcp.checksum_bad -e 
tcp.time_delta -e tcp.time_relative -e tcp.flags -e tcp.flags.syn -e tcp.flags.ack -e 
tcp.flags.fin -e tcp.flags.cwr -e tcp.flags.ecn -e tcp.flags.ns -e tcp.flags.push -e 
tcp.flags.res -e tcp.flags.reset -e tcp.options.sack -e ip.flags.df -e 
tcp.options.time_stamp -e ip.ttl -e ip.id -e tcp.window_size -e frame.len -e tcp.len 
-e ip.len -e http.user_agent -e http.request.method -e http.request.uri -e 
http.host -e http.response -E header="y" -E separator="|" -R "tcp and 
tcp.dstport==80" >> ${f}_ipsrc_ipdst_srcport_dport.csv 
done 
mv $csvfolder $resultfolder 









-T fields   Format of text output. Available formats are 
pdml|ps|psml|text|fields. Default is text. Here 
we are using fields and we define fields with 
the –e <fieldname> command as explained 
below. 
-e frame.number  frame.number field is going to be printed. 
-e frame.time_epoch  frame.number field is going to be printed. 
-e ip.src  frame.time_epoch field is going to be printed. 
-e eth.src ip.src field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.srcport  eth.src field is going to be printed. 
-e ip.dst  tcp.srcport field is going to be printed. 
-e eth.dst  ip.dst field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.dstport  eth.dst field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.checksum_bad  tcp.dstport field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.time_delta tcp.checksum_bad field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.time_relative  tcp.time_delta field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags  tcp.time_relative field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.syn  tcp.flags field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.ack  tcp.flags.syn field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.fin  tcp.flags.ack field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.cwr  tcp.flags.fin field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.ecn  tcp.flags.cwr field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.ns  tcp.flags.ecn field is going to be printed. 




-e tcp.flags.push  tcp.flags.ns field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.res  tcp.flags.push field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.flags.reset  tcp.flags.res field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.options.sack  tcp.flags.reset field is going to be printed. 
-e ip.flags.df  tcp.options.sack field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.options.time_stamp  ip.flags.df field is going to be printed. 
-e ip.ttl  tcp.options.time_stamp field is going to be 
printed. 
-e tcp.window_size  ip.ttl field is going to be printed. 
-e frame.len  tcp.window_size field is going to be printed. 
-e tcp.len  frame.len field is going to be printed. 
-e ip.len  tcp.len field is going to be printed. 
-e http.user_agent  ip.len field is going to be printed. 
-e http.request.method http.user_agent field is going to be printed. 
-e http.request.uri  http.request.methodfield is going to be printed. 
-e http.host  http.request.uri field is going to be printed. 
-e http.response  http.host field is going to be printed. 
-E header="y"  Switch headers on and off. Available options 
are y or n. Using “y” it will add the fields 
header in each column of the csv file that we 
are going to produce. 
-E separator="|"  Available options are /t|/s|<char> select tab, 
space, printable character as separator. Here 
we define how each line in the csv file will be 
separate. In this example we use | as the 
separator character. 
-R "tcp and tcp.dstport==80" Packet Read filter in Wireshark display filter 
syntax. Here we choose only TCP protocol and 
only the packets coming to our local server port 
80. All the other traffic is ignored. 
 




More about tshark commands at http://www.wireshark.org/docs/man-
pages/tshark.html 
 
A.4 Tshark TCP Flags 
 
0x01 = FIN 
0x02 = SYN 
0x04 = RST 
0x08 = PSH 
0x10 = ACK 
0x11 = FIN and ACK 
0x12 = SYN and ACK 
0x14 = RST and ACK 
0x18 = PSH and ACK 
0x31 = FIN, PSH, and URG (TCP XMAS) 















Useful C# functions 










B.1 Phi Calculation C# Function 
/* Code from http://www.johndcook.com/normal_cdf_inverse.html */ 
        static double Phi(double x) 
        { 
            // constants 
            double a1 = 0.254829592; 
            double a2 = -0.284496736; 
            double a3 = 1.421413741; 
            double a4 = -1.453152027; 
            double a5 = 1.061405429; 
            double p = 0.3275911; 
 
            // Save the sign of x 
            int sign = 1; 
            if (x < 0) 
                sign = -1; 
            x = Math.Abs(x) / Math.Sqrt(2.0); 
 
            // A&S formula 7.1.26 
            double t = 1.0 / (1.0 + p * x); 
            double y = 1.0 - (((((a5 * t + a4) * t) + a3) * t + a2) * t + a1) * t * 
Math.Exp(-x * x); 
 
            return 0.5 * (1.0 + sign * y); 
        } 
 
B.2 Rational Approximation Calculation C# Function 
/* Code from http://www.johndcook.com/normal_cdf_inverse.html */ 
        static double RationalApproximation(double t) 
        { 
            // Abramowitz and Stegun formula 26.2.23. 
            // The absolute value of the error should be less than 4.5 e-4. 
            double[] c = { 2.515517, 0.802853, 0.010328 }; 
            double[] d = { 1.432788, 0.189269, 0.001308 }; 
            return t - ((c[2] * t + c[1]) * t + c[0]) / 
                        (((d[2] * t + d[1]) * t + d[0]) * t + 1.0); 
        } 
 
B.3 Phi Inverse Calculation C# Function 
/* Code from http://www.johndcook.com/normal_cdf_inverse.html */ 
        static double PhiInverse(double p) 
        { 
            try 




            { 
                if (p <= 0.0 || p >= 1.0) 
                { 
                    string msg = String.Format("Invalid input argument: {0}.", p); 
                    throw new ArgumentOutOfRangeException(msg); 
                } 
            } 
            catch { } 
            if (p < 0.5) 
            { 
                // F^-1(p) = - G^-1(p) 
                return -RationalApproximation(Math.Sqrt(-2.0 * Math.Log(p))); 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                // F^-1(p) = G^-1(1-p) 
                return RationalApproximation(Math.Sqrt(-2.0 * Math.Log(1.0 - p))); 
            } 
        } 
 
 
B.4 Split a CSV File to Smaller Files C# Function  
/* Copyright Stavros Shiaeles. You can use this code anywhere you need provided 
you reference the source of the code*/ 
public void SplitCSV(string FilePath, int LineCount, int MaxOutputFile) 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                // Validate first 
                if (LineCount < 100) 
                    throw new Exception("Number of lines must be more than 100."); 
 
                // Open the csv file for reading 
                System.IO.StreamReader Reader = new 
System.IO.StreamReader(FilePath); 
 
                // Create the output directory 
                string OutputFolder = FilePath + "_Pieces"; 
                if (Directory.Exists(FilePath) == false) 
                { 
                    Directory.CreateDirectory(OutputFolder); 
                } 
 
                // Read the csv column's header 
                string strHeader = Reader.ReadLine(); 





                // Start splitting 
                int FileIndex = 0; 
                int Status = System.IO.File.ReadAllLines(textBox25.Text).Length; 
 
                do 
                { 
                    // Update progress 
                    FileIndex += 1; 
                    if ((Status != 0)) 
                    { 
                        //Status.Invoke((FileIndex - 1) * LineCount); 
                        Status = (FileIndex - 1) * LineCount; 
                    } 
 
 
                    // Check if the number of splitted files doesn't exceed the limit 
                    if ((MaxOutputFile < FileIndex) & (MaxOutputFile > 0)) 
                        break;  
 
                    // Create new file to store a piece of the csv file 
                    string PiecePath = OutputFolder + "\\" + 
Path.GetFileNameWithoutExtension(FilePath) + "_" + FileIndex + 
Path.GetExtension(FilePath); 
                    StreamWriter Writer = new StreamWriter(PiecePath, false); 
                    Writer.AutoFlush = false; 
                    Writer.WriteLine(strHeader); 
 
                    // Read and writes precise number of rows 
 
                    for (int i = 1; i <= LineCount; i++) 
                    { 
                        string s = Reader.ReadLine(); 
                        if (s != null /*& _IsAbort == false*/) 
                        { 
                            Writer.WriteLine(s); 
                        } 
                        else 
                        { 
                            Writer.Flush(); 
                            Writer.Close(); 
                            break;  
                        } 
 
                    } 





                    // Flush and close the splitted file 
                    Writer.Flush(); 
                    Writer.Close(); 
 
                } while (true); 
 
                Reader.Close(); 
                MessageBox.Show("Split CSV Finish."); 
            } 
            catch {} 
          } 











Modifications and improvements 
performed on the triage tools 











This tool is designed to run remotely on target host by using administrative 
shares.  We modified the script, in order to run it locally.   
 




REM Please email nick@theinterw3bs.com any changes or modifications to 
Kludge 3.1 









set /p gpgenabled=GPG Encryption?  Enter yes or no:  
if %gpgenabled% equ = yes ( 




set /p query=Query for previous incidents?  Enter yes or no:  
if %query% equ yes ( 
set /p ticket=Enter a Ticket Number e.g. 9678:  








IF DEFINED ProgramFiles(x86) ( 
SET OSBit=x64 





REM Check Windows Version 




ver | findstr /i "5\.0\." > nul 
IF %ERRORLEVEL% EQU 0 goto ver_2000 
ver | findstr /i "5\.1\." > nul 
IF %ERRORLEVEL% EQU 0 goto ver_XP 
ver | findstr /i "5\.2\." > nul 
IF %ERRORLEVEL% EQU 0 goto ver_2003 
ver | findstr /i "6\.0\." > nul 
IF %ERRORLEVEL% EQU 0 goto ver_Vista 
ver | findstr /i "6\.1\." > nul 
IF %ERRORLEVEL% EQU 0 goto ver_Win7 
ver | findstr /i "6\.2\." > nul 




:Run Windows 8 specific commands here 
REM echo OS Version: Windows 8 (debug line) 
echo windows 8 %OSBit% detected 
SET ossystem=Windows 8 %OSBit% 
if "%OSBit%" == "x64" ( 
SET HoboCopy=HoboCopy7_64.exe 






:Run Windows 7 specific commands here 
REM echo OS Version: Windows 7 (debug line) 
echo windows 7 %OSBit% detected 
SET ossystem=Windows 7 %OSBit% 
if "%OSBit%" == "x64" ( 
SET HoboCopy=HoboCopy7_64.exe 







:Run Windows Vista specific commands here 
REM echo OS Version: Windows Vista (debug line) 
echo Windows vista %OSBit% detected 
SET ossystem=Windows Vista %OSBit% 
if "%OSBit%" == "x64" ( 











:Run Windows XP specific commands here 
REM echo OS Version: Windows XP (debug line) 
echo Windows XP %OSBit% detected 
SET ossystem=Windows XP %OSBit% 
if "%OSBit%" == "x64" ( 
SET HoboCopy=HoboCopy7_64.exe 








echo %COMPUTERNAME%> %mypath%\report\computername.txt 
 
REM Dump physical memory first 
if %level% equ 3 ( 
echo Dumping Physical Memory 
%mypath%\mdd.exe -q -o %mypath%\report\physmem-
%COMPUTERNAME%.dump 
mkdir %mypath%\report\MemInfo 
REM move physmem-%COMPUTERNAME%.dump MemInfo\ 
 
REM Dump memory from each process 
echo Dumping each Processes memory 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\ProcDump /v EulaAccepted /t 
REG_DWORD /d 1 /f 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\blah.txt process list brief 
/format:csv.xsl 
type %mypath%\report\blah.txt > %mypath%\report\brief.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=5 delims=," %%G IN (%mypath%\report\brief.txt) DO 
@echo %%G >> %mypath%\report\file.txt 
%mypath%\grep.exe -v Process %mypath%\report\file.txt > 
%mypath%\report\pids.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN (%mypath%\report\pids.txt) DO procdump 
%%G 
move *.dmp %mypath%\report\MemInfo\ 




REM Needs retesting since code execution change 




REM echo Outputting Virtual and Physical Memory Information 
REM reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\VMMap /v EulaAccepted /t 
REG_DWORD /d 1 /f 
REM wmic process list brief > %mypath%\report\blah.txt 
REM type blah.txt > %mypath%\report\brief.txt 
REM del blah.txt 
REM FOR /F "tokens=2*" %%G IN (brief.txt) DO @echo %%G >> 
%mypath%\report\file.txt 
REM sort file.txt /o sorted.txt 
REM %mypath%\uniq.exe sorted.txt > %mypath%\report\uniq.txt 
REM %mypath%\grep.exe -i exe uniq.txt > %mypath%\report\procs.txt 
REM %mypath%\grep.exe -v wmic %mypath%\report\procs.txt > 
%mypath%\report\procs2.txt 
REM FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN (%mypath%\report\procs2.txt) DO vmmap -p 
%%G VMMap.txt | type VMMap.txt >> %mypath%\report\REM VMMap-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt | echo ********************************  >> 
%mypath%\report\VMMap-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
REM del %mypath%\report\brief.txt 
REM del %mypath%\report\file.txt 
REM del %mypath%\report\uniq.txt 
REM del %mypath%\report\procs.txt 
REM del %mypath%\report\procs2.txt 
REM del %mypath%\report\sorted.txt 






REM Run Bastardized FLS version against a live C: drive.  Convert output into 
Timeline format.  Parse out the prefetch info into the Events file also. 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
mkdir %mypath%\report\TLN 
%mypath%\fls-live.exe c:/ > %mypath%\report\TLN\fls_bodyfile.txt 
%mypath%\bodyfile.exe -s %COMPUTERNAME% -f 
%mypath%\report\TLN\fls_bodyfile.txt > %mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 




















REM Check Service Status and start if STATE equals STOPPED 
sc query vss > %mypath%\report\vssstatus.txt 
%mypath%\grep.exe STATE %mypath%\report\vssstatus.txt > 
%mypath%\report\vss.txt 
set /p vssvar=<%mypath%\report\vss.txt 
if "%vssvar%"== "        STATE              : 1  STOPPED " ( 
sc start vss 
ping 127.0.0.1 -n 25 -w 1 >NUL 
) 
 
REM Copy Reg files and Event logs using Hobocopy 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
echo Copying Registry, Profiles and Logs 
    if "%ossystem%" == "Windows XP x86" ( 
      REM For each directory in the Docs and Settings copy out it's ntuser.dat 
       FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\%HoboCopy% "c:\Documents and Settings\%%G" 
%mypath%\report\Registry\%%G NTUSER.DAT 
      REM For each directory in the Docs and Settings copy out it's usrclass.dat 
       FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\%HoboCopy% "c:\Documents and Settings\%%G\Local 
Settings\Application Data\Microsoft\Windows" %mypath%\report\Registry\%%G 
UsrClass.dat 
      ) else ( 
                FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Users\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\%HoboCopy% "C:\Users\%%G" %mypath%\report\Registry\%%G 
NTUSER.DAT 
               REM For each directory in the Docs and Settings copy out it's 
usrclass.dat 
                FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Users\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\%HoboCopy% "C:\Users\%%G\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows" 
%mypath%\report\Registry\%%G UsrClass.dat 
              ) 














































REM Copy all Event Logs 
%mypath%\%HoboCopy% "C:\WINDOWS\system32\config" 
%mypath%\report\Logs\*.evt 





REM Change Folder Permitions 
%SystemRoot%\system32\cacls.exe %mypath%\report /t /e /g Administrators:f 
REM %SystemRoot%\system32\icacls.exe * /T /C /grant:r system:(OI) (CI) F 
%SystemRoot%\system32\cacls.exe %mypath%\report /t /e /p Administrator:f 
%SystemRoot%\system32\cacls.exe %mypath%\report /t /e /p "Creator OWner":f 
%SystemRoot%\system32\cacls.exe %mypath%\report /t /e /g Users:f 
 
REM Run RegTime against each reg file and type out the info into the events file 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\regtime.exe %mypath%\report\Registry\%%G\NTUSER.DAT >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
%mypath%\regtime.exe Registry\SYSTEM > %mypath%\report\TLN\system-
regtime.txt 
type %mypath%\report\TLN\system-regtime.txt >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
 
%mypath%\regtime.exe Registry\default > %mypath%\report\TLN\default-
regtime.txt 
type %mypath%\report\TLN\default-regtime.txt >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
 
%mypath%\regtime.exe Registry\SAM > %mypath%\report\TLN\sam-regtime.txt 
type %mypath%\report\TLN\sam-regtime.txt >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
 
%mypath%\regtime.exe Registry\SECURITY > %mypath%\report\TLN\security-
regtime.txt 
type %mypath%\report\TLN\security-regtime.txt >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
 
%mypath%\regtime.exe Registry\SOFTWARE > %mypath%\report\TLN\software-
regtime.txt 
type %mypath%\report\TLN\software-regtime.txt >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
 
%mypath%\regtime.exe Registry\userdiff > %mypath%\report\TLN\userdiff-
regtime.txt 
type %mypath%\report\TLN\userdiff-regtime.txt >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
 
REM Run RegRipper tools against all reg files 
echo RegRipping 
REM Rip each user with regripper's ntuser plugin 




FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO echo 




%mypath%/rip.exe -r Registry\%%G\NTUSER.DAT -f ntuser >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\%%G\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt && echo. 
>> %mypath%\report\Registry\%%G\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt   
REM Combine all users ripped ntuser data into one text file 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO echo 
%%G >> %mypath%\report\Registry\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt && 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\Registry\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt && 
type Registry\%%G\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt  
 
REM Run Regslack against each user profile 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\regslack.exe %mypath%\report\Registry\%%G\NTUSER.DAT >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\%%G\NTUSER.DAT-%%G-regslack.txt 
REM Combine all users regslack data into one text file 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO echo 
%%G >> %mypath%\report\Registry\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt 
&& echo. >> %mypath%\report\Registry\NTUSER-%COMPUTERNAME%-




REM Rip the SAM file 




echo.  >> %mypath%\report\Registry\SAM-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
%mypath%\rip.exe -r %mypath%\report\Registry\SAM -f sam >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\SAM-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
REM REGSLACK OUTPUT.  I don't believe the SAM file has slack but what the heck 




REM Only save the SAM file if running Option 3 
if %level% neq 3 del Registry\SAM 
if %level% neq 3 del Registry\SAM.log 
if %level% neq 3 del Registry\SAM.sav 
 




REM Rip the Security, Software and System files 
if %level% geq 2 (  




echo. >> %mypath%\report\Registry\SECURITY-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
%mypath%\rip.exe -r %mypath%\report\Registry\SECURITY -f security >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\SECURITY-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
%mypath%\regslack.exe %mypath%\report\Registry\SECURITY >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\SECURITY-%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt 
 




echo. >> %mypath%\report\Registry\SOFTWARE-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
%mypath%\rip.exe -r %mypath%\report\Registry\SOFTWARE -f software >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\SOFTWARE-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
%mypath%\regslack.exe %mypath%\report\Registry\SOFTWARE >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\SOFTWARE-%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt 
 




echo. >> %mypath%\report\Registry\SYSTEM-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
%mypath%\rip.exe -r %mypath%\report\Registry\SYSTEM -f system >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\SYSTEM-%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt 
%mypath%\regslack.exe %mypath%\report\Registry\SYSTEM >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\SYSTEM-%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt 
 
REM Output Common Reg Keys 
echo Outputting Common Registry Keys 
%mypath%\regscan.exe >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegScan-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
REM Outputting more common keys 
REM Probably all duplicates but feel free to clean it up 
echo Outputting HKCU\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 




echo Outputting HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run Keys 
>> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Run" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




Keys >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query 
"HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SharedTaskSchedule
r" /s >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon 
Keys >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /s 
>> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify" 
/s >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 







Keys >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query 
"HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad" 
/s >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost 
Keys >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost" /s 
>> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\URLSearchHooks 
Keys >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\URLSearchHooks" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Toolbar" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell Keys >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell" /s >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify" /s >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo ^Outputting HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKCR\LM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit Keys >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKCR\LM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows 
NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKCR\exefile\shell\open\command >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKCR\exefile\shell\open\command" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKCR\comfile\shell\open\command >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKCR\comfile\shell\open\command" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
echo Outputting HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 





reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist 
>> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo ******* >> %mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 





REM Export out the registry into reg text files 
echo Outputting Full Registry 
reg export HKLM %mypath%\report\Registry\hklm-%COMPUTERNAME%.reg 
reg export HKCU %mypath%\report\Registry\hkcu-%COMPUTERNAME%.reg 
reg export HKCR %mypath%\report\Registry\hkcr-%COMPUTERNAME%.reg 
reg export HKU %mypath%\report\Registry\hku-%COMPUTERNAME%.reg 
reg export HKCC %mypath%\report\Registry\hkcc-%COMPUTERNAME%.reg 
) 
 
REM Write out the BHO's 
echo Outputting BHO's 
echo 761497BB-D6F0-462C-B6EB-D4DAF1D92D43 = Java JRE >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\BHOs-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo 18DF081C-E8AD-4283-A596-FA578C2EBDC3 = Acrobat >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\BHOs-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo 5CA3D70E-1895-11CF-8E15-001234567890 = Acrobat >> 
%mypath%\report\Registry\BHOs-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser 






echo Outputting Event Logs 
REM Parse Event log Info 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"Logs\*.evt^"') DO 
%mypath%\evtparse.exe Logs\%%G >> %mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
) 
 
if %level% equ 1 echo ^<h5^> Kludge version 3.2 No Network Run - Simple 
Analysis Scan ^<^/h5^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% equ 2 echo ^<h5^> Kludge version 3.2 No Network Run - Detailed 
Analysis Scan ^<^/h5^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% equ 3 echo ^<h5^> Kludge version 3.2 No Network Run - Detailed 
Analysis Scan with Memory Capture and Process Dumps^<^/h5^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<h5^> %date% ^- %time% ^<^/h5^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<h5^> %ossystem% ^<^/h5^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 








echo ^<h4^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<p align^=center^ style^=^"font-family^:monospace^"^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %query% equ yes echo ^<a 
href^=^"%mypath%\report\SysInfo\PreviousIncidents.txt^"^> Previous 
Incidents ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html^"^> System Info ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\AV\AVLog-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> 
AV Logs ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\AV\Quarantine-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> AV Quarantined Files^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\SysInfo\USBStor-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> USB Device History ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\SysInfo\Patches-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html^"^> Hotfixes and Patches ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\NetInfo\TcpUdp-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> TCP and UDP Connctions ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> DNS Info, TTL, A Records, Hosts File ^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> IP and Network Information (arp, route, firewall, 
netbios) ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\NetInfo\NIC-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html^"^> NIC Info ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html^#Procs^"^> Running Processes ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> 
>> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html^#TList^"^> All Processes using wsock32.dll ^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 





%COMPUTERNAME%.html^"^> Startup Applications ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Procs\AutoRun-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> All Autostarting Programs ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Procs\Services-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html^"^> All Services ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%CD%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Procs\Dlls-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Loaded DLLs ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Procs\Handles-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Open Handles Output ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Acrobat, Flash, Java Versions ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> 
>> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\ProgFilesDir-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> All Files in the Program Files Dir^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\DocsSet-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> All Files in the Documents and Settings 
Dir^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\WindowsDir-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> All Files in the Windows Dir^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> 
>> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\RecycleBin-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Contents in Recyclebin^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% equ 3 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\UnSigned-
Executables-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^>  Unsigned Sys32 Executables 
^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% equ 3 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles/Ads-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Alternate Data Streams ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% equ 3 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles/Md5-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> MD5 Hashes^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
REM echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\AV\Rootkit-
%COMPUTERNAME%.csv^"^> RootKit Revealer Output^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
REM echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\AV\SophosRootkit-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Sophos Anti-Rootkit Output^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> 
>> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 




REM echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\AV\MBR-rootkit-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> GMER MBR Rootkit Detector Output^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
REM echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\AV\Userland-rootkit-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> GMER Userland Rootkit Detector Output^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\BHOs-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Exporting BHO's ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\NTUSER-
%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt^"^> NTUSER.DAT Info - RegRipper Output ^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\NTUSER-
%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt^"^> NTUSER.DAT Regslack ^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SAM-
%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt^"^> SAM Registry Info - RegRipper Output ^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SAM-
%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt^"^> SAM Regslack ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SECURITY-
%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt^"^> SECURITY Registry Info - RegRipper Output 
^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SECURITY-
%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt^"^> SECURITY Regslack ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> 
>> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SOFTWARE-
%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt^"^> SOFTWARE Registry Info - RegRipper Output 
^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SOFTWARE-
%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt^"^> SOFTWARE Regslack ^<^/a^> 
^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SYSTEM-
%COMPUTERNAME%-rr.txt^"^> SYSTEM Registry Info - RegRipper Output 
^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\SYSTEM-
%COMPUTERNAME%-regslack.txt^"^> SYSTEM Regslack ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> 
>> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a href^=^"%mypath%\report\Registry\RegKeys-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt^"^> Common Registry Keys ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo ^<a 
href^=^"%mypath%\report\TLN\%COMPUTERNAME%-Timeline.txt^"^> Timeline 




Information ^<^/a^> ^<br^/^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo "IE/FF History and Flash Cookies are located in BrowserHistory Dir" >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo "Event Logs are located in Logs directory" >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
if %level% geq 2 echo "Full Registry dumps are located in Registry directory" >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<^/p^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<^/h4^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
 
REM AV Info  
echo Copying and Outputting AV Logs 
echo ^<html^> >> %mypath%\report\AV\AVLog-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
REM Copy Logs 
xcopy "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\Symantec\Symantec Antivirus Corporate Edition\7.5\Logs\*" AV\ /s /i /h /y 
xcopy "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\Logs\*" AV\ /s /i /h /y 
xcopy "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\McAfee\VirusScan\Logs\*.Log" AV\ /s /i /h /y 
xcopy "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\McAfee\MSC\Logs\*.logs" AV\ /s /i /h /y 
xcopy "C:\ProgramData\McAfee\MSC\Logs\*" AV\ /s /i /h /y 
REM Type out logs into 1 text file 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /B /O-D ^"C:\Documents and Settings\All 
Users\Application Data\Symantec\Symantec Antivirus Corporate 
Edition\7.5\Logs\^"') DO type "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\Symantec\Symantec Antivirus Corporate Edition\7.5\Logs\%%G" >> 
%mypath%\report\AV\AVLog-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /B /O-D ^"C:\Documents and Settings\All 
Users\Application Data\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\Logs\^"') DO 
type "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Symantec\Symantec 
Endpoint Protection\Logs\%%G" >> %mypath%\report\AV\AVLog-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /B /O-D ^"C:\Documents and Settings\All 
Users\Application Data\McAfee\VirusScan\Logs\*.Log^"') DO type "C:\Documents 
and Settings\All Users\Application Data\McAfee\VirusScan\Logs\%%G" >> 
%mypath%\report\AV\AVLog-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /B /O-D ^"C:\Documents and Settings\All 
Users\Application Data\McAfee\MSC\Logs\*.logs^"') DO type "C:\Documents and 
Settings\All Users\Application Data\McAfee\MSC\Logs\%%G" >> 
%mypath%\report\AV\AVLog-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /B /O-D 




REM System Info 
echo ^<html^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<pre^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<a name^=Env^> ^<h4^>Environment Variables^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> 
>> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
REM Display environment variables via "set" 
set >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
REM Output System Information via PSInfo 
echo Outputting System Information via PSInfo 
echo ^<a name^=SystemInfo2 ^> ^<h4^> System Information via PSInfo 
^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 





REM Output System Information via wmic 
echo Outputting System Information 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\sysinfo.html computersystem 
list full /format:hform 
echo ^<a name^=SystemInfo ^> ^<h4^>System Information^<^/h4^> 
^<^/a^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 




REM Write out the PATH 
echo ^<a name^=Path^> ^<h4^>System Path Variable^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> 
>> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo %PATH% >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
REM Output the OS Info via wmic 
echo Outputting OS Info 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\osinfo.html os get /all 
/format:hform 
echo ^<a name^=OSInfo ^> ^<h4^>Operating System Information^<^/h4^> 
^<^/a^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 








REM Write out Drive Info via wmic 
echo Outputting Drive Information 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\DriveInfo.html diskdrive list full 
/format:hform 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\PartInfo.html partition list full 
/format:hform 
echo ^<a name^=DriveInfo ^> ^<h4^>Drive Information^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> 
>> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
type %mypath%\report\DriveInfo.html >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 





REM Write out the usbstor data 
echo USB Device History 
%mypath%\grep.exe USBSTOR %mypath%\report\TLN\system-regtime.txt > 
%mypath%\report\SysInfo\usbstor.txt 
%mypath%\parse.exe -f %mypath%\report\SysInfo\usbstor.txt > 
%mypath%\report\SysInfo\USBStor-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\USBStor-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




reg query "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR" /s >> 
%mypath%\report\SysInfo\USBStor-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out local accounts 
echo Outputting Local Accounts 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\users.html USERACCOUNT 
WHERE "Disabled=0 AND LocalAccount=1" GET Name /format:hform 
echo ^<a name^=Locals ^> ^<h4^>Local Users^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> >> 
%mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 




REM Write out logged on users via psloggedon 
echo Outputting Logged On Users 




echo ^<a name^=LogOn ^> ^<h4^>Users Currently Logged On^<^/h4^> 
^<^/a^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\loggedon /v EulaAccepted /t REG_DWORD 




REM Write out shares 
echo Outputting Shares 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\shares.html share list brief 
/format:hform 
echo ^<a name^=Shares ^> ^<h4^>Shares^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> >> 
%mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 




REM Write out Scheduled Tasks via schtask and at 
echo Outputting Scheduled Tasks 
echo ^<a name^=SchdTsks ^> ^<h4^> Scheduled Tasks Reported by 
SchdTasks and AT^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 





REM Write out ClipBoard Contents 
echo Outputting Clipboard Contents 




echo Outputting DOSKEY History 
echo ^<a name^=DOSHist^> ^<h4^> DOSKEY HISTORY^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> 
>> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
doskey /history >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
REM Write out all hotfixes and SPs 
echo Outputting hotfixes and service packs 
%mypath%\wmic.exe qfe list brief /format:htable > 
%mypath%\report\SysInfo\Patches-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
echo ^<^/pre^> >> %mypath%\report\SysInfo\SysInfo-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 






REM Write out Network Info  
REM Write out tcp/udp connections via tcpvcon 
echo Outputting TCP^/UDP Connections 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\TCPView /v EulaAccepted /t REG_DWORD /d 
1 /f 
%mypath%\tcpvcon.exe -an >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\TcpUdp-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\TcpUdp-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\TcpUdp-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo NETSTAT OUTPUT >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\TcpUdp-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




REM Write out DNS records via ipconfig 
echo Outputting Resolved DNS 
echo DNS OUTPUT >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\ipconfig.exe /displaydns | findstr "Name Live Host" >> 
%mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out Hosts file 
echo Outputting Hosts File 
echo HOST FILE OUTPUT >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
type c:\windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts  >> 
%mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\DNS-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out ipconfig information 
echo IP Information >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\ipconfig.exe ^/all >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\ipconfig.exe ^/displaydns >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out ARP info 




echo ARP OUTPUT >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\arp.exe -a >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out current route conf 
echo ROUTE OUTPUT >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\route.exe print >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out firewall state if enabled 
echo FIREWALL OUTPUT >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\netsh.exe firewall show state >> 
%mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\netsh.exe firewall show service >> 
%mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out Network Adapter info  
echo Outputting NIC Info 
%mypath%\wmic.exe nic get /format:htable > %mypath%\report\NetInfo\NIC-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
REM Write out any live NetBios connections 
echo Outputting NetBios connections 
echo Net Connections >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\net.exe use >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out NBTStat Info, NetBios over TCP Connections, Cache and Resolution 
echo NetBios over TCP Connections, Cache and Resolution >> 
%mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\nbtstat.exe -nrSsc >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out NetBios Session Info 
echo Outputting all session info 
echo NetBios Session Information >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\net.exe sessions >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\NetInfo\IPConfig-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
 
REM PROCS  
REM Write out all running Processes via wmic 
echo Outputting running processes 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\procs.html process list full 
/format:htable 
 
%mypath%\wmic.exe /output:%mypath%\report\proc.txt process list full 
/format:csv.xsl 
type %mypath%\report\proc.txt > %mypath%\report\procs.txt 
%mypath%\cut.exe -d "," -f 2 %mypath%\report\procs.txt > 
%mypath%\report\procscmdln.txt 
%mypath%\grep.exe "svchost" %mypath%\report\procscmdln.txt > 
%mypath%\report\svchosts.txt 
%mypath%\grep.exe -v -E "svchost -k|svchost.exe -k" 
%mypath%\report\svchosts.txt > %mypath%\report\badsvchosts.txt 
 
echo ^<a name^=Procs ^> ^<h4^>Running Processes^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
type %mypath%\report\procs.html >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<b^> %mypath%\report\Any suspicious SVCHOST Processes are listed 
below ^<^/^> %mypath%\report\>> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo. >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 





REM Write out all processes using wsock32 via tasklist 




echo Outputting WSock32 Processes 
echo ^<a name^=TList ^> ^<h4^> All processes using wsock32.dll ^<^/h4^> 
^<^/a^> >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<pre^> >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
tasklist -m wsock32.dll >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
echo ^<^/pre^> >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Processes-
%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
REM Write out startup apps via wmic 
echo Outputting Startup Apps 
%mypath%\wmic.exe startup list /format:htable > 
%mypath%\report\Procs\Startup-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
REM Write out autoruns via autorunsc 
echo Outputting AutoRuns 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\Autoruns /v EulaAccepted /t REG_DWORD 
/d 1 /f 
%mypath%\autorunsc.exe -a >> %mypath%\report\Procs\AutoRun-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out all Services via wmic 
echo Outputting Services 
%mypath%\wmic.exe service list brief /format:htable > 
%mypath%\report\Procs\Services-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
 
REM Write out all running dlls via listdlls 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
echo Outputting Dlls 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\ListDLLs /v EulaAccepted /t REG_DWORD /d 
1 /f 
%mypath%\listdlls.exe >> %mypath%\report\Procs\Dlls-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write out all handles 
echo Outputtings Open Handles 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\Handle /v EulaAccepted /t REG_DWORD /d 1 
/f 




REM Write out Browsing History 
echo Outputting IE HIstory 




echo ^<a name^=IEHist ^> ^<h4^> IE History Directory located in 
BrowserHistory folder, use IEHistoryViewer ^<^/h4^> ^<^/a^> >> 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO xcopy 
"c:\Documents and Settings\%%G\Local Settings\History\*" 
%mypath%\report\BrowserHistory\%%G-History /s /i /h /y 
 
 
REM Parse out IE Timeline 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\pasco.exe "c:\Documents and Settings\%%G\Local 
Settings\History\History.IE5\index.dat" > %mypath%\report\TLN\%%G-index.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO 
%mypath%\pasco-tln.exe -f %mypath%\report\TLN\%%G-index.txt -s 
%COMPUTERNAME -u %%G >> %mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
) 
 
REM Parse FF Timeline 
echo Outputting FF HIstory 
echo ^<a name^=FFHist ^> ^<h4^> Firefox History (places.sqlite) located in 
BrowserHistory folder, use a SQLite tool, F3E or Fox Analysis ^<^/h4^> 
^<^/a^> >> %mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.html 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO xcopy 
"c:\Documents and Settings\%%G\Application Data\Mozilla\firefox\Profiles\*" 
%mypath%\report\BrowserHistory\%%G-History /s /i /h /y 
 
REM Copy over all Flash Cookies 
echo Outputting Flash Cookies 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN ('dir /b ^"C:\Documents and Settings\*^"') DO xcopy 
"c:\Documents and Settings\%%G\Application Data\Macromedia\Flash Player\*" 




REM Write out Version and Signing info for Acrobat, Acorbat Reader, Flash, Java 
and Firefox 
echo Outputting Version Check 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\SigCheck /v EulaAccepted /t REG_DWORD 
/d 1 /f 
echo Acrobat Versions >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\sigcheck.exe -q -e -i "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 
9.0\Reader\AcroRd32.exe" >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




%mypath%\sigcheck.exe -q -e -i "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 
7.0\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\sigcheck.exe -q -e -i "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 
8.0\Acrobat\Acrobat.exe" >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 





echo Flash Version >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 





echo Java Versions >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




echo Firefox Version >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\sigcheck.exe -q -e -i "C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe" >> 
%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\SoftwareVersions-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
if %level% equ 3 sigcheck -u -e c:\windows\system32 >> 
%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\UnSigned-Executables-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
 
REM Write all files in Prog Files, Doc and Set, Windows, SAV/McAfee Quarantine 
echo Outputting Dir Listing 
dir /S /A /Q "C:\Program Files" >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\ProgFilesDir-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
dir /S /A /Q "C:\Documents and Settings">> 
%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\DocsSet-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
dir /S /A /Q "C:\Windows">> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\WindowsDir-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
dir /S /A /Q "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\Symantec\Symantec Antivirus Corporate Edition\7.5\Quarantine" >> 
%mypath%\report\AV\Quarantine-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
dir /S /A /Q "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application 
Data\Symantec\Symantec Endpoint Protection\Quarantine" >> 
%mypath%\report\AV\Quarantine-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 








REM Write out RecycleBin Contents and Parse into the Timeline Events 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
echo Outputting RecycleBin Contents 
dir /b /a /AD c:\RECYCLER > %mypath%\report\dirlist.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN (%mypath%\report\dirlist.txt) DO 
%mypath%\rifiuti.exe c:\RECYCLER\%%G\INFO2 >> 
%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\RecycleBin-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
del report/dirlist.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN (%mypath%\report\dirlist.txt) DO 
%mypath%\recbin.exe -i c:\RECYCLER\%%G\INFO2 -t >> 
%mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt 
            ) 
REM Run Sophos Rootkit scan and GMER Rootkit scan 
REM echo Rootkit Scan 
REM %mypath%\rootkitrevealer.exe -a -m -c %mypath%\report\AV\Rootkit-
%COMPUTERNAME%.csv 
REM %mypath%\sarcli.exe -proc -reg -log=%mypath%\report\AV\SophosRootkit-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
REM %mypath%\catchme.exe -q -p -r -s -d -f c:\ -l 
%mypath%\report\AV\Userland-rootkit-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 





REM Write out all Alternate Data Streams 
if %level% equ 3 (  
echo Outputting ADS 
reg ADD HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\Streams /v EulaAccepted /t REG_DWORD /d 
1 /f 
%mypath%\streams.exe -s c:\ >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\Ads-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
      
REM Write out hashes of Docs and Sets and Windows Directories 
echo Outputting MD5 Hashes 
echo MD5 Hashes >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\Md5-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
echo MD5 Hashes of Windows Directory >> %mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\Md5-
%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 
%mypath%\md5deep -r -s -l -t c:\windows >> 
%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\Md5-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




echo MD5 Hashes of Docs and Settings Directory >> 
%mypath%\report\DocsAndFiles\Md5-%COMPUTERNAME%.txt 




REM Reset the Volume Shadow Service to it's stopped state if it wasn't initially 
running 
set /p vssvar=<vss.txt 
if "%vssvar%"== "        STATE              : 1  STOPPED " ( 
sc stop vss 
) 
 
REM Get Date from 30 days ago 
******************************************************************
*************************** 
echo %date:~4% > %mypath%\report\justdate.txt 
set /p cDate=<%mypath%\report\justdate.txt 
set cDays=-30 
REM Read the Date format from the registry 
CALL :ReadDateFormat 
REM Parse the date specified 
CALL :ParseDate %cDate% 
REM Convert the parsed Gregorian date to Julian 
CALL :JDate %GYear% %GMonth% %GDay% 
REM Display original input 
ECHO Starting date   : %cDate% 
REM Add or subtract the specified number of days 
set /A NewJDate = %JDate% - %cDays:~1% 
REM Convert the new Julian date back to Gregorian again 
CALL :GDate %NewJDate% 
REM Reformat the date to local format 
CALL :ReformatDate %GDate% 
REM Display the result 





REM Parse all the last 30 days of events into a Timeline 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
%mypath%\parse.exe -f %mypath%\report\TLN\events.txt -r %LDate%-
%cDate% > %mypath%\report\TLN\%COMPUTERNAME%-Timeline.txt 
) 
 




REM Zip up Report and Dirs into 10MB files Report-<COMPUTERNAME>.zip.001 
..002 ..003, use 7Zip or WinRar to extract 
******************************************************************
*************************************** 
REM rmdir /s /q plugins 
 
if %level% equ 1 %mypath%\7za.exe a -tzip -mx7 %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.zip *MemInfo *.html *SysInfo *Procs *NetInfo *Logs 
*BrowserHistory *Registry *DocsAndFiles *AV *TLN 
 
if %level% geq 2 ( 
%mypath%\7za.exe a -tzip -mx7 -v10m %mypath%\report\Report-
%COMPUTERNAME%.zip *MemInfo *.html *SysInfo *Procs *NetInfo *Logs 
*BrowserHistory *Registry *DocsAndFiles *AV *TLN 
) 
 
if %gpgenabled% equ yes ( 
%mypath%\gpg.exe --import %mypath%\report\pubkey.txt 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN (%mypath%\report\analysis\uid.txt) DO 
%mypath%\gpg.exe --always-trust --multifile --encrypt --recipient "%%G" 
%mypath%\report\Report-%COMPUTERNAME%.* 
FOR /F "tokens=*" %%G IN (%mypath%\report\analysis\uid.txt) DO 




move %mypath%\report\*.gpg %mypath%\report\gnupg\ 
) 
 
REM Write a file called done.txt so the Analyst's side knows the script is finished 
ping 127.0.0.1 -n 20 -w 1 >NUL 
echo %date% - %time% > %mypath%\report\done.txt 







REM::                                     :: 
REM::     -     Date Subroutines      -   :: 








REM Convert Julian date back to "normal" Gregorian date 
set /A P      = %1 + 68569 
set /A Q      = 4 * %P% / 146097 
set /A R      = %P% - ( 146097 * %Q% +3 ) / 4 
set /A S      = 4000 * ( %R% + 1 ) / 1461001 
set /A T      = %R% - 1461 * %S% / 4 + 31 
set /A U      = 80 * %T% / 2447 
set /A V      = %U% / 11 
set /A GYear  = 100 * ( %Q% - 49 ) + %S% + %V% 
set /A GMonth = %U% + 2 - 12 * %V% 
set /A GDay   = %T% - 2447 * %U% / 80 
REM Clean up the mess 
FOR %%A IN (P Q R S T U V) DO set %%A= 
REM Add leading zeroes 
IF 1%GMonth% LSS 20 set GMonth=0%GMonth% 
IF 1%GDay%   LSS 20 set GDay=0%GDay% 
REM Return value 




REM Convert date to Julian 
REM First strip leading zeroes 
set MM=%2 
set DD=%3 
IF %MM:~0,1% EQU 0 set MM=%MM:~1% 
IF %DD:~0,1% EQU 0 set DD=%DD:~1% 
set /A Month1 = ( %MM% - 14 ) / 12 
set /A Year1  = %1 + 4800 
set /A JDate  = 1461 * ( %Year1% + %Month1% ) / 4 + 367 * ( %MM% - 2 -12 * 
%Month1% ) / 12 - ( 3 * ( ( %Year1% + %Month1% + 100 ) / 100 ) ) / 4 + 
%DD% - 32075 





REM Parse (Gregorian) date depending on registry's date format settings 
IF %iDate%==0 FOR /F "TOKENS=1-3 DELIMS=%sDate%" %%A IN ('ECHO.%1') 
DO ( 
 set GYear=%%C 
 set GMonth=%%A 
 set GDay=%%B 
) 




IF %iDate%==1 FOR /F "TOKENS=1-3 DELIMS=%sDate%" %%A IN ('ECHO.%1') 
DO ( 
 set GYear=%%C 
 set GMonth=%%B 
 set GDay=%%A 
) 
IF %iDate%==2 FOR /F "TOKENS=1-3 DELIMS=%sDate%" %%A IN ('ECHO.%1') 
DO ( 
 set GYear=%%A 
 set GMonth=%%B 
 set GDay=%%C 
) 
IF %GDay%   GTR 31 set Error=1 









REM Reformat the date back to the local format 











We performed the following modifications: 
 
 In line 179 (“tools\robocopy.exe %WINDIR%\Prefetch %c_drive%:\Data-
%case%\%computername%-%timestamp%\preserved-prefetch-files\Prefetch\ 
/ZB /copy:DTSOU /r:4 /w:1 /ts /FP /np /log:%c_drive%:\Data-
%case%\%computername%-%timestamp%\preserved-prefetch-files\pretch-
robocopy-log.txt)”) the tool was missing a robocopy copy parameter and it had an 
unneeded parentheses in the end of the command . The correct command would 
be “tools\robocopy.exe %WINDIR%\Prefetch %c_drive%:\Data-
%case%\%computername%-%timestamp%\preserved-prefetch-files\Prefetch\ 
/ZB /copy:DATSOU /r:4 /w:1 /ts /FP /np /log:%c_drive%:\Data-





robocopy-log.txt”. We modified the line in question. 
 In line 271 the command should be “tools\pv.exe -e >> 
%vol_outpath%\ProcessInfo_2_process-to-exe-mapping.txt” and not 
“tools\pvc.exe -e >> %vol_outpath%\ProcessInfo_2_process-to-exe-
mapping.txt”. We modified the command accordingly. 
 in lines 273-281 the Currprocess tool runs as CProcess.exe (when downloaded) not 
currprocess.exe. We replaced all occurrences of currprocess.exe with cprocess.exe. 
 In windows 7 64bit the tool could not find the path of the “tools” folder, thus we 













The following .bat script excerpt will disable Prefetch prior to running any triage 
tool. The excerpt can be ported, as is, in the TR3Secure triage tool. In other triage 
tools, the excerpt needs to be adjusted accordingly. 






:: querying the original prefetcher value 
echo executing Reg query "%RegKey%" /v "%RegItem%" to capture original 
prefetcher value 
For /F "Tokens=2*" %%a in ('Reg query "%RegKey%" /v "%RegItem%"') Do 
set original_prefetch_value=%%b   
::on first run disable prefetch through registry to avoid executed tools being 
stored in prefetch and modifying the hard disk 
echo %DATE% %TIME% - Executing reg add 
"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters" /v EnablePrefetcher /t 
REG_DWORD /d 0 /f  to disable prefetch for computer %COMPUTERNAME% 
>> Collection.log 
reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters" /v EnablePrefetcher /t 
REG_DWORD /d 0 /f 
 
:: triage tool is run at this point 
 
::on exit re-enable prefetch through registry to return system to original 
prefetch state 
echo %DATE% %TIME% - Executing reg add 
"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters" /v EnablePrefetcher /t 
REG_DWORD /d %original_prefetch_value% /f  to re-enable prefetch for 
computer %COMPUTERNAME% >> Collection.log  
reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session 
Manager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters" /v EnablePrefetcher /t 
REG_DWORD /d %original_prefetch_value% /f 
 
















Glossary of terms 











“Apache Killer” is a severe vulnerability (discovered in August 2011) affecting the 
widely used Apache web server. This vulnerability allowed an attacker to send a 
request for a URL to an Apache server, in a large number of overlapping “byte 
ranges” or chunks, causing the server in a denial-of-service condition. 
Blackenergy Bot 
BlackEnergy is an HTTP-based botnet used primarily for DDoS attacks. The bot 
that runs on Windows platforms and communicates with the C&C Server to get its 
commands though encrypted http packets. 
BoNeSi 
Is a Tool to simulate Botnet Traffic. It runs in Linux systems and it generates 
ICMP, UDP and TCP (HTTP) flooding attacks from a defined botnet size (different IP 
addresses). It is highly configurable, as values such as rates, data volume, source 
IP addresses, URLs and other parameters can be easily configured through the 
command line. BoNeSi is the first tool to simulate HTTP-GET floods from large-
scale bot networks and also tries to avoid generating packets with easy identifiable 
patterns.  
Botnet 
A botnet is a collection of compromised computers often referred to as “zombies” 
infected with malware that allows an attacker to control them.  
Botmaster 
A botmaster is a person who operates the command and control center(s) of 
botnets for remote process execution.  
Booster Script 
Booster scripts are add-on scripts for the High Orbit Ion Cannon (HOIC) that allow 
users to implement some anti-DDoS randomization counter measures as well as 
increase the magnitude of an attack.  
DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) Attack 
DDoS or Distributed Denial-of-Service attack is a variant of Denial-of-Service DoS 
attacks where an attacker or a group of attackers use multiple machines to carry 




out a DoS attack simultaneously. This way the effectiveness and strength of a DoS 
attack is amplified.  
DDoS attacks can be divided to: 
• Attacks targeting Network Resources: UDP Floods, ICMP Floods, IGMP 
Floods. 
• Attacks targeting Server Resources: the TCP/IP weaknesses –TCP SYN 
Floods, TCP RST attacks, TCP PSH+ACK attacks. 
• Attacks targeting the Application Resources: HTTP Floods, DNS Floods and 
other Low and Slow attacks as Slow HTTP GET requests (Slowloris) and Slow HTTP 
POST requests (R-U-Dead-Yet). 
Exploit 
An exploit is an implementation of a vulnerability meant to allow a malicious user 
to actually compromise a target.  Zero-day exploits are traded on both the black 
market and through legitimate middlemen between $5,000 to $250,000 depending 
on the effects of the exploit and the system they target.  
Flood 
“Flood” is the generic term for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack in which the 
attacker attempts to constantly send traffic (often high volume of traffic) to a 
target server in an attempt to prevent legitimate users from accessing it by 
consuming its resources. Types of floods include (but are not limited to): HTTP 
floods, ICMP floods, SYN floods, and UDP floods. 
hping 
Hping is a free TCP/IP packet generator and analyzer that is similar to the ping 
utility but with more functionality than the sending of a simple ICMP echo request. 
Hping can be used to send large volumes of TCP traffic at a target while spoofing 
the source IP address, making it appear random or even originating from a specific 
user-defined source. 
HOIC (High Orbit Ion Cannon) 
“High Orbit Ion Cannon” is a network stress testing tool related to LOIC. Unlike its 
“low-orbiting” cousin, HOIC is able to cause DoS through the use of HTTP floods. 
Additionally, HOIC has a built-in scripting system that accepts .hoic files called 
“boosters”, allowing a user to implement some anti-DDoS randomization counter 
measures as well as increase the magnitude of his or her attack. 




Ingress Filtering (InFilter) 
Is the technique through which ISPs check the validity of incoming network 
packets’ SRC IPs making sure the IPs are not spoofed, before the packets enter 
the network and possibly affect it. 
IP spoofing 
IP spoofing is the act of creating an IP packet with a forged source IP address for 
the purpose of hiding the true source IP address.  
Low rate attack 
These attacks often aim at leaving connections open on the target by creating a 
relatively low number of connections over a period of time and leaving those 
sessions open for as long as possible.  
LOIC (Low Orbit Ion Cannon) 
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) was originally developed to allow developers subject 
their servers to heavy network traffic loads for diagnostic purposes, but it is used 
as flooding tool as it generates a massive amount of network traffic. On its own, 
one computer running LOIC cannot generate enough TCP, UDP, or HTTP requests 
at once to overwhelm the average web server. It takes thousands of computers all 
targeting a single server to have any real impact. 
Mobile LOIC 
Mobile LOIC is the online web version of LOIC. It is a Javascript-based HTTP DoS 
tool that is delivered within an HTML page, has very few options and is limited to 
conducting HTTP floods.  
Pyloris 
Pyloris is a slow HTTP DoS tool which enables the attacker to craft its own HTTP 
request headers. These include the packet header, cookies, packet size, timeout 
and CRLF option. Pyloris objective is to keep TCP connections open for as long as 
possible between the attacker and the victims servers. This results in exhausting 
the server's connection table resources.  
Tshark 
Is a network protocol analyzer like Wireshark but without graphical interface. It 
lets a user capture packet data from a live network, or read packets from a 
previously saved capture file, either printing a decoded form of those packets to 
the standard output or writing the packets to a file. TShark's native capture file 




format is libpcap format, which is also the format used by tcpdump and various 
other tools. 
Wireshark 
Wireshark is a free cross-platform open-source network traffic capture and 
analysis utility. It began as a project called “Ethereal” in the late 1990s, but its 
name was changed to “Wireshark” in 2006 due to trademark issues. The program 
is GUI-based and uses pcap to capture packets, although there is also a command-
line version of Wireshark called TShark with the same functionality. Packets can be 
either captured directly with Wireshark, or captured with a separate utility and 
later viewed within Wireshark. As a powerful (and free) network analysis tool, 
Wireshark has become an industry standard utility for network traffic analysis. 
Zombie 
A “zombie” or “bot” is a compromised computer under the control of an attacker 
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